Policy Paper
Ameer Makhoul – Progress Center for Policies
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Introduction
Israel’s approach toward the Eastern Mediterranean and its surrounding regional environment has undergone notable transformations in recent years. These shifts reflect a move away from a narrow security-centric focus toward the construction of a regional alliance network with long-term military, economic, and geopolitical dimensions. This trend is evident in a series of parallel initiatives, including efforts to secure recognition for “Somaliland” and establish a major military base on the Red Sea opposite Yemen, engagement in U.S.-brokered understandings with the Syrian regime, and the deepening of a strategic military alliance with Greece and Cyprus.
These moves are unfolding in the context of a multi-front war in which Israel deployed substantial military capabilities, amid a near-total political impasse confronting its government. During and after the war, Tel Aviv sought to translate military superiority into new security arrangements in Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza Strip—arrangements designed to extend beyond the war itself and to institutionalize new regional realities.
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First: From Prolonged War to Regionalizing “Achievements”
As Israel transitions beyond the current phase of the Gaza war termination framework, it is increasingly evident that its objectives are not limited to consolidating localized security arrangements. Rather, Israel is attempting to exploit what it frames as “military achievements” to advance broader regional projects that bypass the political conditionality of normalization—chiefly the requirement of establishing a Palestinian state.
In this context, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu viewed the Trump administration’s inclusion of Turkey and Qatar in the executive framework of the so-called “Peace Council” as a deliberate American breach of Israel’s red lines. Netanyahu translated this stance into an open challenge to the move, and the Israeli security cabinet (the Knesset’s ministerial cabinet) formally rejected any role for Turkey or Qatar in Gaza. Israel justified this rejection by arguing that such involvement would create an environment enabling Hamas to rebuild its capabilities and reproduce what it terms the “October 7 threat.”
By contrast, the Trump administration views Turkey as a major regional power and a NATO member, and—alongside Egypt—an indispensable actor in formulating practical mechanisms for disarmament and preventing the reuse of weapons in Gaza, potentially without resorting to direct military force or confrontation.
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Second: Disarmament Between Rhetoric and Reality
Israeli threats to resume war if armed factions in Gaza are not disarmed appear to carry limited practical weight. At their core, these threats serve domestic electoral purposes, shaping Netanyahu’s and his coalition partners’ public image rather than signaling actionable policy. Empirical experience demonstrates that attempts to impose disarmament through military force failed over two years of intense warfare, including large-scale operations branded as “Gideon’s Chariots 2.”
This reality raises a fundamental question: is Netanyahu genuinely committed to disarming Hamas, or does the persistence of the status quo serve his government’s interest by enabling the continued management of a permanently escalatory security environment in Gaza—similar to Israel’s approach in Lebanon under the banner of disarmament, but without a political horizon or final settlement?
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Third: Israeli–Turkish Competition in the Eastern Mediterranean
Although Israel and Turkey are not formal adversaries, the collapse of the Assad regime has reignited tensions between them over Syria’s future and the struggle for influence—whether Syria remains a unified state or evolves into a fragmented entity.
Israel views the Eastern Mediterranean as a strategic theater encompassing vital maritime routes and offshore gas fields. Israeli national security think tanks have argued that Turkey moved swiftly to entrench its influence in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi, granting it access to high-quality oil resources. These centers also note that Turkey’s control over northern Cyprus and its influence in northwestern Syria have significantly expanded Ankara’s footprint in the Eastern Mediterranean. In parallel, Israel’s outreach toward “Somaliland” has strengthened its presence in the Red Sea.
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Fourth: The Israeli–Greek–Cypriot Alliance
According to a report published by Maariv on 18 January 2026, citing investigations by Turkey’s GZT channel, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus are seeking to elevate their military alliance to an advanced level. This would rely on Israel’s technological military superiority and include the establishment of a joint rapid-deployment force in southern Cyprus, numbering approximately 2,500 troops—around 1,000 Israeli and 1,000 Greek soldiers.
The report states that the force, revealed in late 2025, has begun training to counter drones, protect Eastern Mediterranean gas reserves, and secure strategic maritime corridors known as “energy corridors.” These routes would pass through Cyprus to transport gas to Europe while bypassing Turkey’s extensive Mediterranean coastline—an explicit effort to exclude Ankara from regional trade and energy projects.
What particularly concerns Turkey, according to these sources, is Israel’s technological edge and the potential deployment of the Israeli “Barak MX” air-defense system in Cyprus. Even in the absence of open conflict, such a deployment would enable close surveillance of Turkey and the collection of sensitive intelligence. There is a prevailing belief that the ultimate objective is to construct a “regional Iron Dome” by integrating Israel’s Iron Dome system with Greece’s planned “Achilles Shield” air-defense network, thereby securing joint aerial superiority across the region.
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Fifth: Gaza as a Functional Tool in Regional Competition
Israel’s rejection of Turkish participation in Gaza’s executive framework rests on two main assumptions. First, Israel believes Ankara would not abandon Hamas or dismantle its political and security infrastructure. Second, Israel fears that any Turkish military presence in Gaza could become a launchpad for competition over Palestinian gas fields in the maritime zone off the Strip.
Beyond these considerations, the rejection also serves a functional purpose. Netanyahu uses the Turkish file as a tool to obstruct the transition to the second phase of understandings—even while formally endorsing them—by keeping the disarmament issue unresolved. This occurs amid catastrophic living conditions in Gaza, including the spread of disease, rising premature birth rates, severe malnutrition among pregnant women and infants, the near-total collapse of the healthcare system, the breakdown of education, and a growing population of untreated physical disabilities.
Delaying the implementation of the second phase, keeping the Rafah crossing closed in both directions, and obstructing reconstruction collectively constitute a pattern of “slow, silent annihilation,” pushing residents toward migration as the only perceived path to survival. Elements within Israel’s governing coalition have openly promoted this outcome under banners of mass expulsion, settlement expansion, and full control over the Eastern Mediterranean via Gaza.
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Sixth: Trade-Offs Between Fronts and Their Limits
Multiple Israeli assessments suggest that Tel Aviv’s approach to U.S. proposals has been guided by a strategy of trade-offs—offering limited concessions in Gaza in exchange for reinforcing Israeli policies in the West Bank. In the Turkish case, Israeli voices urged the Trump administration to condition any Turkish role in Gaza on Turkish concessions favoring Israel in Syria. These efforts, however, encountered firm American red lines, as Washington asserted its own priorities.
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Conclusions
• Israel is attempting to leverage what it considers regional military successes to entrench long-term alliances in the Horn of Africa and “Somaliland,” and in the Eastern Mediterranean through a military alliance with Greece and Cyprus. This strategy carries military and economic dimensions aimed at dominating the Red Sea as a global trade and military corridor, as well as energy routes via Cyprus, within the broader India–Middle East–Europe land-sea corridor project. From the Israeli perspective, neutralizing Egypt and Turkey—the two largest regional powers—is a prerequisite for success.
• The alliance with Greece and Cyprus serves as a cornerstone for controlling Eastern Mediterranean gas fields, including Palestinian fields off Gaza’s coast. It reflects the ambitions of Israel’s ruling current to position Israel as a regional hub for energy and international trade, parallel to Gulf states and backed by military alliances.
• Despite Israeli intentions, Greece and Cyprus do not appear willing to enter a military confrontation with Turkey, given the high strategic costs involved and the fact that most Arab and Eastern Mediterranean states prioritize stability and cooperation over confrontation.
• Israel’s functional handling of the Turkish role in Gaza, and the logic of inter-front trade-offs, appear to have reached their limits in light of a U.S. position determined to impose its own priorities irrespective of Netanyahu’s calculations—making the exclusion of Turkey from Gaza unlikely to succeed.
• A regional coordination framework involving Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey would significantly undercut Israeli plans, while Egypt’s good-neighborly relations with Greece and Cyprus constitute an additional restraining factor preventing the Israeli–Greek–Cypriot alliance from becoming a genuine threat to regional stability.
