Dr. Mohamad Kawas – Progress Center for Policies
Situation Assessment
Introduction
Despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to “suspend” strikes that were reportedly in preparation against Iran, the likelihood of war remains elevated—particularly a conflict prepared with the objective of toppling the regime. While Tehran publicly signals that it is better prepared for such a confrontation than it was during the June 2025 war, researchers are closely examining the potential role of “Axis of Resistance” factions and the prospects of their involvement in defending the existential survival of the Iranian regime.
Key Developments
• On 15 January 2026, CNN reported—citing European and Iraqi sources—that approximately 5,000 fighters from Iraqi militias crossed into Iran via two border crossings in southern Iraq to assist Tehran in suppressing protests. The sources added that successive waves of Shiite fighters crossed under the cover of religious pilgrimage.
• Iranian opposition media reported that these fighters are operating in several sensitive areas, and that Iran-aligned Iraqi militias have begun recruiting and deploying fighters to support Iranian forces in repressing protests. According to one report, the fighters belong to Iraqi Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada.
• On 14 January 2026, a well-informed Lebanese source told Reuters that diplomats sought assurances from Hezbollah that it would refrain from military action should the United States or Israel launch an attack on Iran.
• The source added that Hezbollah did not provide explicit guarantees, but indicated it would not undertake military action unless an attack on Iran were deemed “existential” by the Iranian leadership.
• On 13 January 2026, Hezbollah issued a statement asserting that Iran is a sovereign and independent state facing a globally orchestrated aggression sponsored by the United States.
• The party declared its full support for the choice of the Iranian people and their leadership, stressing that the Islamic Republic would remain steadfast, strong, and independent. The statement did not reference any potential military support.
• By contrast, Iraqi Hezbollah threatened on the same day to strike U.S. interests should Washington attack Iran.
• Experts on Iranian affairs note that Tehran’s “axis” previously included Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza, as well as the Assad regime in Syria, and continues to include Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi militias (Kata’ib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and the Popular Mobilisation Forces), the Houthis in Yemen, and other Iran-aligned groups such as the Zaynabiyoun Brigade in Pakistan and the Fatemiyoun Division in Afghanistan.
• These experts add that Iran has long viewed the “axis”—which it supports financially, militarily, and ideologically—as its primary instrument for confronting existential threats, based on the doctrine of “unity of fronts” in defense of the Iranian revolutionary system.
• Lebanese political sources argue that the heavy blows sustained by Hezbollah in 2024–2025 make its intervention weak and potentially suicidal, given Israel’s continued control of the initiative and its ongoing strikes against the group despite a ceasefire agreement concluded in November 2024.
• Iraqi sources confirm the accuracy of reports about Iraqi fighters crossing into Iran, but believe such intervention will remain limited and will not alter the balance of power in Tehran’s favor, due to the absence of a supportive Iraqi governmental and political environment, and because Iraq itself could face U.S.-Israeli retaliation.
• Military experts highlight the Houthis’ demonstrated ability to disrupt maritime navigation and attack U.S. and Israeli vessels. However, geographical distance renders direct intervention inside Iran difficult. Moreover, Houthi fire remains largely harassing rather than deterrent in nature and can be militarily contained.
• Military observers do not rule out the involvement of Shiite militias from Pakistan (Zaynabiyoun) and Afghanistan (Fatemiyoun), but such participation would remain difficult due to its clandestine nature and the need to evade authorities in Islamabad and Kabul.
• Research institutions caution against assessing “axis” militia involvement through a purely tactical lens, arguing instead for a strategic reading tied to the existential fate of these militias should the Iranian regime fall.
• These institutions note that the survival instinct of political Shiism in the region—existentially linked to the Islamic Republic—could push Iran and its allies, if conditions for an existential war become clear, toward nihilistic options that might include detonating the entire region.
• They further argue that a strategy of total containment could drive Iran-aligned Shiite political forces into entrenchment and resistance in the absence of exit options or viable alternatives.
• Diplomatic sources believe that regional states’ reluctance to support an existential war against Iran reflects concerns about the chaos that could engulf the region if the reaction of “axis” militias is not properly anticipated, contained, and integrated into any alternative scenario.
Conclusion
• Information suggests that hundreds—possibly thousands—of fighters from Iran-aligned Iraqi militias have crossed into Iran to support Iranian forces in suppressing protests.
• It is unlikely that Iraqi factional intervention will shift the balance of power in Iran’s favor, due to the absence of a supportive Iraqi state environment and fears of U.S.-Israeli retaliation that could threaten the political order in Baghdad and the ruling Shiite forces.
• Despite Hezbollah’s condemnation of what it describes as a “conspiracy” behind the protests against the Islamic Republic, the group has neither pledged nor ruled out military involvement in a war to defend Tehran should the conflict threaten the regime’s survival.
• Reports do not rule out Houthi involvement in Yemen, given their demonstrated capacity to disrupt international shipping and attack U.S. and Israeli vessels and targets inside Israel, but such involvement would remain largely harassing, deterrable, and containable.
• Sources consider the involvement of Shiite militias from Pakistan (Zaynabiyoun) and Afghanistan (Fatemiyoun) likely, though limited, due to the clandestine nature of their movement and the capacity of authorities in Islamabad and Kabul to counter it.
• Analysts warn against failing to read “axis” militia involvement through a strategic, existential lens tied to their survival in the event of regime collapse in Iran.
• It is believed that the survival instinct of political Shiism in the region—existentially bound to the Islamic Republic—could push Iran and its allies, should an existential war loom, toward nihilistic choices, potentially igniting the entire region.
• A strategy of total containment may drive Iran-aligned Shiite political forces into deeper entrenchment and resistance in the absence of exit channels or alternative options.
• Regional states’ caution toward a war on Iran is thought to reflect fears of regional chaos stemming from inadequate planning to contain and manage the reaction of “axis” militias within any post-conflict scenario.
