Dr. Mohamad Qawas, Progress Center for Policies
Policy Assessment
Introduction:
Reports are multiplying regarding field preparations for the deployment of Russian monitoring forces along the Syria–Israel border. This development reflects new outcomes of recent understandings reached between the Russian and Syrian presidents in Moscow. What are the positions of Israel and Turkey, and how will this new military cooperation between Moscow and Damascus align with Washington’s supportive posture toward the new Syrian government—including the full lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria?
Facts on the Ground:
On 24 November 2025, Israeli media outlets reported that Israeli security assessments indicate Moscow is preparing to raise the issue of redeploying its military forces in southern Syria during upcoming talks with Israel. On 15 November 2025, a phone call took place between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in which they discussed “issues and files in the Middle East.”
The proposal for deploying Russian forces includes transferring new military equipment to Damascus, compensating for the destruction caused by Israeli strikes on Syria’s arsenal after the Assad regime’s collapse in December 2024.
A Syrian observer source reported that Moscow has, over recent months, submitted a proposal to Damascus calling for the return of Russian patrols to the border region to serve as a buffer force between Syrian and Israeli forces. According to the source, the Syrian government has not yet approved the Russian request, and the proposal remains under discussion.
Other Syrian sources noted that the potential reintroduction of Russian presence in southern Syria could become part of any future security understanding between Damascus and Tel Aviv, based on the intensification of political contacts between Russian and Israeli leaders. Moscow relies on a previous experience—one that Israel did not oppose—when Russian forces spread across eight military points in the “disengagement zone” along the border between the occupied Syrian Golan and Quneitra Province, in order to cool that front during the internal conflict between the opposition and the Assad regime. That deployment aimed to keep Iranian-aligned groups away from the area.
On 17 November 2025, news circulated about a field tour conducted by a joint Russian–Syrian military delegation in southern Syria, covering several points and military sites. The visit aimed to assess the field reality as part of the existing cooperation between the two sides, according to the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA).
On 20 November 2025, Syrian Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra met with a high-level Russian delegation headed by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov to discuss “areas of military cooperation and strengthening coordination mechanisms in ways that serve mutual interests, along with practical steps for implementing promising bilateral cooperation.”
It is believed that understandings stemming from the meeting between Syrian President Ahmad al-Shar’a and President Putin in Moscow on 15 October 2025 have begun to materialize in the form of renewed cooperation and coordination between Moscow and Damascus, revealing Russia’s return to security roles in southern Syria similar to those it played under the previous regime.
Observers say the Russian effort aligns with an Israeli desire for Russia to play an advanced role in Syria—one that balances and limits Turkish influence and prevents it from becoming militarily impactful in ways that threaten Israel’s security. Analysts believe the potential Russian deployment does not contradict U.S. support for Syria and may even take place under full U.S.–Russian military coordination. The transfer of Russian weapons to Damascus is also occurring under an American framework that considers Israel’s security concerns.
Russian sources argue that Moscow itself proposed this role in order to improve relations with the new Syrian government, secure a suitable role inside the Syrian landscape without provoking the United States or Europe, and meet Damascus’s security needs as it pursues understandings with Israel under Washington’s sponsorship.
Syrian military observers stress that any Russian deployment would be symbolic and limited—no more than a few dozen military police serving purely as monitors to secure the border with Israel, not as a restoration of previous Russian influence.
Syrian sources believe Damascus has an interest in relying on Russian monitors to deprive Israel of pretexts for continuing its attacks on Syria, thereby strengthening Syria’s demand to return to the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.
Russian observers note that through its relations with Israel—and through the personal connection between Netanyahu and Putin—Moscow seeks to reinforce its presence in Syria, whether through the Hmeimim and Tartus bases, an internal mediating role between Damascus and local communities (the coast, northeastern Syria, Suwayda), or a geostrategic role between Syria and Israel that restores Russia as a player alongside other regional and international actors.
Observers also point out that Russian monitors would operate “in service” of U.S.–Israeli understandings, reminiscent of the role Russia played “in service” of the Obama administration when it removed the old regime’s chemical weapons arsenal, averting U.S. strikes planned after the 2013 Ghouta incident.
Conclusion:
Diplomatic channels are working to arrange a redeployment of Russian monitors at positions in southern Syria to maintain calm along the Syrian–Israeli border. Preparations are underway between Damascus and Moscow following the understandings reached during the summit between Presidents al-Shar’a and Putin in Moscow in October 2025.
A phone call between Netanyahu and Putin is believed to have established the framework for a Russian role acceptable to Israel, based on past experience in border points in Quneitra, Daraa, and elsewhere.
The Russian–Syrian understandings include the arrival of new Russian military capabilities to Syria, compensating for losses inflicted by Israeli strikes on the Syrian arsenal after the fall of the previous regime.
Israel is thought to welcome a strengthened Russian role in Syria as a counterbalance to Turkish influence and as a means of ensuring that such influence does not threaten Israel’s security. The deployment of Russian monitoring forces, as well as Moscow’s provision of weapons to Damascus, appears to be taking place under the framework of U.S. understandings with Damascus and within the scope of U.S.–Russian military coordination in contested zones.
Russia’s deployment in southern Syria aims to make its presence a Syrian security necessity, reinforcing its influence and relevance after the collapse of the previous regime. The Russian monitoring forces would serve as an operational tool supporting any future Russian–Syrian agreement sponsored by Washington.
