Reading and analysis by Ameer Makhoul, Progress Center for Policies
Whether Israel maintains its intransigence in preventing the delegation of Arab foreign ministers — headed by Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan — from visiting Ramallah, or whether it eventually backs down under pressure, the Israeli refusal is a clear indication of the strength of the Arab, including Palestinian and international, mobilization. It reflects a shifting regional reality and signals a decline in Israel’s influence regionally, internationally, and even with the United States.
Israel’s political and overt ban on the entry of the foreign ministers from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, and Oman into Ramallah to meet with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas constitutes a fundamental challenge to both Arab and international will. It is part of the broader struggle led by Netanyahu and his government to halt the growing momentum for international recognition of a Palestinian state and to obstruct the upcoming Palestinian-Arab-international conference in New York, co-chaired by Saudi Arabia and France, aimed at advancing Palestinian statehood.
The ban clearly signals Israel’s intent to suppress any expression of Palestinian sovereignty and to block Palestine’s return to the forefront of Arab and international agendas. Israel’s strategic narrative has long rested on portraying the Arab-Israeli conflict as obsolete, framing the Palestinian issue as an obstacle to the Abraham Accords, and claiming that Palestine has dropped off the list of Arab priorities. This is in line with a joint Israeli-American effort to establish a regional economic-security alliance centered on Israel and aimed at confronting Iran.
Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz announced that any recognition of a Palestinian state would be met with concrete action on the ground: more land annexation and settlement expansion — in other words, the dismantling of any future Palestinian state’s viability. His statement underscores that Israel’s response will not be confined to diplomacy but will be enacted physically, in order to render international efforts futile.
The Israeli government views the current trajectory of U.S.-Saudi relations as bypassing Israel’s priorities and threatening its strategic position both regionally and globally. The Trump administration’s reliance on Saudi Arabia and recognition of its global weight has diminished Israel’s previously central role. Israel also fears the new regional alignments shaped by the Trump administration in handling key regional files, including Syria and Iran — especially as Israel’s priority of escalating military confrontation with Iran clashes with the Arab world’s stance, which seeks to prevent war and is closer to the U.S. position, potentially acting as a restraining force.
The Israeli government knows that its decision to prevent the ministerial delegation from visiting Ramallah may backfire. However, it serves Netanyahu’s internal political agenda, particularly in shoring up support among the far-right bloc as elections approach (if they are held). Foreign policy decisions are subordinated to the electoral needs of the right. Netanyahu’s government is also aware that the ban will not significantly disrupt preparations for the New York international conference advocating for a Palestinian state. It will not deter the growing international — especially European — support for Palestinian statehood. The move is unlikely to please the Trump administration either. Moreover, the ban will not weaken the Palestinian Authority, whose very existence is already under existential threat from Israel. Netanyahu’s government might hope that this ban will pressure Saudi Arabia and the Arab countries into accepting Israeli-imposed political conditions in order to visit Ramallah.
According to Israel’s ruling logic, the intensifying military occupation in the West Bank since the beginning of the war on Gaza is part and parcel of that same war. Israel officially declared in September 2024 that the West Bank is a warfront. Netanyahu’s government has rejected any post-war scenarios that envision the Palestinian Authority playing a role in administering Gaza. This stance stems from a refusal to allow any political or structural link between the West Bank and Gaza — thereby avoiding the formation of any meaningful Palestinian political entity, let alone a state. Netanyahu expressed this early in the war by saying he wanted “neither Hamastan nor Fatahstan.”
At the same time, the Israeli government is trying to link the West Bank and Gaza in a different context — that of a right-wing bargaining strategy: for every withdrawal or concession in Gaza, there will be corresponding expansion of settlements and annexation in the West Bank. This strategy helps solidify the ruling coalition between Likud and the Religious Zionist parties.
Strategically, Netanyahu’s government fears any bolstering of the Palestinian Authority’s influence, as the PA’s vision is based on the establishment of a Palestinian state within the June 4, 1967 borders — a position diametrically opposed to Israel’s ruling strategy of preventing the establishment of such a state under any circumstances.
In summary:
Israel may eventually reverse its decision to block the Arab ministerial delegation from visiting Ramallah due to international pressure. However, it may prioritize domestic right-wing politics to preserve the cohesion of the ruling coalition and frame opposition to Palestinian statehood as a central issue in the upcoming elections (if held), allowing Netanyahu to portray himself as the sole bulwark against such efforts.
Israel’s ban starkly underscores the total blockage of any political horizon due to the deliberate exclusion of a viable political solution. Conversely, it strengthens international voices calling for the imposition of a two-state solution, based on the recognition that it cannot come from Israel and cannot be achieved unilaterally by the Palestinians.
Expectations for the New York international conference on establishing a Palestinian state are high — necessitating continued reinforcement of a unified Arab official stance, especially in light of profound shifts in international positions regarding Israel and Palestine.
