Why Is Damascus Resorting to Military Action Against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)?

Dr. Mohamad Kawas – Progress Center for Policies

Situation Assessment

Introduction
Recent military operations in several neighborhoods of Aleppo—and subsequent preparations for a wider offensive east of the city—suggest that a combination of local, regional, and international conditions now enables Damascus to act militarily against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This development raises legitimate questions about the scope of these operations, their strategic objectives, and Washington’s position amid shifting dynamics.

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Facts and Developments
• 14 January 2026: Media reports indicated clashes between the Syrian Army and the SDF in Deir Hafer, east of Aleppo. Damascus accused the SDF of massing forces near Maskanah. The SDF detonated the Umm Tina bridge—the only access route—to preempt a possible Syrian assault.
• 13 January: Damascus declared Deir Hafer and Maskanah “closed military zones,” demanded SDF withdrawal east of the Euphrates, and carried out drone strikes around Tishrin Dam and Deir Hafer. The SDF denied any troop mobilization, calling the escalation unjustified.
• Turkey, on the same day, expressed support for the Syrian operation, labeling the SDF as “terrorist” and warning it against escalation. Turkish drones also struck SDF positions near Raqqa. Syrian sources claim that senior SDF commander Sipan Hemo may have been involved in an attempted drone assassination targeting Syrian ministers in Aleppo.
• According to The National, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reportedly instructed SDF commander Mazloum Abdi to surrender Aleppo neighborhoods to the Syrian Army and avoid resistance, in connection with preparations for the Syrian–Israeli negotiation track scheduled in Paris on 5 January 2025 under U.S. sponsorship.
• A U.S. source said President Donald Trump is prepared to scale down U.S. support for the SDF if Damascus and Ankara show willingness to cooperate against terrorism and in the context of U.S.-led Syrian–Israeli diplomacy.
• The SDF recognizes that without a U.S. security umbrella, defending isolated positions is futile—mirroring the collapse of Afrin in 2018 to Turkish-backed forces.
• Prior to the handover of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh, Arab tribal fighters—notably from the al-Baggara tribe—shifted allegiance to Damascus, despite some having previously fought alongside the SDF. Observers expect other tribes in eastern Syria to follow suit.
• Senator Lindsey Graham (14 January) warned Damascus that human rights violations against minorities “will not be tolerated,” adding that Syrian and Turkish advances against Kurdish areas could provoke a strong U.S. response.
• 12 January: SDF commander Sipan Hemo accused external actors (implicitly Turkey) of pushing Damascus toward confrontation, calling it an effort to sabotage the March 2025 military-integration agreement.
• 11 January: Syria’s Interior Ministry announced it had seized SDF-made explosive devices and drones hidden in homes in Sheikh Maqsoud and opened corridors for civilian evacuation.
• 10 January: The Syrian Army secured Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh after SDF withdrawal. The SDF accused Damascus of war crimes, including arbitrary detentions and abuses against Kurdish residents.
• 9 January: Ankara welcomed the Syrian operation as reinforcing Syrian sovereignty. It reiterated that the SDF is an extension of the PKK and said it is ready to provide direct military support if requested.
• On 13 January, the Kurdish “Shams” channel in Erbil (aligned with the Kurdistan Democratic Party) refrained from airing an interview with Syrian President Ahmad al-Shar’a, citing its “escalatory tone.”
• Monitoring groups reported significant Syrian military reinforcements, alongside SDF demolitions of bridges, suggesting the conflict could expand toward Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, threatening nearby oil fields.
• Analysts believe Damascus aims for a limited operation to expel the SDF from west of the Euphrates, leveraging Turkish support and temporary U.S. tolerance, particularly around eastern Aleppo.
• Diplomatic sources insist that while the international environment is not conducive to a large-scale Syrian campaign, it favors a return to political negotiations. CENTCOM commander Brad Cooper called for de-escalation and civilian protection.
• U.S. assessments increasingly view Damascus as a “pragmatic partner” in counter-ISIS operations, reducing the strategic necessity of the SDF—though the U.S. still favors a negotiated arrangement between Damascus and the SDF.
• Washington remained largely silent regarding Syria’s takeover of Aleppo neighborhoods, while the EU called for protecting Kurdish rights. French intermediaries reportedly warned both sides against sliding into a major conflict.
• Some Syrian analysts argue Damascus is using military pressure as leverage in stalled political talks.
• Given the sensitivity of eastern Aleppo and its linkage to future settlement negotiations, both sides may employ significant military force to shape bargaining power.
• Kurdish observers believe that sustained SDF resistance could reshape U.S. calculations, prompting internal debate in Washington about renewing support for the SDF, despite what they perceive as envoy Tom Barrack’s bias toward Damascus.

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Conclusion and Key Judgments
1. The battles of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh—and the buildup east of Aleppo—indicate that Damascus now views military coercion as an effective tool to force SDF withdrawal west of the Euphrates.
2. Tactical gains in Aleppo may embolden Damascus to expand military pressure while postponing direct negotiations with the SDF.
3. Syrian operations appear to benefit from Turkish military-political backing and a calibrated U.S. tolerance, likely bounded by a red line: no Syrian advance east of the Euphrates.
4. A full-scale Syrian offensive against the SDF remains unlikely; the U.S. will not permit a total collapse of Kurdish political-military structures in northeast Syria.
5. The current military approach serves as a negotiating instrument, potentially leading to a new political arrangement between Damascus and the SDF, possibly under French or broader European mediation.
6. If reports of a U.S. request for SDF withdrawal from Aleppo are accurate, then current battlefield events are unfolding with implicit U.S. coordination—or at least prior knowledge.
7. Senator Lindsey Graham’s warning signals Washington’s intent to regulate Damascus’s tempo, not halt it entirely—giving Syria room to maneuver within defined boundaries.