Policy Assessment by Dr. Mohamad Kawas – Progress Center for Policies
⸻
Introduction
Israeli leaks continue to reveal growing concern in Tel Aviv over developments that have led to the resumption of U.S.–Iranian negotiations. Readings of this development diverge between Washington’s approach to what it seeks from Tehran and Israel’s objectives, which view the moment as a historic opportunity to fundamentally address the Iranian challenge. Between these perspectives, an Iranian reading has emerged that interprets the possibility of Tehran offering concessions that could satisfy the U.S. president.
⸻
Key Developments
• On 3 February 2026, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian confirmed that he instructed Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to pursue conditional negotiations with the United States. He stated: “In response to requests from friendly countries in the region to respond to the U.S. president’s request for negotiations, I instructed the foreign minister that—if there is an appropriate, non-threatening space free of unrealistic expectations—to prepare fair and just negotiations based on the principles of dignity, wisdom, and national interest.”
• On 2 February 2026, Reuters reported that U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi intended to meet on 6 February 2026 in Istanbul to discuss a potential nuclear agreement, with expectations that some regional countries—such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman, and Egypt—might participate.
• Signaling an Iranian shift, Iran’s Vice President for Executive Affairs Mohammad Jafar Ghaem-Panah commented on Pezeshkian’s post: “There is no good war, and no peace means surrender.”
• On 2 February 2026, U.S. President Donald Trump said: “There is now a massive fleet heading toward Iran. We are talking to them now, and if we can reach a solution that would be great. If we don’t reach an agreement, bad things could happen.”
• On 2 February 2026, The New York Times, citing officials, reported that Iran is prepared to shut down or suspend its nuclear program, but prefers a U.S. proposal made last year to establish a regional consortium for nuclear energy production. It also noted that Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council—who met Russian President Vladimir Putin days earlier—conveyed a message from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei indicating Iran might agree to ship enriched uranium to Russia, as it did under the 2015 agreement.
• Experts argue that Tehran’s position rests on an assessment that neither the U.S. military buildup nor Washington’s political circumstances signal existential plans threatening the regime’s survival. They also contend that Iran is convinced it cannot push a military nuclear program in the face of Western opposition—and even that of allies such as Russia and China. Tehran, they add, is betting that a nuclear concession could preserve its ballistic missile program, which it views as the crown jewel of its strategic security.
• Israeli circles are reported to hope the Washington–Tehran negotiations fail—and quickly, at the Istanbul meeting—believing the moment ripe to topple the regime rather than engage with it.
• According to observers, Israel fears that Iranian concessions on the nuclear file could be deemed sufficient by Trump to achieve the objective he pursued since withdrawing from the Vienna nuclear agreement in 2018.
• Israeli assessments stress that eliminating the nuclear weapons threat does not remove the danger posed by Iran’s ballistic missile program. While ballistic missiles are widespread in the region, Israeli sources note that Iran’s missiles and drones have not been merely theoretical threats; they have been used repeatedly to target Israeli cities and sites.
• European sources acknowledge that Israel draws strength from a European position increasingly demanding that Iran’s ballistic missile file be placed on the negotiating table as part of a comprehensive agreement.
• Europe considers itself—by virtue of geography—within range of Iranian missiles, in addition to suspicions that Russia has used such missiles to strike Ukrainian territory.
• Israeli leaks say Tel Aviv is pressing the Trump administration to address Iran’s ties to its regional proxies, arguing that allied or affiliated factions in Yemen, Lebanon, and Iraq—and earlier in Syria and Gaza—have targeted Israel and continue to openly threaten its security.
• Diplomatic sources suggest Israel’s fears of a deal limited to the nuclear file may be justified, given Washington’s assessment of what constitutes an imminent threat and the domestic calculations of Trump and his administration.
• The sources explain that Washington has focused, since talks began, on preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and that the Obama administration’s outcome merely imposed temporary restrictions confining the program to civilian purposes.
• They add that Obama’s mistake—later “corrected” by Trump—lay in the temporary nature of those limits and in allowing Iran, in exchange for the deal, access to financial assets that helped expand its missile ambitions, while overlooking “destabilizing” regional policies that reached the point where semi-official Iranian platforms claimed control over four Arab capitals.
• Sources note that Trump’s statements—including recent ones—refer only to Iran’s nuclear program as the primary objective he seeks to achieve. A decisive Iranian concession—halting enrichment, exporting highly enriched stockpiles, and restoring international monitoring—could effectively convince Trump not to go further.
• Some sources believe Tehran received advice from Russia and China—echoing what its envoys heard recently in Turkey (Araghchi), Russia (Larijani), and Pakistan (Pezeshkian)—to “offer up the nuclear program” as a gift sufficient for Trump to halt an impending war.
⸻
Conclusions
• It is believed that Trump has received reliable information about concessions approved by Tehran with the Supreme Leader’s consent that would strip Iran of any capacity to militarize its nuclear program.
• Trump is likely to settle for achieving the nuclear objective without pushing to the extreme on other files Washington does not deem imminent.
• Tehran’s stance is based on an assessment that neither the U.S. military buildup nor Washington’s political conditions indicate plans threatening the regime’s survival.
• Tehran is convinced it cannot advance a military nuclear program in the face of international opposition, including from Russia and China.
• Iran is betting that a nuclear concession will preserve its ballistic missile program, which it considers the core of its strategic security.
• Israel fears losing a historic opportunity to topple the regime in Tehran, with Trump content to prevent Iran from producing a nuclear bomb as the primary goal.
• Israel believes the ballistic missile file and Iran’s ties to “axis” factions must be part of any comprehensive agreement.
• The U.S. assessment diverges from Israel’s in not viewing Iran’s missiles as an immediate existential threat and in concluding that the “axis” has been weakened by Israeli–U.S. strikes.
• Iran’s assessment rests on the necessity of “bending with the storm,” while the U.S. approach reflects a “salami-slicing” policy—settling for incremental strategic gains as a prelude to later ones.
