Policy Assessment by Dr. Mohamad Kawas — Progress Center for Policies, London
Introduction
President Donald Trump justified postponing a strike against Iran as a direct response to requests from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. While no public Gulf-side details have emerged about the nature of communications with the three leaders, reports have begun revealing that the Hajj season emerged as a key pressure factor in the de-escalation decision — to the point of an open public divergence in positions between Washington and Tel Aviv over the military path.
The Facts
Timeline of Events
On May 17, 2026, reports indicated that Gulf leaders asked Trump to grant negotiations a short additional window, characterizing the Iranians as “acting rationally.” That same day, Reuters reported that Pakistan was playing an active mediating role with both the Gulf states and the United States simultaneously, working to prevent a slide into new strikes, while noting that the Pakistani mediation was racing against time and that the target kept shifting between Washington and Tehran.
On May 18, Reuters reported that Pakistan had delivered a revised Iranian proposal to end the war to the United States, with Tehran confirming its position had reached the American side via Islamabad.
On May 19, Trump announced he had temporarily halted the attack that had been planned for the following day, citing important ongoing talks with Tehran. He confirmed that the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE had asked him to wait two or three days because they believed a deal was within reach. Reports indicated this Gulf request was not purely technical — it drew on the Hajj season as a religiously and security-sensitive period, with large numbers of pilgrims flowing into Mecca.
On May 20, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan stated that the Kingdom deeply appreciated the American president’s responsiveness in granting negotiations an additional opportunity to reach an agreement that would end the war, restore security and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz to pre-February 28, 2026 conditions, and address all outstanding disputes in the interest of regional security and stability. He added that Saudi Arabia also deeply appreciated Pakistan’s ongoing mediation efforts, and looked to Iran to seize the opportunity to avoid the serious consequences of escalation and respond promptly to efforts toward a comprehensive agreement achieving lasting peace in the region and the world.
Regional Background Preceding the Crisis
On April 7, 2026, reports surfaced of American security warnings linked to the Hajj season alongside intensified Saudi measures running from April 18 through mid-June — making clear that the Hajj season had long been recognized as an acutely sensitive security window. On April 24, Saudi Arabia began receiving Iranian pilgrims in a notable resumption after years of severance, a development that revealed the regional de-escalation track had already taken practical shape before the May crisis.
The UAE’s Position
The UAE’s stance stood out among the three Gulf states. It had been the most exposed to Iranian targeting and the most hawkish in calling for retaliation — yet it joined the unified Gulf position requesting a halt to the attack. This was read as an expression of Gulf cohesion and the prioritization of collective coordination over bilateral calculations.
Implications for the US-Israel Relationship
Available information revealed that Trump abandoned plans that had been developed jointly with Israel in response to Gulf pressure and Pakistani inputs, resulting in a call described as “difficult” between Trump and Netanyahu — followed by Trump’s public statement that Netanyahu “will do what I want.”
Analysis
The Hajj Season as a Strategic Pressure Card
Observers broadly agree that the Hajj season was not merely a convenient pretext, but rested on a political foundation that preceded the recent escalation and gave Riyadh additional motivation to prevent a military explosion during the largest religious gathering in the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia does not treat the Hajj as solely a religious event but as a test of sovereignty, management, and global reputation. Any American strike on Iran during this period would have placed Riyadh before difficult questions about securing millions of religious travelers and preventing security blowback threatening management of a logistically complex season even in peacetime. The resumption of Iranian pilgrims under formal arrangements further reinforced Riyadh’s image as a unifying actor for Muslims, adding an extra political dimension to its calculations.
Gulf Leverage Inside the American Administration
Observers hold that Saudi Arabia, in consultation with Qatar and the UAE, led Gulf pressures exercised by leaders of the three states who enjoy excellent and personal relationships with the American president. This direct access allowed the three states to achieve real influence over the American decision that exceeded what Israel was able to achieve at this particular moment.
A Useful Exit for Trump
American sources suggest Washington responded to Gulf pressures anchored in the Hajj season that provided Trump with an exit allowing him to retain the military threat without paying an immediate cost. These pressures coincided with Pakistani inputs indicating progress in talks and Iranian flexibility — giving the White House additional justification to suspend military options and test a negotiating window. Observers also suggest Trump was responsive to considerations concerning his reputation within the Islamic world and his relationships with its states.
The Limits and Horizons of the Pause
Observers consider it unlikely Trump will follow through on his threat to launch a military campaign before the Hajj season ends, as a truce measured in days appears more consistent with the logic of preserving leverage without using it. The open divergence between Washington and Tel Aviv also indicates that Gulf pressure succeeded — at least temporarily — in shifting the balance of influence over American decision-making, at the expense of Israeli pressure.
Conclusions
The Hajj season was a key factor employed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE to press Trump to halt the planned military strike against Iran. Riyadh drew on its religious and political influence as custodian of the Two Holy Mosques to prevent any disruption to the largest annual Islamic gathering in the world.
Trump’s engagement with the leaders of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar — who enjoy excellent and personal relationships with him and carry influence within his administration — gave the Gulf states the ability to provide him with a moral and religious justification for halting the attack. This coincided with Pakistani inputs indicating progress in talks and Iranian flexibility worth protecting through a negotiating window.
It is unlikely Trump will carry out his threatened military campaign before the Hajj season ends. This episode revealed the Gulf’s capacity to press Trump at the expense of Israeli pressure to resume fighting — which is what drove the American president to publicly assert that Netanyahu “will do what I want.” The UAE’s position remained particularly striking in combining the status of most-targeted and most hawkish with full adherence to the unified Gulf call to halt the attack, demonstrating that collective Gulf solidarity took priority in the decisive moment.
