Where Does Pakistan Stand on Its Defense Commitment to Saudi Arabia?
Policy Assessment by Dr. Mohamad Kawas – Progress Center for Policies
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Introduction
The strategic defense agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is facing its first real test following Iranian missile and drone strikes against the Kingdom. While neither country has shown clear signs of activating the agreement, questions have emerged regarding whether Pakistan may feel constrained about intervening in a conflict that would place it openly on one side, potentially affecting its geopolitical relations and strategic interests with Iran.
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Key Developments
• 12 March 2026: Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif paid a short visit to Saudi Arabia, where he met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Sharif was accompanied by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, as well as Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir (who also serves as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee).
• 11 March 2026: One day before the visit, the spokesperson for the Prime Minister, Mosharraf Zaidi, told Bloomberg:
“We will be in Saudi Arabia before they need us… There is no question about that; we will be there no matter what and whenever necessary.”
• 7 March 2026: Field Marshal Asim Munir visited Riyadh and met Saudi Defense Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman. They discussed the “serious security situation resulting from Iranian drone and missile attacks on the Kingdom” and the “necessary measures to stop them” within the framework of the Strategic Military Defense Agreement (SMDA), while calling on Iran to exercise “wisdom and avoid miscalculations.”
• 6 March 2026: Reports pointed to intense Pakistani diplomatic mediation efforts, including “shuttle diplomacy” by Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar between Tehran and Riyadh in an effort to contain the escalation.
• 4 March 2026: Ishaq Dar told the Senate and reiterated in a press conference:
“I reminded the Iranian leadership of the defense agreement with Saudi Arabia… everyone knows this sovereign agreement, and we asked them to take it into account.”
• Dar also said he conveyed Saudi assurances to Iran that Saudi territory would not be used against Tehran, noting that Iran’s response toward Saudi Arabia had been less severe compared with other Gulf states, partly due to these diplomatic efforts.
• 1 March 2026: Pakistan’s representative at the UN Security Council condemned the U.S.–Israeli attacks as a “violation of international law,” warned of a potential “regional conflagration,” and called for de-escalation and a return to diplomacy.
• 1 March 2026: Eight people were killed during clashes between Pakistani security forces and protesters who attempted to storm the U.S. consulate in Karachi, protesting the American–Israeli attacks on Iran.
• 28 February 2026: On the day the war on Iran began, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning the “unjustified” U.S.–Israeli attacks on Iran, while also strongly condemning Iran’s retaliation against Gulf states (including Saudi Arabia), describing it as a “flagrant violation of sovereignty.” The statement expressed full solidarity with the “brotherly” Gulf countries and called for maximum restraint.
• Experts on Pakistani affairs suggest that Islamabad’s position reflects a calculated dual approach:
1. Publicly maintaining a relatively neutral tone condemning the initial “aggression” against Iran.
2. In practice, pursuing policies that clearly aim to protect Saudi interests.
• Analysts note that the 2025 defense agreement, which stipulates that “an attack on either country constitutes an attack on the other,” has provided Riyadh with significant leverage and has become a Pakistani diplomatic tool to partially deter Iran. Dar’s public warning to Tehran was viewed as a rare and explicit signal of deterrence.
• Observers warn that if Riyadh were to request explicit military activation of the agreement, Pakistan would face two difficult choices:
1. Participating—at least symbolically or logistically—which could threaten stability along its western borders and inflame sectarian tensions at home.
2. Refraining from participation, which could damage its credibility with Saudi Arabia (a crucial financial supporter of Pakistan) and with Gulf allies more broadly.
• Analysts also recall Saudi involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear program. In 1998, when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif conducted Pakistan’s nuclear tests despite expected Western sanctions, Saudi Arabia provided significant economic support, including supplying Pakistan with approximately 50,000 barrels of oil per day free of charge to mitigate the sanctions’ impact.
• The same sources also note that in 2015, when Saudi Arabia and the UAE launched an air campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, Pakistan’s parliament voted against participating in the military operations. The decision triggered sharp reactions in the Gulf, where some observers concluded that Tehran seemed more important to Islamabad than the Gulf states.
• Diplomatic sources suggest that Pakistan’s strategy as of 13 March 2026 appears relatively successful in containing escalation without sliding into direct confrontation.
• However, they add that as the war continues and oil prices rise, the economic consequences for Pakistan may gradually narrow its room for maneuver. The current balance could shift toward clearer alignment if Saudi Arabia begins to view itself as facing an existential threat.
• Reports highlight the sensitivity of the situation since the defense agreement was signed. A Saudi source suggested the agreement effectively places Saudi Arabia under a Pakistani nuclear umbrella in the event of an attack. Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif hinted at the same interpretation when he said Pakistan’s capabilities “would be available to Saudi Arabia under this agreement,” though he later walked back the statement.
• Observers believe the ambiguity reflects Islamabad’s structural dilemma: the agreement was designed to remain deliberately ambiguous, but Ishaq Dar’s public remarks have significantly reduced that ambiguity.
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Conclusion
• Pakistan is struggling to find a balance between its defense commitments to Saudi Arabia and the need to avoid damaging relations with Iran.
• Although the defense agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia remains ambiguous, the Pakistani foreign minister’s warning to Iran has reduced that ambiguity and narrowed Islamabad’s room for maneuver.
• If Saudi Arabia were to request activation of the agreement, Pakistan’s response could threaten stability along its western borders and exacerbate sectarian tensions domestically.
• Islamabad must also consider domestic pressures, including the presence of around 40 million Shia citizens and recent protest movements that have already resulted in casualties.
• At the same time, failure to respond could harm Pakistan’s credibility with Saudi Arabia—an essential financial supporter—and with Gulf allies more broadly.
• Historical Saudi support for Pakistan, including assistance to its military and nuclear programs, remains an important factor in Islamabad’s calculations.
• Saudi Arabia may refrain from requesting the agreement’s activation as long as the attacks remain limited and Pakistan’s warnings are taken into account.
• The Pakistani prime minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia at this moment sends a signal of Pakistan’s commitment to Riyadh while also delivering a high-level warning to Iran.
• Pakistan is implicitly suggesting that the existence of the defense agreement may be one reason why Iran’s response toward Saudi Arabia has been less severe than toward other Gulf states.
