Policy Assessment by Dr.Mohamad Kawas – Progress Center for Policies – London
Introduction
Emerging information points to a comprehensive restructuring of Hezbollah’s political, military, and security leadership bodies in Lebanon. This development raises critical questions regarding the motives, strategic direction, and broader context behind a sweeping internal overhaul involving the sidelining of certain figures, the promotion of others, the dissolution and merger of units, the redistribution of competencies, and the gradual presentation of a structure in which the political dimension appears increasingly dominant.
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Key Developments
• Hezbollah is undergoing a broad round of appointments and structural changes across its military, security, and political hierarchies—the first such overhaul since the end of the 66-day war in November 2024.
• According to analysts, the restructuring aims to reform decision-making mechanisms, reduce bureaucratic layers, and address security vulnerabilities that enabled the assassination of several senior military leaders.
• Reports indicate that Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem is supervising the process politically, while a team of officers affiliated with the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is overseeing military aspects.
• Qassem is reportedly consolidating authority by linking all party institutions directly to the Secretary-General’s office, a departure from previous arrangements where operational details were largely delegated to the Executive Council.
• News of new appointments surfaced following the removal of Wafiq Safa from the leadership of the Liaison and Coordination Unit. Prior reports suggested administrative decisions had already curtailed the unit’s powers, prompting Safa’s resignation.
• Safa had survived an Israeli assassination attempt during the recent war, amid speculation regarding possible security lapses that facilitated Israeli strikes on senior figures.
• During Hezbollah’s period of dominant influence over Lebanon’s political system, Safa’s unit managed relations with Lebanese security and political institutions and was accused of threatening a judge overseeing a sensitive investigation.
• The Liaison Unit has now been subordinated to the Political Bureau headed by Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyed. It has lost its former judicial and security functions and is confined to political coordination with parties.
• The reshuffle includes political units connected to the May 2026 parliamentary elections, alongside military and security branches.
• Independent security entities—including the Liaison and Coordination Unit, Preventive Security, Unit 910, and others—have reportedly been dismantled or merged under a centralized supervisory authority. Direct security engagement with the Lebanese state through specialized committees has been reduced in favor of political intermediaries.
• Observers argue that the changes go beyond internal power redistribution. They reflect major regional shifts, including mounting pressure on Iran, financial and military constraints, and international demands for the dismantling of Hezbollah’s armed wing.
• Analysts note the growing prominence of political figures in decision-making roles, replacing clerical dominance. Several new figures reportedly accompanied Qassem in earlier Islamic political movements prior to Hezbollah’s formal establishment.
• It is expected that Mohammad Raad, head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc, may later be appointed deputy to Qassem following the upcoming elections.
• Former minister and MP Mohammad Fneish is reportedly assuming leadership of the Executive Council, tasked with reorganizing the party’s administrative and institutional apparatus.
• Sources suggest the party is adapting to a new strategic reality centered on preserving its presence, protecting its constituency, and avoiding renewed war or displacement.
• The restructuring may also aim at “breaking the ice” with Lebanese state institutions and preparing the ground for dialogue.
• Experts observe a gradual predominance of the political dimension over the military-security apparatus, possibly paving the way for a comprehensive arrangement with the Lebanese state.
• The process appears responsive to regional and U.S. pressures advocating the monopolization of arms by the Lebanese state—a condition potentially tied to broader negotiations involving Iran.
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Conclusions and Assessments
• The restructuring does not represent a routine administrative adjustment or simple redistribution of influence. It reflects a deliberate transition in Hezbollah’s internal governance model driven by intersecting domestic, regional, and international pressures. Security breaches and the targeting of senior leadership have prompted centralization of authority and rationalization of structures. Concurrently, war fatigue and socio-economic strain within the party’s support base necessitate strengthening political, administrative, and service functions to maintain internal legitimacy.
• Regionally and internationally, Hezbollah is reacting to mounting pressure linked to its arms status and Iran’s negotiating position. Elevating political figures and reducing direct security engagement with Lebanese institutions signals tactical adaptation—without necessarily indicating a fundamental shift regarding the weapons issue.
• The restructuring suggests a transition from an expansionist-offensive doctrine toward a defensive-containment approach focused on survival, constituency protection, and avoidance of large-scale confrontation, while improving positioning within Lebanon’s political system ahead of electoral milestones.
• In the foreseeable term, Hezbollah is likely to pursue a dual-track strategy: increased domestic political engagement and calibrated normalization with state institutions, while preserving deterrent capabilities as a strategic asset tied primarily to regional balances rather than solely Lebanese dynamics. The party’s flexibility or rigidity will likely depend more on the trajectory of Tehran-Washington relations than on domestic Lebanese variables alone.
• Some assessments interpret parallel regional trends—such as greater discipline among pro-Iranian factions in Iraq, potential reintegration of Syrian Kurdish forces into state structures, and Abdullah Öcalan’s decision to dissolve his party—as indicative of a broader shift away from militia-style organizational models.
• This evolution may benefit from acknowledgment, including from U.S. Special Envoy Tom Barrack, of Hezbollah’s political weight within Lebanon’s landscape.
• The preliminary conclusion suggests that Hezbollah is preparing for a phase of deeper institutional integration within the Lebanese state through a leadership structure increasingly weighted toward political rather than military-security dominance, while maintaining strategic deterrence capacity as leverage within the wider regional equation.
