Washington Pushes for a Normalization Path Between Lebanon and Israel: Facts and Probabilities

Policy Assessment – Progress Center for Policies

Introduction:

American and Israeli sources indicate that Washington and Tel Aviv are preparing to shift military negotiations between Lebanon and Israel over border disputes to a diplomatic level aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries. What are the developments in this matter? How are Washington and Tel Aviv advancing this trajectory? What are the chances of success, and what obstacles stand in the way?

On March 12, 2025, Israeli newspapers quoted a “senior Israeli official” stating that Israel is taking steps toward potential normalization with Lebanon, where diplomatic representatives will replace military officials in the upcoming negotiations.

The source confirmed that these talks aim to move towards a political-diplomatic path and that the next meeting will include an Israeli diplomatic representative instead of a military official, which, from an Israeli perspective, significantly increases the importance of the discussions.

Israeli sources believe that Israel released five Lebanese prisoners to allow Lebanon’s new president, Joseph Aoun, to present himself to the Lebanese public as capable of achieving results for the country without military confrontation that could devastate Lebanon. This, they argue, could pave the way for future normalization.
On March 11, U.S. Special Envoy to Lebanon, Morgan Ortagus, announced the release of five Lebanese prisoners held by Israel. She praised the efforts of President Aoun, stating that U.S. President Donald Trump believes peace and political and diplomatic decisions are the solutions to border issues. She added, “We have launched diplomatic working groups to resolve disputes between Lebanon and Israel, including the Blue Line, and I am optimistic about reaching an agreement to resolve the five disputed points.”

Justifying continued Israeli airstrikes on Lebanon, Ortagus stated that destroying Hezbollah’s arsenal south of the Litani River is part of Resolution 1701, adding, “We are working to build the Lebanese Army’s capabilities so that it becomes the sole governing force.” She emphasized that “under the leadership of President Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, we are striving to establish a new future for Lebanon, with our focus today on reaching a diplomatic agreement regarding the five points and the release of prisoners.”

On March 11, the Axios news website quoted a White House official saying that Lebanon and Israel had agreed to resolve their remaining border disputes through U.S. mediation. The official added that Israel released five Lebanese prisoners as part of these understandings, and that the Trump administration had been mediating between Israel and Lebanon for several weeks, aiming to strengthen the ceasefire in Lebanon and agree on the next steps.

Observers noted Ortagus’ announcement of the formation of “diplomatic working groups” as an unexpected development that might indicate a broader discussion about the future of Lebanese-Israeli relations. They pointed out that the border demarcation issues Ortagus mentioned are usually handled by military delegates, and that all previous negotiations had taken place in a strictly military framework under U.S. and UN mediation. The formation of a diplomatic working group suggests an intention to politicize the negotiations, potentially exploring normalization prospects.

On March 11, the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office announced an agreement to form three joint working groups with Lebanon, France, and the United States to discuss issues related to demarcating the Blue Line, Israeli military-controlled sites, and Lebanese detainees. This move was described as a gesture of goodwill towards Lebanon’s new president.

On March 12, the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar wrote in response to normalization efforts:
“There is no force in Lebanon capable of undertaking such a task. It is worth reminding those who need to be reminded that President Aoun himself told the Americans after the war that they should not expect him to do what the U.S. and Israel failed to do against Hezbollah.”

On March 12, Lebanese presidential sources stated that the formation of the three committees tasked with resolving border disputes with Israel was merely a continuation of the implementation of Resolution 1701. The sources asserted that “these committees are not separate from Resolution 1701 and will not engage in direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel.” They added that “any talk of these committees being a precursor to normalization is completely false, as their role is strictly limited to addressing disputed border points dating back to 2006.”

American sources monitoring the situation suggest that Washington is testing Lebanon’s willingness to shift its position under U.S. pressure, given Lebanon’s dependence on U.S. military aid and Trump’s administration’s historical role in brokering the Abraham Accords.

These sources also predict that Washington’s policy of escalation against Iran to pressure it into nuclear negotiations will have repercussions for Lebanon’s situation.

On February 26, U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff expressed optimism about persuading Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords. He stated that he believed there was a possibility for Syria and Lebanon to normalize ties with Israel following the severe blows suffered by Iran-backed forces there, referring to Hezbollah and the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

Conclusion:

– The United States aims to expand the Abraham Accords to include Lebanon and Israel, leveraging regional shifts following the “Al-Aqsa Flood” war since October 2023.
– Washington is exploiting Iran’s weakened regional influence, Hezbollah’s losses in Lebanon, and Assad’s fall in Syria to push for political agreements that go beyond technical military negotiations over the Lebanese-Israeli border dispute.
– The U.S. announcement of a diplomatic working group to discuss Lebanese-Israeli disputes signals an effort to elevate negotiations from a purely technical-military level to a political one. Meanwhile, Lebanese presidential sources deny that these diplomatic committees are meant to discuss any form of normalization.
– Israel is promoting its border talks with Lebanon as a step toward normalization, portraying its release of Lebanese prisoners as an effort to strengthen President Joseph Aoun’s position and prove that diplomacy is more effective than armed confrontation.
– The U.S. prioritizes expanding the Abraham Accords to include Saudi Arabia, with expectations that such efforts would later extend to Syria and Lebanon. Washington is relying on its influence over Lebanon and its support for Lebanese institutions to secure greater flexibility from Beirut on this issue.
– Despite Lebanon’s political complexity and its lack of readiness for normalization, Washington appears intent on pushing the matter forward, presenting it as an alternative to temporary technical agreements between Lebanon and Israel (with similar efforts likely to follow concerning Syria).
– Observers in Washington believe that increasing pressure on Iran, and any potential agreement with Tehran, will directly impact Lebanon’s position and the feasibility of pushing normalization agreements with Israel.