U.S. Congress Opens the Door to Designating the Rapid Support Forces as a Terrorist Organization: Implications and Possible Scenarios
Zaelnoon Suliman – Progress Center for Policies
Policy Assessment
Introduction:
On August 1, the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jim Risch, introduced an amendment to the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (covering Department of Defense military activities, military construction, and defense programs). The amendment requires an assessment of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Congolese M23 armed movement for possible designation as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).
Analysis
Under the law, the Secretary of State—after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General—must conduct an evaluation to determine whether the RSF and M23 meet the criteria for designation under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The Secretary of State is required to submit a classified report within 90 days of the law’s enactment, presenting the findings of this evaluation to the relevant congressional committees: the Senate Foreign Relations, Judiciary, and Intelligence Committees, as well as the House Foreign Affairs, Judiciary, and Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
If the State Department determines that the groups meet the legal criteria, they will be formally listed as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The U.S. standard for designation requires that the group be involved in terrorist activity—or have the capability and intent to engage in such activity. Terrorist activity is defined as violence targeting civilians and civilian property, constituting a threat to the national security of the United States or to its citizens.
Several factors increase the likelihood that the RSF will be designated, including international reports documenting war crimes against civilians, the presence of cross-border armed groups in its ranks, and its direct threat to regional stability in the Horn of Africa—all of which affect U.S. national security interests.
Factors that May Hinder Designation:
Complexity of U.S. policy in Sudan: Washington seeks to maintain an active diplomatic role in mediating between the warring parties. Designating the RSF as a terrorist organization could complicate these efforts.
Regional sensitivities: The move could embarrass or put pressure on U.S. regional allies, opening new fronts in U.S. relations with certain countries and creating wider regional repercussions.
Implications of Designation:
Political leverage: The designation would be used as a tool to exclude the RSF from any political process, or at minimum to impose strict conditions on its participation. Any government including the RSF would effectively be denied U.S. recognition, on the basis that such participation legitimizes terrorism.
Impact on peace prospects: The decision could undermine political settlement efforts. Army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan might interpret the designation as implicit U.S. support for his war against the RSF.
Humanitarian fallout: The move could worsen humanitarian conditions in RSF-held areas if aid delivery is further restricted under tightened sanctions.
Regional consequences: The designation may pressure the RSF’s regional and international backers by targeting financial, logistical, and political support networks. U.S. pressure on these states could create destabilizing effects.
Options for the RSF: Following designation, the RSF would face a stark choice: either dismantle itself and enter a political settlement preserving part of its influence, or confront mounting international isolation, political escalation, and intensified military confrontation—potentially leading to its collapse.
Targeting of leaders: Senior RSF leaders, notably Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) and his brother Abdul Rahim Dagalo, could face harsher international sanctions and possible arrest warrants from international judicial bodies.
Conclusion
The attempt to designate the RSF as an FTO could undermine ongoing peace efforts and complicate regional mediation initiatives (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and the African Union) aimed at securing a comprehensive settlement. The RSF might adopt more hardline stances, resorting to military escalation or strengthening ties with anti-Western actors such as Russia—exacerbating security risks in the region.
The Sudanese army and its allies could exploit the U.S. move as political backing, using it to delegitimize the RSF and settle internal political scores. This risks derailing the political process and creating a new legitimacy crisis.
The designation could reshape Sudan’s political scene, making political participation conditional on the exclusion of armed groups, in line with international policies supporting the existence of a single national military institution.
Internal splits within the RSF may emerge, as some field commanders seek to defect or strike separate deals with the army to avoid international prosecution.
The decision could accelerate Sudan’s fragmentation, pushing the RSF toward a separatist project in Darfur or leading to new armed political alliances.
In sum, while U.S. designation of the RSF as a terrorist organization would weaken the group, it is likely to deepen Sudan’s conflict rather than resolve it—driving the RSF toward greater violence and reinforcing regional polarization between the army’s backers and the RSF’s supporters.
