Trump’s Options Toward Iran: A Reading of Western Expert Assessments and Analysis

Hamza Ali – Progress Center for Policies

Introduction

Tehran has announced that it continues to keep communication channels open with Washington, at a time when U.S. President Donald Trump has been weighing how to respond to what he described as the Iranian authorities’ “bloody crackdown” on a wave of popular protests that swept across multiple regions of the country—one of the most serious challenges facing the Iranian system since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

As part of escalating pressure, Trump announced on the evening of Monday, 12 January 2026, that any country engaging in trade with Iran—one of the world’s major oil producers—would face a 25% tariff on its exports to the United States. Trump made the announcement via the “X” platform, stressing that the decision was “final and conclusive,” without clarifying the legal basis for the measure or whether it would apply to all of Iran’s trading partners.

Trump also issued a direct warning to Iran’s leadership, threatening a U.S. military attack should Iranian security forces open fire on protesters. In what appeared to be preparation for such a threat, reports indicated that the U.S. Department of Defense had presented the president with an expanded set of military options, exceeding what had previously been disclosed. These options reportedly include strikes against facilities linked to Iran’s nuclear programme, as well as ballistic missile sites—going beyond the scope of the airstrikes carried out in June of last year.

Western Expert Assessments

The Economist, in its 12 January issue, argues that President Trump faces a genuine strategic dilemma. Despite his hardline rhetoric and apparent inclination to act on his threats, the practical options available to him remain inherently limited. There is no clear precedent for the United States launching military action in support of peaceful popular protests, particularly in the absence of a unified leadership or central organisation for those protests, and given their failure to secure defections from within the regime’s core power structures, especially the security apparatus.

The magazine further notes that even if U.S. support were forthcoming, it would at best raise protesters’ morale without fundamentally altering the balance of power. Within this context, it outlines a range of “constrained” options, largely limited to symbolic strikes. Such actions might generate temporary momentum for the protests but could also backfire if interpreted by the regime as a sign of weakness or reluctance to escalate—potentially encouraging authorities to intensify repression.

According to The Economist, a broader option would involve targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the regime’s principal coercive arm and core shield. While such strikes could inflict tangible damage on Iran’s military and security infrastructure and send a strong message domestically and internationally, they would not prevent IRGC forces or affiliated militias such as the Basij from using violence against protesters. Moreover, this option risks alienating segments of Iranian society fearful of state collapse and chaos reminiscent of experiences elsewhere in the region.

The most radical option discussed by the magazine involves targeting senior regime figures, potentially including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself. It suggests that Trump might be tempted by a commando-style operation, particularly in light of what he portrays as a successful precedent in Venezuela. However, executing such an operation inside Iran would be far more complex than any previous case. As a result, the magazine considers selective airstrikes against senior officials—similar to those carried out by Israel in June—to be more plausible. Even if successful, such strikes could trigger political change at the top, but Iran’s internal context—marked by a weak opposition and resilient coercive institutions—would likely tilt the balance in favour of hardline factions, strengthening the IRGC and its allies in the post-crisis order.

Reinforcing Media Assessments

The Wall Street Journal reinforces this reading, reporting on 12 January that available indicators suggest Washington is leaning toward a diplomatic track rather than military action, despite its escalatory rhetoric. A similar view is echoed by The New York Times, which cited Carnegie Endowment senior fellow Karim Sadjadpour as saying that Iran is attempting to deter Trump from pursuing the military option by dangling the prospect of talks and deals. In the same context, Vali Nasr, a professor at Johns Hopkins University, argued that Iran is pursuing a pragmatic strategy aimed at avoiding war while simultaneously constraining any parallel Israeli move that could ignite a broader regional conflict.

Ellie Geranmayeh, Deputy Head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, noted in a Friday interview that signs had emerged toward the end of the week suggesting Iranian authorities had instructed security forces to curb excessive violence, specifically to avoid providing Washington with a pretext for intervention.

The New York Times also reports that any potential U.S. strike would not be aimed at overthrowing the regime, but rather at delivering a warning message to Iran’s leadership regarding its handling of the protests.

In an interview with The Guardian on 11 January, former UK ambassador to Tehran Rob Macaire warned that U.S. strikes “may not unfold as some hope,” stressing that previous operations had failed to meaningfully erode the regime’s authority and in some cases had contributed to its internal consolidation. He nevertheless pointed to a widening gap between Trump’s high-pitched rhetoric and the constraints imposed by political and strategic reality.

Analytical Conclusion

Western expert and media assessments broadly converge on the existence of a growing gap between President Trump’s escalatory rhetoric toward Iran and the United States’ actual capacity to translate that rhetoric into decisive strategic action. Despite threats of military force in response to the suppression of protests, the available options remain narrow, high-risk, and burdened by significant political costs.

The notion of employing military force as a tool to support unstructured popular protests lacks precedent and carries a strong risk of unintended consequences. Symbolic strikes could weaken U.S. credibility and offer the Iranian regime an opportunity to tighten its grip, while broader attacks could prove counterproductive by empowering hardline factions, marginalising opposition forces, and opening the door to instability that would allow the IRGC to reassert dominance.

Conversely, Tehran appears keenly aware of the limits of U.S. decision-making and has demonstrated tactical skill in calibrating repression, signalling openness to dialogue, and floating diplomatic gestures designed to neutralise American escalation without offering substantive concessions.

Within this framework, the most likely U.S. strategy rests on non-military tools: economic pressure, cyber operations, support for access to information, and high-profile diplomatic signalling. This approach allows Washington to sustain pressure while avoiding an open-ended confrontation whose trajectory and outcomes it cannot control.