Trump’s Message to Iran via the UAE: Washington’s Goals and Tehran’s Obstacles

Position Assessment – Progress Center for Policies

Introduction:

After Iran received the U.S. president’s message regarding negotiations between the two countries, and following the tense exchanges between Tehran and Washington, observers are questioning Iran’s tools for resisting U.S. pressures, as well as the positions of major powers involved in the nuclear deal regarding Washington’s threats to resort to military action. Meanwhile, new U.S. demands are emerging that go beyond the nuclear program and touch upon the Middle East’s balance of power.

Details:

On March 12, 2025, the spokesperson for Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the diplomatic advisor to the President of the UAE, Anwar Gargash, had delivered a message from U.S. President Donald Trump to Iranian officials regarding the resumption of direct negotiations between Tehran and Washington.

On March 8, Trump stated: “There are two ways to deal with Iran: either militarily or by making a deal. I prefer the deal because I do not want to harm Iran—the Iranians are a great people, but their leadership is evil and their system is harsh. I want to negotiate a good nuclear agreement with Iran. The time is now, and something will happen one way or another.”

He added: “I sent them a message, saying that I hope they negotiate because if we are forced to intervene militarily, it will be terrible for them. I hope they negotiate because that would be much better for Iran. The alternative is that we take action, as Iran cannot be allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon.”

On March 12, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, stated that he had not yet received Trump’s message and confirmed that Tehran was not ready to negotiate with him. (The message was delivered to Iran’s Foreign Minister at the same time as Khamenei’s statement.) He added that “when the U.S. president says he is ready to negotiate with us, it is merely a deception of public opinion,” stressing that Tehran “will not be forced into negotiations through exaggerated demands and threats.” He also warned that “the U.S. threatens military action, which is unwise, because Iran can and will strike back.”

On March 12, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian stated that Tehran would not negotiate with Washington under threats, emphasizing that “it is unacceptable for the United States to issue orders and threats. I will not negotiate with you, Mr. Trump. Do what you want.” This position contrasts with his statement on March 2, in which he said that “dialogue with the Trump administration was the best option, but the Supreme Leader rejects it completely.”

On March 12, the UN Security Council held a closed meeting on Iran’s nuclear program at the request of the United States, Britain, France, Greece, Panama, and South Korea. The meeting was convened to discuss a report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stating that Tehran had increased its nuclear stockpile in a “highly concerning manner.” The meeting was considered a “diplomatic mobilization” as part of the pressure campaign on Tehran.

Iran’s ambassador to the UN, Amir Saeed Iravani, stated that Washington was exploiting the Security Council to intensify its “economic war” against Iran, describing the meeting as an “unjustified intervention” in Tehran’s cooperation with the IAEA.

The UK, through its deputy ambassador to the UN, once again raised the possibility of activating the “snapback mechanism,” which allows for the reimposition of international sanctions on Tehran.

On March 12, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed concern over the U.S. insistence on imposing political conditions, including stopping Iran’s support for certain groups in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, calling these demands “troubling and concerning.” He noted that Washington was demanding Iran cease its support for certain Middle Eastern groups as a “precondition for a new nuclear agreement.”

Explaining his concerns, Lavrov argued that all regional countries had “expanded their influence beyond their borders and have economic and humanitarian programs in other areas, including North Africa. Some even mediate in crises like the one in Sudan.” He added that “singling out Iran alone and restricting its right to expand its influence is unrealistic, while other countries are allowed to do so in different regions.”

On March 12, Iran announced the conclusion of joint military exercises with Russia and China at Chabahar Port on the Indian Ocean. Former IRGC official Hossein Kanaani stated that these drills were a response to Trump’s threats of an attack on Iran, stressing that “Trump must understand that Iran is not alone; its allies, Russia and China, stand by its side. Attacking Iran would mean attacking China and Russia.”

Experts believe that the joint exercises send mixed signals to Washington—China reaffirms its presence in a region key to its “Belt and Road Initiative,” Russia asserts its influence in warm waters, and Iran demonstrates that it is not isolated and draws strength from its two powerful allies.

On March 14, a meeting will be held in Beijing between China, Russia, and Iran concerning the “Iranian nuclear issue,” at the deputy foreign minister level. Observers believe that China is seeking to reclaim its role in the nuclear negotiations, while Moscow (after engaging with Washington) and the European troika in the P5+1 group are playing active roles.

Conclusion:

The official delivery of Trump’s message to Iran means that negotiations between Tehran and Washington are now a formal issue, no longer limited to public exchanges of positions, placing both sides before open-ended choices.

Trump’s military threats and Tehran’s rejection of negotiations under pressure appear to be pre-negotiation maneuvers, while Iran’s reliance on joint military drills with Russia and China does not necessarily improve its military standing in response to Trump’s threats.

Pezeshkian’s statement about his willingness to negotiate with Washington—before withdrawing it under pressure from the Supreme Leader—reveals an internal debate in Iran over whether to engage in talks or adhere to Khamenei’s position.

The UN Security Council meeting on Iran’s nuclear program signals the activation of international pressure, particularly through the possibility of reinstating broad international sanctions against Tehran.

Amid talk of Russian mediation on Iran, expected to be on the agenda of a forthcoming meeting between Trump and Putin, China is moving to reactivate its role in the nuclear agreement alongside Moscow and the European troika.

Notably, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov revealed that Washington is demanding Iran cease its support for certain groups in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria as a “precondition for a new nuclear deal.” This suggests that negotiations extend beyond the nuclear program to broader issues tied to Trump’s vision for the Middle East.