Policy Assessment by Hamza Ali – Progress Center for Policies, London
Background
President Donald Trump pressed several Muslim-majority countries to join the Abraham Accords — a set of treaties normalising relations with Israel — framing it as part of a broader settlement he seeks to negotiate with Iran. In a Truth Social post, Trump called on Saudi Arabia and Qatar to sign first, and also referenced Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan, despite Turkey having recognised Israel since 1949, and Egypt and Jordan already being bound by peace treaties signed in 1979 and 1994 respectively. Trump went further still, hinting that Iran itself might eventually join the Accords, describing the endeavour as “a global coalition like no other” and calling Tehran’s potential participation an “honour.” The announcement came on the heels of calls Trump held on Saturday with regional leaders, and amid ongoing nuclear negotiations between Washington and Tehran.
The response from Western analysts was marked by near-unanimous scepticism, raising fundamental questions about both the strategic logic of the proposal and its political timing.
“Strange” and “Detached from Reality”
In a report published on 28 May, The New York Times spoke to regional experts who questioned the proposal’s basic coherence. Yoel Guzansky, a senior researcher at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies, said: “The whole thing is strange. What is the connection between a deal with Iran and this? I am genuinely puzzled.” Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East programme at Chatham House, was equally blunt, telling the paper on 27 May that Trump had “misread the room,” adding: “It is a typical Trump ask, completely detached from reality.”
Reactions were not confined to outside observers. Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina — who had recently criticised the potential deal with Iran — nonetheless posted on social media calling the expansion of the Abraham Accords “simply genius,” adding: “I expect our Arab allies to embrace this initiative.” Analysts noted that both positions, taken at face value, reflect a misreading of Middle Eastern political dynamics. Politico reported on 27 May that officials in the targeted countries received the proposal with laughter, dismissal, and — most tellingly — silence.
Imposition, Not Partnership
Analysts point to a deeper structural problem: the more Washington pushes for normalisation, the less appealing it becomes. A non-resident scholar at the Gulf International Forum put it plainly: “The more American officials push normalisation as a diktat rather than part of a mutually beneficial deal, the more bitter it becomes.” Ties with Israel, never popular with Arab public opinion, have become far more toxic since the Gaza war and the wider regional escalation that followed. Governments in the region face genuine domestic constraints that Washington appears either unwilling or unable to account for.
The Telegraph, in an analysis published on 26 May, described the proposal as a fundamental misreading of the current situation. The assumption underpinning Trump’s push — that the ongoing war, which erupted on 28 February with a joint US-Israeli military operation against Iran codenamed “Epic Wrath,” had broadly brought the Middle East closer to Israel — was, the paper noted, a narrative “enthusiastically promoted by Israel, but not necessarily a shared one” across the region. Countries that had been struck by Iranian attacks did not automatically translate that experience into a desire to deepen ties with Tel Aviv.
A Framework Overtaken by the Moment
A professor of international law at La Trobe University offered a deeper structural explanation for the proposal’s timing — and its likely failure. The United States and Israel are, in his view, militarily, strategically, and economically weaker than they were when Operation Epic Wrath was launched at the end of February. Their alliances with Gulf states are being quietly reassessed: those alliances did not prevent Gulf states from being targeted by Iranian strikes, raising serious questions about their actual value. Iran, despite the heavy losses it has suffered among its political and military leadership over months of strikes, appears more resilient — and in some respects more influential — than it was before the war.
In this context, both Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu find themselves under pressure to secure a symbolic victory ahead of the US midterm elections and the anticipated Israeli Knesset elections later this year. But what serves Washington’s political needs is no longer necessarily what serves the interests of regional states. The Abraham Accords are increasingly seen as an American-imposed framework, while parts of the region are actively reshaping the strategic landscape on their own terms.
Most notably, reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has floated an alternative: a regional non-aggression pact that would include Iran, modelled on the Helsinki Accords that helped ease Cold War tensions in Europe during the 1970s — a framework that places Israel neither at its centre nor relies on American mediation.
Trump’s renewed push for the Abraham Accords may partly be an attempt to counter this Saudi initiative and reassert American primacy over the regional order, as well as to deliver Netanyahu a diplomatic win he can present to Israeli voters. Yet the wall of silence that met his demand may be the clearest signal yet that the region is no longer willing to accept the terms Washington offers.
Conclusion
Trump’s Abraham Accords gambit looks less like a serious diplomatic proposal than a window onto how Washington continues to misread a region that has moved beyond it. The wall of silence that met his demand is not merely a reaction to a poorly timed or clumsily worded initiative. It reflects something deeper: a Middle East in a genuine moment of strategic repositioning, in which the United States is no longer the indispensable architect of the regional order that it once was.
The countries Trump named are not passive actors waiting to be organised into American-designed frameworks. They are governments actively weighing their interests in a more competitive, more multipolar environment — one in which Iran has proven more resilient than expected, in which the Gaza war has made normalisation with Israel a domestic liability across the Arab world, and in which alternatives to US-led arrangements, such as the Helsinki-style regional pact floated by Riyadh, are being seriously discussed.
What this episode ultimately reveals is the widening gap between American ambition and American leverage in the region. Attempting to expand the Accords now — by diktat, in the middle of a burning war, with no sensitivity to what regional governments actually need — does not demonstrate strength. It reveals its absence. The region is changing, and Washington appears not yet to have fully grasped what that change means.
