Ameer Makhoul — Progress Center for Policies
Introduction
On May 20, 2025, President Trump stated he was in daily, intensive contact with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, adding that Netanyahu would carry out whatever the American president wanted. Around the same time, the Israeli Chief of Staff announced the military was at high readiness to renew war against Iran. Israeli media covered extensively what it described as Trump postponing a strike on Iran that had been planned for May 19, with coverage then shifting to the tensions between Trump and Netanyahu over the American president’s preference for a political rather than military solution. Media also focused on Trump’s statement that the strike was delayed after Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE requested it.
Part One: Analysis
The Israeli Military vs. Political Leadership: A Deep Professional Disagreement
Unlike the political level, the military establishment and security apparatus are engaged in a serious professional debate about what renewed intensive war with Iran could realistically achieve — particularly around the feasibility of undermining the Iranian regime and removing Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. Notably, the Israeli military stated it was not informed of any American intention to strike Iran on May 19, suggesting the political leadership may have had knowledge of the American decision while the military received no operational directives regarding the ultimately cancelled strike.
Trump-Netanyahu Tensions: How Israeli Political Circles Read the Situation
Israeli political circles broadly assess that Trump’s lavish praise of Netanyahu — describing him as strong and willing to do whatever Trump wants — actually reflects the tension that characterized their conversations, rather than genuine alignment. The intensive communications between the two in recent days reinforces this reading. Netanyahu is reportedly seeking an urgent visit to Washington to prevent the conclusion of a US-Iran framework agreement being pushed by regional mediators.
Two additional drivers of American decision-making are worth noting. First, public opinion within the Republican Party is becoming an open, confrontational struggle with the “America First” current — exemplified by Tucker Carlson, one of the most influential voices in Republican circles, who described Netanyahu as leading toward ruin and accused Israel of dragging the United States into war. Second, American assessments hold that toppling the Iranian regime or removing its enriched uranium stockpile through renewed war is not a realistic objective.
US Military Assessment: Aligned with the Israeli Military, at Odds with Netanyahu
American military assessments diverge from Netanyahu’s goals while converging with those of the Israeli military. These assessments hold that if the United States were to renew intensive operations against Iran — even under the label of a “limited strike” — Israel would find itself at the center of the most draining phase of the conflict, as occurred in the previous round. This rests on a firm analytical principle: the party that initiates a confrontation does not determine its scope; the nature of Iran’s response does — and analysts expect that response to extend beyond the region.
Part Two: The Lebanese File
Netanyahu’s concerns extend beyond direct war with Iran to its regional ripple effects and the implications of Washington’s tilt toward political solutions. The Lebanese front commands a higher level of anxiety in Israeli public opinion — particularly among residents of northern border communities — and has direct electoral implications for the Knesset.
The Israeli security establishment is trying to assess how renewed war on Iran would affect the trajectory of the war in Lebanon and the interim understandings reached there. The military is pressing the political level for clarity on this, since defined parameters would allow it to expand operations in Lebanon. The military views political-level constraints — shaped by the American ceasefire decision and prohibitions on targeting Beirut and the Bekaa Valley — as tying its hands north of the Litani River. Israeli media reports that the war of attrition is intensifying, with rising casualties among Israeli forces as a key indicator.
Both the political and military levels fear that renewed war with Iran would translate into escalation on the northern front with Lebanon, the southern front with Yemen, the longer-range Iranian missile threat, and a return of the home front to a war footing. The recent disclosure of a covert Israeli military presence in Iraq under American cover could also broaden the arenas of confrontation if war resumes.
Another concern for Netanyahu is that the war with Hezbollah and his acquiescence to the American ceasefire decision may damage his electoral position — which he treats as a paramount objective. The confusing American trajectory threatens his hold on power. Moreover, should the Trump administration ultimately refrain from striking Iran, it would remove what may have been a Netanyahu contingency: cancelling elections on national security grounds.
Conclusions
Netanyahu is deeply troubled by American signals pointing toward a political resolution of the Iranian file. Should that materialize, he would face a crisis that is simultaneously regional, domestic, and political.
A political track would in practice push toward regional de-escalation across all fronts — which also aligns with Arab, regional, and international demands, and serves the interests of those seeking secure energy supply routes and prevention of an uncontrolled regional nuclear arms race.
The Lebanese front is existentially important for Netanyahu politically, and appears resolvable only through a political track. Operating from its assessment that toppling the Iranian regime and removing enriched uranium are unachievable, the Israeli military is working to hold the political level accountable rather than allowing blame to be deflected onto the institution. This pattern of competing narratives between the military and political leadership — particularly on Lebanon and Iran — is recurring.
Regionally, the capacity of states in the region to influence American decision-making has been notably reinforced, as demonstrated by the Saudi-Qatari initiative backed by Egypt and Turkey. Following Trump’s visit to China, a degree of calm in the Strait of Hormuz may signal an emerging international direction toward comprehensive de-escalation and a diplomatic exit for the strait and energy supply routes.
Bottom line: The risk of sliding back into renewed war remains real and serious, but its probability appears limited given current conditions.
