Truce on the Brink of Explosion: The Struggle of Wills Between Port Sudan and the Rapid Support Forces
By: Zaelnoon Suliman, Progress Center for Policies
Situation Assessment
Introduction:
The Sudanese scene is witnessing an escalation in political and military activity following the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) announcement of their approval of the humanitarian truce proposed by the Quartet Mechanism — comprising the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt — while the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) remain committed to a military confrontation as the means to achieve a decisive victory rather than entering into a political settlement.
Details:
On Thursday, November 6, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan announced their agreement to enter into the humanitarian truce proposed by the Quartet Mechanism (the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt), which would last between three to nine months.
The Security and Defense Council held an emergency session on November 5, chaired by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. The council called for continued general mobilization and popular enlistment to eliminate what it described as the “rebel militia and its mercenaries.” The meeting concluded that there would be no truce at the current time, emphasizing that military victory remains the priority.
On Tuesday, November 4, the Assistant Commander of the Sudanese Army, Lieutenant General Yasser al-Atta, during a meeting with leaders of the Joint Forces in Khartoum, pledged a decisive victory over the RSF. Al-Atta preempted the Security and Defense Council meeting with a press statement linking any ceasefire to the RSF’s surrender, the relocation of its forces to camps outside cities, and the handover of its weapons and equipment. He also demanded the prosecution of those who committed crimes or collaborated with the RSF — whether politically, militarily, or in the media — and stressed that the RSF leadership would have no political or military role in Sudan’s future.
Both warring parties continue to mobilize their forces in the Kordofan region, with drone airstrikes exchanged between them. The RSF targeted areas in North, South, and West Kordofan, while the army carried out drone strikes — which, according to the RSF, originated from a foreign base — on North and Central Darfur.
A White House spokesperson stated that Washington is “closely monitoring” the situation in Sudan, confirming that the U.S. administration is seriously engaged in the issue and in continuous contact with its Arab partners in the Quartet (the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the U.K.) to push efforts toward a peaceful settlement despite the complexity of the scene.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Aaty emphasized that a military solution is not possible and that the division of Sudan is a red line for Egypt, warning that partition would lead to regional catastrophes.
Analysis:
The Sudanese army has not yet officially responded to the Quartet’s truce proposal, despite the Security and Defense Council meeting, which did not provide a definitive answer. Several influential military leaders and pro-war allies from armed movements and Islamist groups have expressed their rejection of the truce.
According to analysts, this rejection stems from the Islamist faction’s control over the political decision-making center in the Port Sudan bloc and its opposition to the Quartet’s proposal — which explicitly aims to exclude Islamist forces from the future political process. The Quartet statement declared that “violent and extremist groups — some linked to the Muslim Brotherhood — cannot continue to dictate their destabilizing policies in Sudan and the region.”
The Islamist bloc’s stance aligns with that of certain armed struggle movements within the Joint Force, which view the RSF as a political, military, and social rival competing for influence in both Darfur and Khartoum.
This convergence of interests has created a unified pressure front against the pro-settlement faction within the military establishment, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy, General Shams al-Din al-Kabbashi, pushing the army to continue the war in order to improve its future negotiation position.
Observers believe this strategy aims to preserve the war faction’s interests and privileges within the central state by maintaining its regional-based dominance over the country’s civil and military institutions.
The Army’s Hardening Position:
Internal sources revealed that the army’s position paper demands:
-Extending the truce period to nine months instead of three,
-Expanding the mediation framework to include Turkey and Qatar,
-RSF withdrawal from besieged army garrisons in Babanusa, al-Obeid, and Ailawaj in the Triangle region (bordering Sudan, Libya, and Egypt),
-Ending troop build-ups and withdrawing RSF forces from North Kordofan (Al-Nuhud, Bara, Umm Sumaymah, and Al-Khowei) to designated locations,
-Removing all rocket launchers, drones, and UAV bases up to the RSF’s last positions in West Kordofan.
According to informed sources, Port Sudan’s hardened stance stems from two factors on which the Islamist war faction is relying in its existential confrontation with the RSF:
-A pragmatic partnership with the New Middle East Alliance, by abandoning ideological rigidity and joining the Abraham Accords camp led by the United States and Israel, in exchange for maintaining power as representatives of the so-called “moderate forces.”
-Upgrading its air arsenal with Russian systems to halt RSF advances after its takeover of El-Fasher, and to regain control over Darfur and Kordofan.
Reliable reports indicate that secret negotiations were accelerated since late August with Russian intermediaries to purchase Sukhoi (Su-27 and Su-30) fighter jets, but limited availability in Russia hindered the deal. Parallel talks explored alternatives in Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, focusing on sourcing engines compatible with Su-24 or K-8 (Chinese-Pakistani) aircraft.
Conclusion:
The latest developments reveal a deep internal divide within the Port Sudan camp between advocates of a political settlement and proponents of military escalation. The military leadership, backed by Islamist forces and certain armed movements, remains resolutely opposed to the Quartet’s proposed truce.
The Islamist faction’s dominance over decision-making within the Port Sudan bloc is a key reason behind the army’s lack of an official response, particularly since the Quartet’s plan seeks to exclude Islamists from the future political process.
The RSF’s acceptance of the truce gives it a political advantage, portraying it as open to a peaceful path and improving its international image, potentially easing human rights–related pressures and criticism.
Conversely, the army faces a complex dilemma: preserving the cohesion of its political and military alliances while balancing its international and regional obligations.
The Quartet will likely continue pushing for a long-term peace settlement, as the conflict increasingly transcends the military realm into a broader ideological and regional competition over who shapes Sudan’s political future — a trajectory that threatens to prolong and complicate the path toward any sustainable settlement.
