Policy Assessment by Ameer Makhoul, Progress Center for Policies – London
Preamble
Iran followed through on its threats following Israel’s strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, launching — for the first time — a missile attack on Israel on the evening of June 7th. Israel in turn threatened to retaliate against Iran, particularly against Tehran itself. Israeli political sources confirm that their actions are coordinated with Washington, and that operations in Lebanon — including targeting Beirut’s southern suburbs — were carried out within the framework of Israeli-American understandings.
US President Donald Trump stated he was not “happy with Israel’s targeting of the suburbs,” adding that Iran must stop firing missiles. He indicated he was awaiting a phone call with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that night, seeking to dissuade him from carrying out an Israeli strike against Iran.
The nature of developments suggests that Iran’s missile strikes on northern Israel — deliberately confined to that region and publicly announced as such — signals that Tehran’s messages are directed primarily at Washington, but also at Tel Aviv, Lebanon, regional states, and even Iran’s own domestic audience.
Toward America
The Iranian strikes disrupted American calculations that had been advancing — without resolution — along a negotiating track, aimed at improving US terms through the continued blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and the possible delivery of a final blow to the “Unity of the Arenas” strategy, one of whose main fronts runs through Lebanon.
The Iranian missile strikes on Israel also serve to communicate to the United States that the strategic landscape of the region, as traditionally calculated by Washington, is fundamentally shifting. In Iran’s view, Israel is no longer the actor that deters others and threatens their regimes and state structures — nor the United States’ unqualifiedly strongest ally. Tehran is signaling to Washington that Israel’s relative weight has diminished, and that Iran is working to reclaim the initiative and transition from a posture of permanent defensive reaction to offensive action.
Through this shift, Iran is inviting the Trump administration to negotiate on different terms and at a different pace — as a state that believes it is rebuilding the capabilities that the US and Israel sought to erode. Tehran also seeks to strain the Washington–Tel Aviv relationship, drawing on Trump’s statements expressing dissatisfaction with Israel’s strike on the suburbs, and insinuating that Netanyahu’s policies risk dragging the United States into a long, open-ended war — something at odds with Trump’s stated priorities.
Iran is also betting that Trump will prevent a broad Israeli retaliation and impose restraint on Netanyahu, driven by American calculations that favor negotiating with Iran to reach a settlement ending the war — particularly given that Washington is itself the initiator and sponsor of the ongoing Israeli-Lebanese negotiations taking place in the American capital.
Toward Israel
Assessments still suggest that Israel cannot easily absorb the Iranian strikes, given the fundamental shift in regional equations they represent. Iran is effectively declaring that its primary weapon is its missile arsenal — not its nuclear program — and that it will not relinquish it in any future negotiations.
The Iranian attack on Israel thus constitutes an event with potentially far-reaching strategic consequences: for the concept of deterrence, for the transition to an offensive posture, and as a public challenge to the special nature of the US-Israel relationship.
If Israel responds broadly and openly, it may not align with the Trump administration’s priorities. But if Israel refrains from responding due to an American-imposed decision, this could damage Netanyahu’s political future. In either case, Israel remains an indirect party to the ongoing American-Iranian negotiations.
On the level of Israeli public opinion, the Iranian missile strikes are expected to intensify anger toward Netanyahu and his government. Should Israel re-enter the war — as the reinstatement of emergency measures may suggest — it would return to a war of attrition just as economic, commercial, and tourism activity had begun recovering.
Conversely, if Netanyahu does not retaliate — due to American pressure or decision — this could represent a significant step toward his political end, as a growing segment of the Israeli public becomes convinced of the limits of his ability to follow through on his escalatory rhetoric. It may also reinforce the perception of a declining Israeli deterrence and eroding confidence in existing security arrangements, even if this does not translate into direct demands for political alternatives.
In the context of Israeli elections, the Iranian missile strikes make non-retaliation a highly unlikely option — unless it is imposed by Washington. Israel has opposed most of the ceasefire decisions initiated by the US with Iran, in Lebanon, and earlier in Gaza, despite the fragility of those decisions at the implementation level.
Netanyahu has therefore systematically sought to obstruct any final agreement between Tehran and Washington, or at minimum to influence its content and terms. An Israeli strike against Iran may thus represent a last opportunity to reshuffle the cards and derail any comprehensive American settlement process involving both Iran and Lebanon.
Toward Lebanon
It is clear that the Lebanese state continues to be treated as an arena of conflict rather than as a responsible actor in charge of its own sovereignty and national interests.
In practice, Iran’s strikes on Israel weaken the Lebanese state’s position and draw Lebanon — directly or indirectly — into regional and international rivalries. Linking the targeting of northern Israel to the targeting of Beirut’s southern suburbs entrenches an equation that may deepen internal complications and push the country toward higher levels of tension and confrontation. This objective is not unique to Iranian calculations; it also intersects with Netanyahu’s government’s own approach and goals.
Practically, Lebanon is once again held hostage to these tensions — or risks paying their price — should the Iranian strikes succeed in strengthening Tehran’s negotiating position with Washington and accelerating negotiations between them. In that scenario, Lebanon lacks sufficient capacity to protect its interests independently of the American role, at a moment when Washington is directly engaged in negotiations with Iran.
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, meanwhile, provide Lebanon with a degree of political and regional support that helps limit the domestic fallout from these tensions — though only to a limited extent.
Toward Iran — Internally
The Iranian regime is betting that this move will bolster its domestic image and reinforce the narrative of resilience and perseverance in the face of external pressure — weakening narratives about the possibility of its collapse or fall, as promoted by certain circles in the United States and Israel.
In this vein, the regime seeks to project an image of a strong, cohesive state capable of taking initiative — one that can push broad segments of Iranian society toward accepting its continuation and moving away from political alternatives or other paths of change.
Conclusion
The coming days will reveal whether Iran has succeeded in achieving its objectives: returning to negotiations with Washington to end the war without abandoning the pillars of its regional strategy.
On the Israeli side, the situation may manifest as rising popular anger toward Netanyahu and his failures, making the option of no military retaliation unlikely — especially amid a heated electoral contest.
Netanyahu is aware that the limits of his political and military maneuverability remain tied to the American position, both in terms of substance and the ability to impose choices.
On the American side, the preferred option remains negotiating with Iran and ending the war within an approach that links the various related regional files.
Current developments represent a new juncture that may open the door to broad regional settlements — or, alternatively, pave the way for a renewed war.
Iran’s messages are multi-directional and multi-addressed, crafted according to precise calculations from Tehran’s perspective. Yet the coming days alone will determine whether those calculations prove correct or mistaken — and whether Iran’s move serves the “Unity of the Arenas” strategy or effectively trades it away at the negotiating table.
