Policy analysis by Ameer Makhoul, Progress Center for Policies
Introduction:
According to Israeli media, the security agreement between Israel and Syria, which the Trump administration seeks to sign on September 29, 2025, on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly, will take place in a tripartite meeting bringing together Trump, Netanyahu, and Sharaa.
A preparatory meeting was held on the 22nd of this month between the Syrian foreign minister and the Israeli minister of strategic affairs. Israeli media, citing Independent Arabia Saudi, noted that the Trump administration is pressuring Netanyahu to convene the tripartite meeting on that date.
Notes:
In his September 23 speech before the General Assembly, Trump claimed to have resolved seven armed conflicts, though not all were accurate, and argued this qualified him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Meanwhile, Tom Barrack, U.S. ambassador to Turkey and envoy for the Syrian and Lebanese files, said peace in the region is far off and unlikely, and that security agreements do not last. In a long interview with Sky News, he stressed that the United States will not fight others’ wars — a principle firmly rooted in Trump’s doctrine. Yet Trump portrayed the Israeli–Syrian security agreement as the “eighth conflict” he resolved.
In the Syrian reality, amid regional and international rivalries, Israel is not interested in normalization, while Turkey strongly opposes any possibility of the Syrian regime joining the Abraham Accords, given their security alliance with Israel. From the U.S. perspective, the security agreement could later evolve into a comprehensive political settlement and lasting peace. But Washington is clear that Israel will not withdraw from Syria — neither from Mount Hermon nor, certainly, from the Golan Heights, occupied in 1967 and annexed under Israeli law.
In the same interview, Barrack emphasized that Israel will not withdraw from the five positions it has held in Lebanon since the last war, adding that defeating Hezbollah is the task of the Lebanese Army, which he described as “mostly Sunni,” facing the Shiite party. He considered the army’s sectarian composition a key factor in disarming Hezbollah, on an identity-based and doctrinal basis. This approach aligns with the agreement’s clause preventing Iran’s use of Syrian territory, while Israel and the U.S. highlight the Syrian army’s sectarian character. It effectively assigns the Syrian regime a functional role in Lebanon’s internal affairs to secure outcomes favorable to Israel and the U.S.
The U.S. administration follows a doctrine of “diplomacy backed by force.” Since it avoids waging others’ wars in the region, it threatens both Syria and Lebanon with Israeli military force, leaving them under the weight of Israeli intervention — carried out almost exclusively by the Israeli Air Force.
Israel appears willing to show flexibility regarding the use of Syrian airspace, restricting it exclusively to strikes against Iran or preventing weapons transfers. It also seeks to impose balances against Turkey in Syria, aiming for power-sharing under Israeli terms. This “flexibility,” according to Washington, is possible because Israel possesses strategic capabilities that compensate for concessions. Still, Israel will not abandon its long-standing doctrine with the previous Syrian regime — the “war between wars” strategy, preemptively striking any emerging capabilities before they force a full-scale confrontation.
Another condition of the agreement is banning the transfer of heavy Syrian weapons south of Damascus. It also includes a settlement, in line with Israeli terms, requiring the Syrian regime to integrate “minority groups” — specifically Druze and Kurds, as Israel defines them — into the political system, and a special arrangement for the Suwayda region. Reports in Israeli media claim Israel is funding about 3,000 fighters in Suwayda with military aid and is behind the raising of Israeli flags and calls among some Syrian Druze circles for secession and self-determination.
On this issue, Israel lacks internal consensus. Some argue that pushing Druze separatism could entangle Israel in the long term, since its obligation is to its Druze citizens, not Syrian ones. Another viewpoint suggests Israel should instead deepen Syria’s fragmented identities — particularly among Druze and Kurds — to serve Israeli policy interests, even if that means conceding its alliance with the SDF to Turkey in northeastern Syria, while maintaining influence in Suwayda under Turkish-approved power-sharing.
Conclusion:
Israel, backed by the U.S., exploits the Syrian regime’s internal weakness and its quest for international legitimacy to impose a security agreement entirely on Israeli terms — including maintaining its occupation and consolidating its influence in Syria.
Israel pursues a strategy of avoiding direct war with Turkey, instead enforcing power-sharing in Syria.
The tripartite security agreement — Trump, Netanyahu, and Sharaa — in New York on September 29 grants Israel unprecedented security influence in Syria, with international endorsement.
The agreement serves to curtail French influence in both the Syrian and Lebanese files.
While the agreement may provide the Syrian regime with some stability, it comes at the cost of national sovereignty — making it far more than a mere “security” arrangement.
