Policy Assessment
Zaelnoon Suliman, Progress Center for Policies
This assessment analyzes the repercussions of the Saudi–Emirati rift on prospects for ending the war in Sudan, in light of escalating tensions between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These tensions are rooted in the Yemen file and the broader struggle for maritime influence in the Red Sea. The assessment concludes that this rift has become a direct obstructive factor to regional mediation efforts—particularly within the framework of the Quadrilateral Mechanism tasked with ending the Sudanese conflict.
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General Context
The deterioration of Saudi–Emirati relations has undermined levels of political and security coordination between the two states. Given that they are the most influential regional actors within the Quadrilateral Mechanism, this divergence has negatively affected the effectiveness of diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the war in Sudan.
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Impact on the Mediation Track in Sudan
• Declining Effectiveness of the Quadrilateral Mechanism:
Western actors—especially the United States and the United Kingdom—rely on Saudi and Emirati weight due to their lack of direct operational tools on the ground in Sudan. In the absence of Gulf consensus, the mechanism’s ability to apply coordinated and effective pressure on the warring parties erodes.
• Politicization of the Peace Process:
The Gulf dispute is linked to a broader competition over control of maritime corridors in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. As Sudan possesses a strategically significant Red Sea coastline, competing regional agendas draw the peace process into geopolitical alignments, weakening the neutrality of mediation efforts.
• Absence of a Unified Gulf Position:
It has become increasingly difficult to formulate a joint policy of pressure or financial incentives toward Sudan. This shifts the file from a framework of “collective management” to one of “competitive balancing,” reducing the prospects for a comprehensive political settlement.
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Implications for the Behavior of Sudanese Conflict Parties
• The Gulf split encourages the warring parties to stall and buy time, exploiting divergent regional messages to avoid making substantive concessions.
• It increases the likelihood of renewed bets on military victory with uncoordinated external backing.
• It redirects potential Saudi engagement away from supporting the political process toward prioritizing Red Sea security considerations (ports, coastlines, and supply lines).
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Outlook for the International Role
The U.S. role within the Quadrilateral Mechanism is likely to focus on containing the effects of the Saudi–Emirati dispute and preventing it from causing total paralysis, by maintaining a minimum level of political coordination. It is also expected that the mechanism’s priorities will be recalibrated from pursuing a “comprehensive political solution” toward a risk-management approach, including:
• Protecting maritime navigation in the Red Sea,
• Preventing the disintegration of the Sudanese state,
• Limiting the expansion of influence by competing international powers.
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Conclusion
Any meaningful progress toward ending the war in Sudan remains contingent upon achieving at least a minimum level of Saudi–Emirati consensus, particularly on the Yemen file and Red Sea security. In the absence of such consensus, regional and international mediation efforts will remain limited in impact, while the risks of prolonging the conflict—and transforming Sudan into an open arena for regional power competition—will continue to grow.
