The Repercussions of the American-Iranian Conflict on Africa: Economic Risks and Food Security
Assessment by Zaelnoon Suliman , Progress Center for Policies – London
Preamble:
The military escalation between the United States and Iran presents a compounded challenge for African states, which already suffer from structural fragility in their economies and a high degree of dependence on imports of energy, food, and agricultural production inputs. As global supply chains are disrupted and the costs of shipping and insurance rise, the burden of the conflict has been transmitted directly into the African interior — threatening the stability of domestic markets and placing agricultural seasons under serious strain.
These developments converge with warnings issued by international institutions, among them the United Nations Development Programme and the World Food Programme, regarding escalating food insecurity risks and the erosion of African governments’ capacity to absorb external shocks, given their limited fiscal resources and mounting debt burdens.
Analysis
First: Structural Fragility Laid Bare Under the Pressure of Global Shocks
The current crisis exposes deep structural fragility in African economies, which are net importers of both energy and food. International estimates indicate that the continent imports annually between $70 and $100 billion worth of food, more than $120 billion in refined petroleum products, and upward of 6 million tonnes of fertilisers.
Disruptions to maritime navigation and rising insurance costs — particularly in the context of tensions linked to the Strait of Hormuz — have produced sharp price increases. In countries such as Nigeria and Malawi, fuel prices have risen by between 30% and 50%, while fertiliser prices have surged by more than 40%, directly threatening the agricultural season across West and Central Africa.
These indicators confirm the conclusions reached during both the COVID-19 crisis and the Russian-Ukrainian war, when African governments demonstrated limited capacity to build rapid alternatives and were compelled to resort to costly borrowing — resulting in declining productivity and a widening food security gap.
Second: Mounting Financial Pressures and Declining Governmental Response Capacity
International data indicate that a growing number of African states face a dual predicament: rising borrowing costs and increasing debt repayment obligations. According to estimates from international financial institutions, more than ten African countries — including Kenya, Ghana, and Egypt — are experiencing debt pressures that exceed safe thresholds, constraining their ability to finance crisis responses.
In this context, rising energy and food prices are depleting foreign currency reserves at a time when global capital is gravitating toward more stable markets, further aggravating the financing crisis. Assessments suggest that many African governments may be unable to secure agricultural production inputs in a timely manner, threatening a decline in domestic output and a deepening dependence on imports.
Third: Food Security Under Dual Pressure
The World Food Programme warns that the repercussions of the conflict could push approximately 45 million additional people worldwide to the brink of acute hunger, with a significant concentration of these risks in Africa. The United Nations Development Programme similarly indicates that rising agricultural input costs will lead to reduced production and higher food prices, particularly in low-income economies.
These risks are compounded by the continent’s dependence on fertiliser imports, where any supply disruption translates directly into an impact on agricultural output. This means that the conflict affects not merely prices but productive capacity itself — raising the prospect of a shift from a price crisis to an availability crisis.
Fourth: Africa’s Exposure to Shifts in Global Capital
Recent years have witnessed substantial Gulf investments in Africa, with total foreign direct investment from Gulf Cooperation Council states between 2012 and 2025 exceeding $179 billion — distributed as follows: the UAE at $64.3 billion, Saudi Arabia at $28.7 billion, and Qatar at $9.2 billion.
However, the continuation of regional tensions may prompt these states to redirect their resources toward domestic or regional priorities, including military expenditure or reconstruction, potentially leading to a decline in investment flows toward Africa. Private assessments suggest that such a decline, should it materialise, would directly affect infrastructure, energy, and agricultural projects across the continent.
Fifth: Limited Governmental Responses Reflecting the Depth of the Crisis
The measures adopted by some African governments reflect the scale of the pressure bearing down upon them. Madagascar has declared a state of emergency in the energy sector; Egypt has imposed restrictions on electricity consumption; and Tanzania has resorted to symbolic austerity measures to reduce fuel consumption.
These responses indicate that governments’ room for manoeuvre is narrow, and that the current responses remain adaptive and short-term in character rather than constituting long-term structural solutions.
Recommendations
The current crisis makes plain that addressing economic fragility in Africa can no longer remain hostage to isolated national responses or excessive dependence on external actors. What is required instead is:
-More ambitious regional approaches built around the formation of quasi-confederal economic blocs, particularly in West Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa.
-Enhanced integration through open borders, free zones, and the coordination of fiscal and trade policies — measures capable of expanding market size, alleviating geopolitical constraints, and addressing the challenges posed by ethnic intermixing and the colonial legacy of national and border divisions.
-The adoption of this model would provide a more attractive environment for external investment and strengthen African states’ capacity for collective bargaining, contributing to greater economic autonomy and resilience in the face of global shocks.
Conclusions
The war and the Strait of Hormuz crisis represent the core of an extended international crisis that reaches far beyond the Middle East to affect Africa directly — above all in the areas of food security and market stability — reflecting the fragility of the global economic system in the face of geopolitical shocks.
The urgent need for comprehensive international initiatives to restructure African debt is brought into sharp relief, through coordinated mechanisms that bring creditors together in a manner that lightens the financial burden and creates greater space for crisis response.
The role of multilateral institutions becomes increasingly vital, particularly in providing credit support instruments, financing guarantees, and the activation of debt suspension mechanisms during crises — reducing the pressure on national budgets.
Investment in renewable energy and the localisation of agricultural production chains becomes a strategic priority for reducing external dependence and building resilience against shocks.
The need for more advanced regional integration approaches is equally clear — founded on the construction of flexible or quasi-confederal economic blocs in West Africa, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa, encompassing the facilitation of trade flows, open borders, and free zones. This would contribute to expanding markets, attracting investment, and strengthening collective capacity to confront crises.
The crisis reveals that Africa is bearing the cost of a global economic system it played no part in shaping — calling for a fundamental reassessment of development financing mechanisms and for enabling the continent to transition from fragility toward stability and economic sovereignty.
