The Balance of Positives and Negatives Under U.S. Pressure
Mustafa Al-Miqdad, Progress Center for Policies – Damascus
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I. Background
Over the past few weeks, the Syrian–Israeli track has witnessed notable diplomatic–security movement—the most significant in years—represented by undisclosed meetings and other anticipated meetings in Paris, under direct U.S.–French sponsorship. This development comes as Washington reactivates mediation channels between Damascus and Tel Aviv within an approach led by the U.S. administration under President Donald Trump, focused on managing disputes and reducing risk levels rather than pursuing comprehensive political settlements.
Available information—based on intersecting official and media sources—suggests that the current move has gone beyond mere testing of intentions and is moving toward a disciplined, clearly bounded negotiating path centered on reactivating the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, without entering a political peace process or public normalization. Accordingly, the track takes on a technical security character, with outcomes measured by its ability to contain tension rather than redefine the conflict.
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II. The Governing Assumption of the Assessment
This assessment is premised on the core assumption that the proposed track is primarily security-driven and does not currently include elements of mutual political recognition or a final settlement. Rather, it aims to reduce escalation risks and prevent an explosion on the Syrian–Israeli front, operating within a logic of controlled engagement rather than a logic of comprehensive political resolution. On this basis, the potential positives and negatives for each party are evaluated within a realistic framework and limited expectations.
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III. Priorities of the New Syrian State and the سقف (Ceiling) of Political Maneuvering
Estimates from research centers and monitoring circles in Damascus indicate that the Syrian state, in its current phase, is operating according to a priority ladder different from traditional approaches to sensitive regional tracks. At the top of these priorities is the pursuit of an urgent and relative remedy for the economic and livelihood crisis, viewed as the most immediate and stability-shaping challenge. This includes securing urgent support and aid flows, reactivating key economic mechanisms, and creating a minimum level of financial and service stability.
In this context, constitutional and institutional milestones acquire particular importance—especially the convening of the first session of the People’s Assembly in its new term—to pass a package of reform and regulatory laws and decrees, introduce carefully calibrated constitutional amendments, and ratify international agreements, some of which carry high political and sovereignty sensitivity. These priorities also include complex structural files such as establishing legal and political frameworks for integrating armed forces into a unified national army and adopting an operational model of administrative decentralization that balances state unity with effective local governance.
According to observers in Damascus, these files constitute core issues that grant the Syrian state a wider political and temporal margin of maneuver, enabling it to postpone engaging in the signing of any highly sensitive regional security agreement—particularly those directly tied to the Syrian–Israeli track—without being compelled to open the file of the occupied Syrian Golan or bring it into short-term bargaining.
Conversely, placing these issues on the agenda and demonstrating serious engagement with them can serve as indirect political pressure on the United States and the international community to provide rapid and urgent assistance that contributes to economic revival and stability consolidation, on the grounds that this is a necessary condition for the success of any subsequent de-escalation tracks or understandings.
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IV. The Syrian Side: Security Gains Versus Sovereignty Considerations
From the Syrian perspective, the proposed track offers a set of potential gains, foremost among them a reduction in direct military pressure. Reactivating the disengagement agreement could contribute to decreasing the pace of Israeli strikes and reducing the risk of sliding into a broad, uncalculated confrontation, particularly in southern Syria. A more stable southern front could also provide a more suitable environment for renewed security control, the restoration of state authority, and the reduction of disorder and the proliferation of undisciplined actors.
Politically, the track opens a window for indirect communication with the United States, partially breaking political isolation and reinforcing Damascus’ image as a party engaged in de-escalation rather than escalation. Syrian commitment to the security component can also be leveraged as a bargaining card for the future, whether to seek political or economic incentives or to reduce certain international pressures.
At the same time, several risks stand out, most notably the possibility of indirect harm to sovereignty if temporary security arrangements evolve into long-term constraints imposed outside a balanced alignment of interests. The absence of binding U.S. guarantees is also a troubling factor, given precedents suggesting limited U.S. capacity—or willingness—to compel Israel to uphold long-term commitments. Added to this is the possibility of strained relations with certain regional allies if the track is interpreted as an uncoordinated repositioning, as well as risks of domestic political or popular pressure if the track is read as an undeclared normalization step.
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V. The Israeli Side: Neutralizing the Front and the Cost of Constraint
For Israel, the track provides direct security gains, primarily by neutralizing the Syrian front and reducing multi-front risks amid ongoing tension in Gaza and Lebanon. Reactivating the 1974 agreement also offers an internationally legitimized security framework that helps stabilize comfortable rules of engagement without requiring Israel to enter a comprehensive peace process or make political concessions.
Domestically, the Israeli government can market the track as a security achievement backed directly by the United States, strengthening its standing in a pressurized internal political environment. However, these gains carry potential costs, including constraints on the margin for preemptive strikes and greater political pressure from Washington on Israel’s freedom of military movement. Additionally, the practical recognition of Damascus as a sovereign negotiating party could strengthen Syria’s regional position and provoke internal objections from hardline right-wing currents.
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
Political circles and observers in Damascus estimate that the ongoing Syrian–Israeli track, under current U.S. pressure, is likely to produce limited and temporary security understandings that meet both sides’ needs for containing tension, without reaching the level of a comprehensive political settlement or public normalization.
These circles consider that Damascus’ approach will remain governed by internal priorities—particularly economic and institutional ones—and by a clear sovereignty ceiling that rejects transforming temporary security arrangements into long-term obligations.
It is likely that the Syrian state will pursue a policy of managing time and widening its room for maneuver by linking any progress on the security track to the extent to which the United States and the international community respond to requirements for urgent economic support and the easing of pressures. Any potential understandings are expected to be treated as situational tools to regulate engagement, not as an entry point to redefining the conflict or bypassing major sovereignty issues.
These assessments conclude that confining understandings to a narrow technical security framework—and refraining from signing sensitive agreements in the absence of clear international guarantees or tangible political–economic returns—appears the more probable option. It is also expected that constitutional and institutional milestones will be used as a political lever to improve the terms of indirect negotiation, and that the economic recovery file will be employed as a pressure tool on Washington and the international community, as an essential entry point for any long-term stability.
