POLICY PAPER by Dr. Mohamad Kawas | Progress Center for Policies
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
-The Islamabad negotiations represent a historic turning point in the conflict and reflect a mutual, genuine willingness to reach an agreement.
-The absence of a clear military victory complicated the prospects for concession and settlement at the negotiating table.
-Iran was represented by a state-level delegation, while Washington dispatched its most senior political figure to conclude the deal.
-Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz — and Washington’s subsequent blockade — pushed the conflict to its most extreme dimensions.
INTRODUCTION
The Iranian-American negotiations in Islamabad constitute an unprecedented episode in the history of relations between Washington and Tehran — most notably for being the first direct, high-level talks between representatives of both sides since the founding of the Islamic Republic. Although the negotiations failed to produce an agreement, the event itself, its circumstances, and its outcomes are conditioning Iran and the region for scenarios of both peace and war whose signs remain contradictory — particularly following Washington’s decision to impose a blockade on the Strait of Hormuz.
TWENTY-ONE HOURS OF NEGOTIATIONS
On April 11, 2026, the Pakistani capital of Islamabad hosted the first direct, high-level negotiations between the United States and Iran in decades — an attempt to convert a fragile two-week ceasefire into a lasting settlement ending a six-week war.
The talks lasted approximately 21 hours across multiple intensive rounds interspersed with bilateral meetings with the Pakistani side.
The event tested the capacity of Pakistani diplomacy to draw both countries into direct talks for the first time, after all previous negotiating sessions — under both the Biden and Trump administrations — had been conducted indirectly. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Asim Munir served as the principal mediators, holding separate and then joint meetings with both delegations to narrow the gap between positions.
NEGOTIATING AGENDA
The American delegation was led by Vice President JD Vance, accompanied by Presidential Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and presidential adviser Jared Kushner. The Iranian delegation was led by Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, joined by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and Foreign Ministry Spokesman Esmail Baghaei.
Upon arriving in Islamabad, Ghalibaf stated that Iran came in “good faith” but “without trust” in the American side, insisting that Washington accept Iran’s preconditions — including a ceasefire in Lebanon and the release of frozen Iranian assets. He declared Iran was “prepared to reach a genuine agreement if its rights are granted,” while warning that past experience with the United States had proven the absence of trust.
On the same day, the destroyers USS Frank E. Petersen and USS Michael Moore transited the Strait of Hormuz — the first passage of US warships since the outbreak of the war. Washington described the operation as “establishing a safe corridor and clearing mines” planted by Revolutionary Guard forces. Tehran interpreted the transit as a direct pressure signal during negotiations and an attempt to demonstrate American control over the waterway through which approximately one-fifth of global oil trade passes.
Negotiations centered on five key issues:
-Iran’s nuclear program
-Iran’s ballistic missile program
-Iranian regional policy, including support for proxies: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and pro-Iran militias in Iraq
-The lifting of sanctions on Iran and the release of frozen assets
-The full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz
The Iranian side presented a ten-point paper demanding recognition of Iran’s right to peaceful enrichment, the complete lifting of sanctions, and compensation for war damages. In response, the American delegation insisted on an absolute commitment to “no nuclear weapons,” along with restrictions on missiles and regional influence. Vice President Vance noted he had been in contact with President Trump six times during the negotiations, affirming the administration came in “good faith” but would not accept any solution allowing Iran to approach nuclear weapons capability.
THE NEGOTIATIONS IN TWO NARRATIVES
The talks proceeded in an atmosphere of deep mutual distrust. Iranian media, citing sources close to the delegation, reported “partial understanding” on certain humanitarian issues and partial sanctions relief, alongside Pakistani de-escalation initiatives on Lebanon. Some accounts described sharp exchanges over the nuclear file and Hormuz, including a confrontation between Araghchi and Witkoff.
Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Baghaei stated that the Iranian delegation had “negotiated continuously for 21 hours,” that there was “understanding on a number of points,” while disagreement persisted on three core issues: the nuclear program, missiles, and regional presence. He added that “the path of diplomacy has not been closed,” and that diplomacy for Iran represents “the continuation of the sacred struggle in defense of Iranian soil” — warning that Tehran “will not forget broken promises and the crimes committed by America.”
On the American side, Vice President Vance stated at a press conference: “We did not reach an agreement. Iran rejected our final and best offer.” He described the failure as “bad news for Iran more than for the United States,” affirming Tehran had “chosen not to accept American conditions” — particularly the explicit commitment to not seeking nuclear weapons. Vance left a “final” paper in Islamabad awaiting Tehran’s response. President Trump posted on Truth Social a brief message linking to an article headlined: “The Trump Card the President Holds If Iran Does Not Yield: A Naval Blockade.”
Parliamentary Speaker Ghalibaf stated after the talks that “the American delegation failed to earn the trust of the Iranian side,” adding the time had come for Washington to decide whether it was capable of building trust. Foreign Minister Araghchi indicated the negotiations took place in an atmosphere of “distrust and suspicion,” noting that “a deal in a single round was never expected,” and that Iran would continue working to bridge gaps provided its legitimate rights were respected.
THE POSITIONS OF WASHINGTON AND TEHRAN
The American Position
Washington maintains a hardline stance focused on permanently preventing Iran from acquiring military nuclear capabilities — holding that while the war destroyed Iran’s facilities and removed the immediate threat, it did not resolve the strategic problem. Vance and Trump believe any agreement must include a clear Iranian commitment to renouncing nuclear weapons, along with restrictions on missiles and regional influence. They view military pressure — such as the destroyer transit through Hormuz — as necessary to push Tehran toward concessions. This reflects a “maximum pressure” strategy combined with a desire to avoid a new full-scale war due to its catastrophic global economic costs.
The Iranian Position
Tehran insists on its “legitimate rights” to peaceful enrichment, viewing any concession in the aftermath of military strikes as “surrender” threatening the domestic legitimacy of the regime. Ghalibaf and Araghchi hold the United States responsible for the lack of trust, arguing any agreement must include full sanctions relief, compensation, and an end to the Israeli war in Lebanon. The Iranian delegation uses populist language to reinforce the domestic narrative of resistance, while maintaining tactical flexibility that allows for future rounds.
THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ: THE HEART OF THE CRISIS
Immediately following the failure of the Islamabad talks, Trump announced a full naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, declaring Iran a “continuing threat to global energy security.” The move signals a shift from diplomatic to military-economic pressure: Trump ordered the US Navy to prevent Iranian or Iran-linked vessels from transiting the strait, while permitting non-Iranian commercial ships to pass under American supervision. He described the decision as “necessary to force Iran back to the negotiating table under realistic conditions,” asserting that “Hormuz will not be a weapon in the hands of terrorists.”
The decision sparked wide debate, structured around two views:
-Supporters argue it represents a smart alternative to costly ground war — leveraging American naval superiority to strangle the Iranian economy without significant casualties, while sending a strong signal to Iran’s partners Russia and China.
-Opponents warn the blockade could trigger rapid escalation, including asymmetric Iranian attacks on commercial vessels or American bases in the Gulf — driving oil prices to unprecedented levels and threatening the global economy.
Iran’s reaction was unequivocal. Ghalibaf described the decision as “an explicit declaration of war,” warning Iran “will respond with full force” and possesses the capability to close the strait completely if the blockade continues. Araghchi stated that “any attempt to impose a blockade on Hormuz will turn into a regional catastrophe,” insisting Tehran regards the strait as part of its sovereignty and will not allow it to become “an American corridor.” Baghaei declared the blockade “proves the failure of American diplomacy” and “will unite the Iranian people further around resistance.”
Two competing frameworks govern the view of Hormuz:
The American Framework: Washington regards control of the Strait of Hormuz as a global strategic necessity, viewing any Iranian threat to close it as justification for immediate military response. Vance affirmed that “Hormuz will not be closed to global commerce,” seeing the destroyer transit during the Islamabad talks as a clear message that Washington can force the strait open by force if necessary.
The Iranian Framework: Tehran insists the Strait of Hormuz falls within its territorial waters, and that any American activity there without coordination constitutes “aggression” demanding a response. Ghalibaf had warned prior to Trump’s blockade announcement that any attempt to impose American control would lead to “a full-scale war in the Gulf.”
CONCLUSIONS AND ASSESSMENTS
A naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could serve as an effective pressure tool to force Iran back to the negotiating table on American terms — but risks rapid escalation involving Iranian attacks on commercial vessels or US bases in the region, driving up global energy costs and threatening the world economy.
The form of the negotiations — direct, with the highest-level representation from both countries, lasting 21 hours across three rounds — indicates genuine seriousness from both sides. A purely ceremonial negotiation would have seen one party withdraw early.
Failure to reach an agreement immediately after the war is both logical and expected, given the complexity of the files and the difficulty for either side to walk back positions they had not conceded before the war.
The post-failure statements from both sides maintain a non-hostile tone, preserving calm diplomatic language — which may reflect a continued belief on both sides in the possibility of a future deal.
Iran’s dispatch to Islamabad of a delegation reportedly exceeding 80 individuals — representing technical, political, military, and security bodies including the Revolutionary Guard — reflects the full weight of state authority and a genuine desire to conclude a reasonable agreement.
Both sides are believed to have no desire to return to war. Even Trump’s resort to a naval blockade may signal that all-out war is not his next choice.
Trump appears to have stripped Tehran of the Hormuz card — which Iran had counted on to soften Washington’s demands on other files — while that card, if played, turns the entire international community against Iran.
The risk of war resuming remains elevated in the short term, particularly if Tehran responds militarily to Washington’s blockade of Hormuz.
Both sides lean toward avoiding full-scale war due to its prohibitive costs: soaring oil prices, severe economic losses, and sweeping regional risks.
Resumption of negotiations is the more realistic scenario — most likely through indirect channels via Pakistani or Omani mediation — particularly if the ceasefire holds and global economic pressure takes effect.
