The Impact of the Chinese–Russian Position on the War in Iran
Policy Assessment by Dr. Mohamad Kawas – Progress Center for Policies
Introduction
Following the phone call between the Russian and U.S. presidents to discuss “proposals” for ending the war in Iran, it is worth examining Moscow and Beijing’s positions on the conflict in light of their shared interests with Iran and the influence and room for maneuver they possess to shape outcomes that could affect their interests in the region and globally.
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Key Developments
• March 9, 2026: Russian President Vladimir Putin held a phone call with U.S. President Donald Trump described as “frank and constructive,” lasting approximately one hour. According to reports, the discussion focused on ending the war in Iran quickly through a political and diplomatic settlement.
• March 8, 2026: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned that “planning a color revolution or regime change in Iran will not find public support,” calling for respect for Iran’s sovereignty and an immediate halt to U.S.–Israeli military operations.
• March 7, 2026: CNN cited U.S. intelligence sources claiming that Russia has been providing Iran with precise intelligence regarding the locations and movements of U.S. forces, warships, and aircraft in the Middle East, including satellite imagery from Russian military orbital systems.
• The same sources indicated that China has shown “signs of readiness” to provide financial support, spare parts, and missile components to Iran.
• March 7, 2026: In an interview with NBC News, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi confirmed that Russia and China support Iran “politically and otherwise.” He added that “military cooperation with Russia is not new, nor is it secret—it existed in the past, continues today, and will continue in the future.”
• March 8, 2026: U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth downplayed reports of Russian intelligence support, saying, “No one is putting us in danger.”
• March 5, 2026: Russia and China condemned the attacks on Iran. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that there is “no evidence” that Tehran is seeking to build a nuclear bomb, while Beijing called for an immediate halt to the attacks.
• March 3, 2026: Russia, China, and Turkey jointly called for an immediate end to the war. The Chinese foreign minister also informed his Israeli counterpart that Beijing opposes the air campaign and calls for dialogue.
• March 2, 2026: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning confirmed Beijing and Moscow’s support for convening an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council regarding Iran, stressing the need to respect Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
• Despite these positions, sources indicate that Tehran feels its “strategic partnerships” with Moscow and Beijing are extremely limited, and that verbal support alone is insufficient to counter the intensive air campaign. Iran has reportedly requested greater assistance—advanced weapons, air defense systems, or even indirect intervention—but neither country has so far provided direct military support capable of altering the balance of power on the ground.
• Reports indicate that China’s interests can be summarized as follows:
1. Iran serves as a key source of discounted oil (at times accounting for roughly 10–15 percent of Chinese imports).
2. China seeks stability in the Strait of Hormuz to secure energy supply routes.
3. Maintaining a stable regime in Tehran supports China’s Belt and Road Initiative and balances U.S. influence.
4. Beijing fears that escalation could drive global energy prices higher or close the strait, harming its economy.
• Monitoring reports suggest that Russia’s interests include:
1. Benefiting from Iran as a partner in confronting the West and as a market for arms.
2. Preventing the loss of another ally after the fall of the previous regime in Syria and the absence of leadership in Venezuela.
3. The war distracting U.S. attention from Ukraine.
4. Rising oil prices benefiting the Russian economy.
• Research institutions also note that China maintains strong economic relations with Israel, while Russia continues to keep communication channels open with Tel Aviv, including military coordination in Syria. Putin has previously offered to mediate.
• Russian sources state that while Moscow is aligned with Iran and has a partnership agreement with it, the agreement does not include a mutual defense clause similar to Russia’s treaty with North Korea.
• The sources add that Moscow is mindful of Putin’s relationship with Trump and of Trump’s role in easing Russia’s Western isolation since receiving Putin in Alaska in August 2025. Accordingly, Russia seeks to avoid direct confrontation with the United States and instead favors de-escalation, mediation, and diplomatic initiatives.
• The same sources emphasize that Russia’s priority remains the war in Ukraine, which for Moscow outweighs concerns about the conflict in Iran. Consequently, Russia’s stance toward Washington remains linked to U.S. policies regarding a settlement in Ukraine.
• Chinese sources state that Beijing’s position is clear: it condemns the war being waged by the United States and Israel, expresses solidarity with Iran, and calls on all parties to return to dialogue and diplomatic solutions.
• Iranian sources acknowledge that criticism has emerged within Iranian society and among political elites toward China and Russia for failing to take stronger positions against U.S. policy and the war against Iran.
• These criticisms include Moscow’s previous refusal to sell Iran certain weapons systems, including Sukhoi fighter jets and advanced air defense systems such as the S-300 and S-400. Critics argue that Iran’s current predicament is partly due to the absence of fourth- and fifth-generation aircraft and insufficient defensive systems.
• At the same time, Iranian sources do not deny the existence of supportive Russian-Chinese cooperation with Iran in the military field, nor the economic cooperation among Russia, China, and Iran that has helped Tehran withstand U.S. sanctions.
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Conclusion
China and Russia are concerned about the U.S.–Israeli war against Iran, which they regard as a strategic partner and a shared sphere of influence.
Beijing and Moscow have adopted political and diplomatic positions supportive of Iran, amid reports that they have provided limited intelligence and military assistance to Tehran.
Moscow is mindful of Putin’s relationship with Trump and the latter’s role in easing Western isolation of the Russian president following their meeting in Alaska.
Russia also takes into account Washington’s potential cooperation in reaching a settlement that would end the war in Ukraine in terms acceptable to Moscow.
China, for its part, balances its solidarity with Iran with its economic relations with Israel, maintaining communication with Tel Aviv while calling for dialogue and diplomatic solutions. Russia likewise maintains communication channels with Israel.
Despite the strategic risks that the collapse of the Iranian regime would pose for Russian influence—especially after the loss of the Assad regime in Syria and the absence of leadership in Venezuela—Russia’s intervention remains politically limited.
While China fears the possible closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the main route for its energy imports, Russia stands to benefit from rising oil prices resulting from the war.
Within Iran, criticism has emerged regarding the limited nature of Russian and Chinese support in confronting the war, including criticism of Moscow’s previous refusal to supply Iran with Sukhoi fighter jets and advanced air defense systems.
