The Impact of Damascus’s Control over Eastern Syria on the Reproduction of Power in Iraq

By capadmin On Jan 23, 2026

Dr. Mohamad Kawas, Progress Center for Policies

Situation Assessment

Introduction

Developments in Syria following the takeover by Damascus-aligned forces of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, both bordering Iraq—and amid conflicting reports regarding the fate of Hasakah—have entered directly into Iraq’s ongoing deliberations over the reconfiguration of political power, particularly against the backdrop of the crisis surrounding the formation of a new government. These developments have coincided with warnings from Iraqi Shiite political forces about Damascus and Sunni-aligned forces (some of them described as extremist) controlling the border areas between the two countries.

Key Developments
• On 27 January 2026, the Iraqi parliament is scheduled to convene to elect a president, amid the absence of reports indicating Kurdish agreement on a single candidate—raising the likelihood of postponement.
• In the latest political developments, Sunni forces announced their support for the prime ministerial candidate selected by the Shiite Coordination Framework, strengthening Nouri al-Maliki’s position as a leading contender.
• Deliberations over the election of the president and the formation of a new government have been influenced by the Syrian developments, particularly the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) from two provinces in the Jazira region bordering Iraq.
• These developments—especially following the ISIS prison crisis—have triggered debate over the risks Syria now poses, whether due to the escape of ISIS members or fears of collusion by Sunni allies within the Damascus system.

• On 20 January 2026, the SDF announced its withdrawal from al-Hol camp, which houses thousands of ISIS-affiliated women and children, citing “international indifference” toward the terrorist threat. On the same day, Syria’s Interior Ministry announced the escape of approximately 120 ISIS detainees from al-Shaddadi prison, accusing the SDF of deliberately releasing them (it was later announced that 81 had been rearrested).
• On 19 January 2026, Damascus forces took control of al-Shaddadi city and its prison, which contains thousands of ISIS detainees. Violent clashes around the prison led to the escape of around 200 detainees classified as “low-level,” according to U.S. reports. On the same day, Damascus announced full control over Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor provinces, including oil and gas fields, following the SDF’s withdrawal from areas west of the Euphrates.
• On 21 January 2026, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) announced the transfer of 150 detainees from Hasakah to secure facilities in Iraq, with the possibility of the number reaching 7,000. Iraqi government spokesperson Basem al-Awadi described the move as a “precautionary step to safeguard national security.”
• On the same day, CENTCOM commander Gen. Brad Cooper held a phone call with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa to discuss mechanisms for transferring ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraq as part of joint security coordination.

• On 20 January 2026, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani spoke with President al-Sharaa, discussing border security and detainee transfers, with al-Sudani emphasizing the importance of cooperation to prevent the spread of ISIS.
• On 21 January 2026, al-Sudani also spoke with SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, warning that “any breakdown in Syrian prisons would force Iraq to confront terrorism.”
• These contacts reflected Iraq’s deep concern over potential terrorist inflows, particularly given the proximity of al-Hol camp—approximately 13 kilometers from the Iraqi border—and the presence of large numbers of Iraqi nationals within it.
• On 20 January 2026, the Iran-aligned Shiite Coordination Framework warned that “any instability in Syrian prisons threatens Iraq,” proposing the dispatch of a security delegation to Damascus.
• On 21 January 2026, al-Sudani expressed concern about the presence of ISIS elements inside Syrian prisons, while the Dawa Party stated it was “closely and seriously concerned” about the lack of control over detention facilities, warning of ISIS militants infiltrating Iraq and reviving “scenarios of unrest.”
• On 22 January 2026, media sources reported concerns within the Coordination Framework, which views al-Sharaa’s rule as a “Sunni jihadist threat” resembling ISIS, calling for strengthened border controls. Hadi al-Amiri (Badr Organization) was quoted warning of a “Sunni government in Damascus sympathetic to extremists,” urging strict border monitoring to prevent terrorist infiltration.

• On 20 January 2026, Sadrist leader Muqtada al-Sadr described reports of prison openings and the release of ISIS elements as an indicator of heightened regional danger.
• Al-Sadr stressed that these developments require urgent Iraqi government action, beginning with demands that Damascus hand over escaped Iraqi nationals, and extending to pressure on Jordan to extradite what he described as elements of the “filthy Baath.”
• Commentators argue that the Syrian developments are influencing the reshaping of power in Iraq, particularly the selection of a new prime minister following the 2025 elections.
• Some analysts believe that fears of ISIS resurgence could strengthen al-Sudani’s chances for a second term, given his demonstrated regional balance (with Iran, Arab states, and the United States) and his role in preventing Iraq’s entanglement in Israel–Iran confrontations or the collapse of the Assad system.
• The Shiite Coordination Framework, aligned with Iran, opposes al-Sudani’s second term, arguing that “the prime minister should function as a general manager” rather than forming a personal political party.
• Observers suggest that the “Syrian threat” could delay government formation due to the introduction of the “Sunni risk” factor into the Coordination Framework’s deliberations.
• Analysts expect Iran to exploit anxiety over Syrian developments to support a loyal candidate and push Nouri al-Maliki back into office.

Conclusions
• Damascus’s takeover of areas bordering Iraq has ignited debate in Baghdad over the risks posed by the prison crisis and the escape of ISIS members.
• Shiite figures have issued warnings implicitly framing political Sunni leadership in Damascus as a growing threat to Iraq.
• Despite recent communication between the Iraqi prime minister and the Syrian president regarding coordination and cooperation, relations between Baghdad and Damascus remain cautious, marked by restraint and mistrust.
• Syrian developments are directly affecting Iraq’s current deliberations over the reconfiguration of power, particularly the choice of a new prime minister or the potential reappointment of Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani.
• The Shiite Coordination Framework is expected to select a candidate supported by other political components, with Sunni forces already declaring their backing for any Framework nominee.
• Although Nouri al-Maliki’s prospects had advanced prior to the recent Syrian border developments, sectarian mobilization and implicit Shiite warnings about post-SDF “Sunni risks” increase the likelihood of pushing Maliki forward.
• Available indicators suggest Iranian pressure on its Iraqi allies to rally around Maliki as the most loyal candidate to Tehran.
• Some analyses do not rule out reappointing al-Sudani, given Iraq’s need for a moderate figure acceptable to both Arab and Western circles.
• Despite Syrian developments, Sunni political forces have not, thus far, altered their support for a Coordination Framework candidate—even if that candidate is Maliki—while leaving open the possibility of new compromises tied to the presidential election that could influence the identity of the next prime minister.
• Commentators note that it has not yet been demonstrated that Syrian developments since the fall of the Damascus regime have altered Iraq’s internal balance of power, arguing that regional dynamics have not decisively pushed in that direction.