Policy Assessment, Progress Center for Policies – London
Introduction
The fall of the coastal city of Mokha to the forces of Ansar Allah (the Houthis) on 10 September 2026 marks a turning point in the course of the war in Yemen—not as an isolated battlefield development, but as part of a broader reshaping of the balance of power along one of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors. Located approximately 70–80 kilometres north of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the city was more than a military position in Taiz Governorate: it represented the internationally recognised government’s last coastal outlet on the Red Sea and the final defensive line preventing the Houthis from gaining a direct foothold overlooking the strait.
The significance of the capture is heightened by two parallel developments. The first is the extension of Houthi control along the coast from Hodeidah in the north to Mokha in the south, increasing the group’s ability to threaten international shipping lanes through which roughly 12 per cent of global trade passes, as well as Gulf oil shipments bound for the Suez Canal. The second is the wider regional context of US–Iranian tensions, as Yemen increasingly becomes a proxy arena in which the Houthis serve as a means of exerting pressure on Riyadh and Washington.
Despite the significance of the development, however, it should not be assessed without important methodological caveats. The Yemeni front has yet to stabilise, and the fighting remains fluid, making any projection of the post-Mokha landscape inherently vulnerable to further shifts on the ground. This paper therefore examines the implications of the Houthi capture of Mokha in light of local and regional balances of power, while identifying the most plausible scenarios and the limits of such projections.
I. The Facts on the Ground
On 10 September 2026, forces belonging to Ansar Allah (the Houthis) seized the coastal city of Mokha and its historic port in Taiz Governorate in western Yemen. Three Yemeni government sources confirmed the development to Reuters, reporting that forces loyal to the internationally recognised government had withdrawn southwards towards Dhubab and that the Houthis were now better positioned to expand their influence towards the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
According to the Sana’a-aligned Yemen Press agency, Houthi forces captured the Jabal al-Nar military camp, which had served as a headquarters for government forces, before advancing into Mokha following the collapse of Tariq Saleh’s defensive lines. Witnesses reported that Houthi fighters entered the city chanting, “Death to America, death to Israel.”
Losses and Political Reactions
Tariq Saleh, Vice-President of the Presidential Leadership Council and commander of the National Resistance Forces, announced that the forces engaged in the fighting along the western coast—including the National Resistance, the Giants Brigades, Nation’s Shield Forces and units of the Taiz Military Axis—had suffered casualties over the preceding days.
Saleh, whose forces had been leading the defence of Mokha and the western coastline, ordered his troops to regroup and establish an alternative command centre at a secure location south of Mokha, in consultation with the leadership of the Arab Coalition and the Presidential Leadership Council. He accused Iran of planning and supporting the offensive.
Other Fronts
On the inland fronts, government forces made advances in the governorates of Al-Jawf, Marib and Al-Bayda in an effort to disperse Houthi pressure. Along the coast, meanwhile, the Houthis seized the districts of Hays and Al-Khawkhah south of Hodeidah, as well as Al-Wazi’iyah and Mawza, and the Khalid ibn al-Walid military camp. There were also reports of attacks on the Hanish Islands and Zuqar Island.
Countermeasures
Government forces withdrew towards Dhubab, the coastal town closest to the strait and opposite Perim Island, in order to regroup and reinforce defensive positions. Coalition aircraft carried out dozens of strikes against Houthi positions in Hodeidah and Taiz, while government forces shelled reinforcements moving from Sana’a towards Marib.
Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said that Saudi aircraft had carried out between 40 and 54 strikes across the governorates of Taiz, Hodeidah, Al-Jawf, Marib, Saada and Al-Bayda.
Analysis
Following their control of Hodeidah to the north, the capture of Mokha gives the Houthis a near-contiguous stretch of coastline and strengthens their capacity to launch missiles, drones and explosive-laden boats against vessels at sea. It also increases their ability to threaten a maritime corridor through which approximately 12 per cent of global trade passes, alongside Gulf oil shipments travelling towards the Suez Canal. Houthi control of Mokha also cuts Taiz off from its coastline and places additional pressure on government supply lines.
The withdrawal of Tariq Saleh’s forces and their redeployment to Dhubab expose the fragility of the government’s coastal defensive line and shift the focus of the battle from defending Mokha to securing the final strategic position before the strait. Houthi control of Mokha and its port also closes a major supply outlet for Taiz and government-held areas, increasing both military and economic pressure on the internationally recognised government.
The Houthi advance along the coast—set against more limited government gains in Al-Jawf, Marib and Al-Bayda—points to a strategy centred on concentrating forces along the strategically vital maritime axis while government forces are drawn into less strategically consequential inland fronts. The Saudi response, involving air strikes following attacks on Khamis Mushait, Abha and Jizan, appears to have come relatively late and failed to halt the ground advance, highlighting the limitations of air power alone in stopping a coordinated land offensive along the coast.
The Houthis’ advance towards Bab al-Mandab also raises the prospect of further internationalisation of the conflict. By threatening a vital artery for global trade and Gulf oil exports, the advance could prompt Washington and Riyadh to expand their involvement in order to safeguard freedom of navigation. Against the backdrop of broader US–Iranian tensions, this could involve joint operations or an expansion of maritime patrols, as seen previously. The scale of any intervention, however, is likely to depend on the extent to which global energy supplies are threatened and whether attacks on commercial shipping persist.
Linking the fall of Mokha to the broader confrontation with Iran further transforms Yemen into a proxy arena in which the Houthis can be used as a source of pressure against Saudi Arabia and the United States, potentially drawing both countries into opening a parallel front alongside the confrontation with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.
A necessary caveat remains. It would be premature to project too far beyond the immediate consequences of the development, particularly given the fluid nature of a war characterised by repeated advances and reversals. Conditions on the ground have yet to stabilise, and the front lines could shift again in the coming days. More definitive conclusions should therefore await greater clarity over the emerging military lines.
Assessment Summary
The fall of Mokha represents a major strategic shift, giving the Houthis near-contiguous control of Yemen’s western coastline from Hodeidah southwards and bringing them to within approximately 70–80 kilometres of Bab al-Mandab. This significantly enhances their capacity to pose a direct threat to international shipping.
The withdrawal of Tariq Saleh’s forces exposes the fragility of the government’s coastal defensive line and shifts the battle towards securing the final strategic position before the strait. Houthi control of Mokha also closes a major supply outlet for Taiz, placing further pressure on the government.
The Saudi air campaign appears to have come relatively late and failed to prevent the Houthi ground advance, underscoring the limitations of air strikes alone in stopping a coordinated land offensive. The Houthis’ proximity to Bab al-Mandab also increases the likelihood of the conflict becoming further internationalised, potentially intensifying pressure on Washington and Riyadh to intervene.
