The Arab Vote in Israel: From the Margins to a Decisive Factor in the Upcoming Elections
Policy Paper
Hamza Ali, Progress Center for Policies
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I. Introduction and Methodology:
This paper draws on an analytical article published by the Financial Times (21 December) regarding the return of the Ra’am party, led by Mansour Abbas, to a potential kingmaker position in Israel’s upcoming elections, as well as on other journalistic and research sources that shed light on:
(1) the positions of Arab parties regarding support for a Jewish bloc/candidate to form a government; and
(2) the willingness of Jewish (Zionist) parties to form a government with Arab support, in light of the political transformations following 7 October.
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II. The General Political Context:
The Israeli political environment reflects a fragile balance between blocs of comparable size in opinion polls, making the attainment of the 61-seat threshold uncertain for any side and reviving the logic of “kingmakers” in the post-election phase—particularly among smaller lists. This context forms the basis upon which the Financial Times built its hypothesis of Mansour Abbas and his party “returning” to a pivotal role in 2026.
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III. Ra’am and the “Kingmaker” Role:
Ra’am’s entry into the Bennett–Lapid coalition in 2021 constituted a historical precedent, as it became the first Arab party to formally join an Israeli government in decades. This move entrenched the model of “pragmatic participation” as an Arab political option within Israel.
Analytical readings suggest that Ra’am’s value does not lie solely in the expected number of seats, but in its ability to convert those seats into bargaining power within highly fragile coalitions, and in its capacity to reproduce a “tipping card” scenario should the deadlock between the two blocs persist.
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IV. Positions of Arab Parties on Supporting a Jewish Bloc/Candidate to Form a Government:
Arab positions can be summarized into three practical trends (with overlaps among them):
1. Direct Coalition Participation Model:
The Financial Times presents Mansour Abbas as an actor seeking to replicate the 2021 experience—namely, moving from a position of “conditional support” to direct participation when a political/civic deal can be marketed within Arab society.
2. Parliamentary Support without Entering Government (Historical Model):
Arab parties have documented precedents of tipping the balance in favor of assigning a Jewish candidate without joining the government, as occurred in 2020 when the Joint List recommended Benny Gantz to the Israeli president, granting his bloc a formal majority of recommendations.
Research-based readings of the Joint List’s breakup in 2022 indicated that parties such as Hadash and the Tibi bloc were more open to continuing a “recommendation/support” approach—and possibly even negotiating broader arrangements—compared to the more rigid nationalist-principled stance of Balad, which rejected this path.
3. Principled Rejection of Participation/Support:
Literature and analyses linked to the Joint List’s split indicate that Balad tends to reject steps perceived as structural normalization with Zionist governments, particularly when the political and symbolic cost is high amid war and polarization.
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A Social Indicator Supporting Pragmatism:
Despite tensions, polls published in late 2025 show a notable rise in support within Arab society in Israel for Arab party participation in a governing coalition (exceeding 70 percent in some measurements). This provides parties—especially Ra’am—with a degree of societal cover to justify pragmatic choices.
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V. Readiness of Jewish Parties to Form a Government with Arab Support:
Available sources indicate that “acceptability” among Jewish parties has declined compared to the 2019–2021 period, more markedly after 7 October, across three main indicators:
1. Rising Cost of Political Legitimacy for Arab–Jewish Cooperation:
The Financial Times explicitly notes that Jewish public sentiment has hardened toward Arab citizens, increasing the political cost of any partnership with an Arab party—even within the so-called “opposition camp.”
2. Explicit Rejection of Minority Governments or Reliance on Arab Support after 7 October:
In December 2025, Israeli coverage showed that even a hint by Gadi Eisenkot regarding possible partnership or reliance on Arab support triggered sharp reactions, while Benny Gantz described such a scenario as “unrealistic after 7 October.” This stance effectively limits the ability of the Zionist opposition to translate relative numerical advantages in polls into a viable coalition if Arab votes are required.
3. Continued Use of “Delegitimization” as an Electoral Weapon:
The Financial Times narrative includes references to the right’s potential push to delegitimize Ra’am, including threats of banning it or smearing it through media campaigns—tactics also used to deter Jewish parties from cooperation.
Conclusion of This Axis:
The decisive political condition is not merely the “willingness of Arab parties to provide support,” but rather the “ability of Jewish parties to bear the cost of Arab support” before their electorate and internal structures—a challenge that appears more acute in 2024–2025–2026 than in the pre-war period.
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VI. The Legal and Institutional Dimension:
Public debate (per the Financial Times) shows that threats of legal measures against Arab parties are used within the battle over political legitimacy. While the judicial track (elections committees/courts) remains a partial restraining factor, it does not constitute a sufficient safeguard in an environment of growing polarization and pressure on institutions.
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VII. Implications and Forward-Looking Assessment:
1. The Arab “electoral weight” is likely to be influential to the extent that the Zionist political system allows its conversion into coalition power.
2. Arab options range between direct participation (Ra’am), parliamentary support without entering government (historical Joint List models), and principled rejection (Balad). Ultimately, the decisive factors are the balance of legitimacy within Arab public opinion on the one hand, and the Jewish partner’s capacity to bear the cost on the other.
3. The intensification of delegitimization campaigns does not signal the erosion of Arab weight, but rather growing recognition of its impact under conditions of parity between the blocs.
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Conclusions and Recommendations:
1. A central reading of the Arab vote as a “tipping factor” rather than a “marginal bloc” in upcoming elections, while noting the decline in “coalition convertibility” after 7 October.
2. Analytical differentiation between three levels of support:
(a) recommendation/mandate,
(b) external support,
(c) coalition entry—while assessing the cost of each level for both the Jewish partner and Arab legitimacy.
3. Early monitoring of delegitimization/banning rhetoric as an electoral indicator of an intensifying battle over “who has the right to partnership,” rather than as a purely legal issue.
4. Grounding assessments in the shifting internal Arab mood (rising support for coalition participation in late-2025 polls) to gauge Arab party flexibility, without assuming a fixed Arab consensus.
5. Most likely scenario: continued parity between blocs, with the “legitimacy lock” among Jewish parties remaining an obstacle to overt partnership with Arab parties—thereby increasing the likelihood of indirect/conditional support formulas or a return to additional election rounds if this deadlock cannot be breached.
