Syria Between Preventing Fragmentation and Reconstructing the State: Toward an Internationally Managed Transition
Policy Paper: Experts | Progress Center for Policies – London – Damascus
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Introduction
International and regional approaches toward Syria are reaching a qualitative inflection point. The shift is from policies of isolation, fragmentation, or reliance on decisive military outcomes toward a more pragmatic model: reconstructing the state from within rather than accelerating its disintegration. This approach draws on Western diplomatic sources in Damascus and reflects a growing consensus in specialized Western literature that state collapse in complex conflict environments does not produce stable settlements, but instead generates prolonged cycles of transnational violence.
In the Syrian case, this shift is reinforced by converging concerns: the risk of de facto partition across a fragmented geography; the potential resurgence of multi-sided civil war; and the erosion of security systems that previously contained extremist expansion. Yet additional dimensions must be factored into any rigorous assessment. First, Israeli calculations do not treat Syrian fragility as a risk to be mitigated, but as a strategic asset. Second, the risk of a renewed rise of jihadist organizations if the transition falters or security vacuums widen. Third, a less visible yet highly probable internal threat: the possibility of jihadist allies turning against President Ahmad al-Sharaa should they perceive ideological deviation.
Within this complex landscape, a Western–regional framework for re-engineering authority in Damascus is taking shape, led diplomatically by London, Washington, and Paris, in coordination with Riyadh and Ankara. This framework rests on three parallel tracks: the formation of a government with full executive authority; the reconstruction of a unified national military; and the retention of President Ahmad al-Sharaa as a transitional guarantor of stability—supported in governance by Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Interior Minister Anas Khattab.
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Analysis
I. From Regime Change to Functional Adaptation
The emerging approach reflects a fundamental shift in Western thinking on political transitions in the Middle East. The objective is no longer to dismantle regimes and rebuild governance from scratch, but to modify state behavior and function within a manageable regional framework.
This shift is grounded in accumulated evidence—from Libya, Yemen, and Iraq—that rapid state dismantlement produces deep institutional vacuums rather than stable alternatives. Within this logic, retaining the head of state becomes a functional necessity, aimed at preserving institutional continuity and preventing systemic collapse, while restructuring executive, military, and legal layers to meet international expectations.
However, this approach carries inherent risk. President al-Sharaa’s origins within Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham link him to jihadist networks whose ideological orientation does not align with institutional state-building or democratic transition. The result is a dual-risk equation: internationally tolerable at a minimum threshold, yet internally contested by more hardline allies.
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II. The Israeli Factor: When Fragility Becomes Strategy
Israel’s position constitutes a critical yet often underexplored dimension. Israeli strategic thinking does not necessarily view Syrian fragility as a threat; rather, it can function as a stabilizing condition in Israel’s favor.
A fragmented or weak Syria limits the emergence of a cohesive military threat and justifies sustained Israeli military presence along and beyond buffer zones. Israeli strikes on Syrian military infrastructure following the fall of the Assad regime reflect a deliberate effort to prevent military reconstruction and sustain structural weakness.
This posture directly conflicts with Western and regional efforts to rebuild Syrian state capacity, creating a latent structural tension within Western policymaking between state reconstruction and accommodating Israeli security imperatives.
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III. Partition as a High-Cost Scenario
There is broad analytical convergence that partition would not produce stability, but rather reconfigure conflict along more complex axes—ethnic, sectarian, and territorial.
Fragmentation would generate weak, competing entities lacking economic viability and would expand regional interventions by Turkey, Iran, Israel, and Gulf states. The Libyan case illustrates this dynamic: fragmentation entrenched foreign influence rather than enabling local stabilization.
Notably, the international rejection of partition does not fully align with Israeli preferences, reinforcing internal contradictions within Western strategic frameworks.
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IV. Rebuilding the Military as a Foundation of State Unity
Reconstruction of the Syrian military on inclusive national foundations emerges as the central pillar of state reconstitution. Western policy literature consistently identifies military restructuring as the decisive condition for preventing relapse into conflict.
Proposals to appoint non-compromised defected officers to senior command positions reflect an effort to build a hybrid leadership capable of integrating former regime elements, defectors, local forces, and groups such as the Syrian Democratic Forces and Druze formations.
Yet this process faces a core structural challenge: transforming a heterogeneous force into a coherent national military doctrine. Moreover, while the current leadership may concede flexibility in civilian governance, it is far less likely to compromise on control over security and military institutions.
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V. The Risk of Jihadist Resurgence
The potential resurgence of jihadist groups—ISIS, al-Qaeda, and affiliates—remains a high-impact failure scenario. These groups retain infrastructure and networks across key regions, including the Syrian desert and eastern borderlands.
Their reactivation depends on three conditions: security vacuums, absence of legitimate governance alternatives, and access to informal financing. All three conditions are partially present, making this a realistic rather than hypothetical risk.
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VI. Internal Reversal Scenario
A largely underexamined risk is that jihadist allies themselves may turn against al-Sharaa. His current pragmatic repositioning—seeking international legitimacy—faces resistance from factions that view ideological compromise as betrayal.
This risk extends beyond HTS to allied extremist groups such as the Turkistan Islamic Party and factions within joint operations structures. This dynamic adds a further layer of fragility to any transition reliant on a single leadership figure.
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VII. Government Formation as a Tool of Legitimacy
The formation of a new executive government is central to reconstructing political legitimacy through performance. Proposed figures—including defectors and business elites—reflect an attempt to balance international acceptance with administrative competence.
However, constitutional constraints require interim adjustments—either expanding executive authority within existing frameworks or delegating powers through presidential appointments. This process is further complicated by competing pressures: HTS factions wary of dilution of ideological control, and international actors demanding inclusive governance.
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VIII. Gradual Transition as the Least-Cost Option
A managed, gradual transition emerges as the most viable pathway. It prevents state collapse, avoids partition, reduces risks of civil war recurrence, and enables incremental reintegration into regional and international systems.
However, its success depends on addressing three critical variables simultaneously: mitigating Israeli constraints, closing security gaps exploited by jihadists, and managing internal tensions within the ruling structure.
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IX. The Economic Condition: No Stability Without Economic Opening
No political or security transition can succeed without addressing the economic dimension. Stability in post-conflict settings is built through tangible improvements in daily life—food, electricity, employment, and credible prospects.
In Syria, this requires full lifting of Western sanctions, not as a reward but as a prerequisite. Without it, the transitional government cannot restore services or generate legitimacy.
Additionally, international and Gulf deposits into the Syrian central bank are essential to stabilize currency and finance basic imports. Long-term stability further depends on opening Western and Arab investment in infrastructure—energy, transport, healthcare, and education.
Economic recovery is not secondary to political stabilization; it is its foundation.
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Conclusions
• The international trajectory favors state reconstruction over fragmentation, recognizing that institutional collapse poses greater risks than gradual reform.
• Partition and decisive military resolution are structurally unsustainable and likely to generate prolonged instability.
• Israeli strategic interest in sustained Syrian weakness introduces a structural constraint on reconstruction efforts.
• The risks of jihadist resurgence and internal fragmentation remain immediate and significant.
• Military restructuring is the decisive factor in preserving state unity.
• Government formation is central to rebuilding legitimacy, contingent on balancing internal and external pressures.
• Economic recovery—sanctions relief, financial support, and investment—is a prerequisite for any successful transition.
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Final Assessment
The most likely trajectory in Syria is not regime change, but functional redefinition within an internationally managed transition framework. Yet this pathway remains constrained by four interlinked structural risks: Israeli preference for sustained fragility, jihadist resurgence, internal fragmentation within the ruling coalition, and economic failure.
The success of this transition depends on the international community’s ability to address these risks simultaneously—particularly through immediate sanctions relief and economic stabilization measures. Only under these conditions can gradual transition evolve from a low-cost containment strategy into a genuine state-building process restoring Syria’s institutional function, identity, and regional role.
