The Red Sea as an Arena for Maneuvering and Strategic Repositioning
Situation Assessment by Zaelnoon Suliman, Progress Center for Policies
Introduction:
On November 10, 2025, Russian Ambassador to Sudan Andrey Chernovol announced the temporary suspension of Russia’s planned naval base project in Port Sudan.
Although no official statement was issued by Khartoum, analysts suggest the decision came from Sudan’s leadership as part of a political and diplomatic repositioning led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of the Sovereign Council.
Analysis
Maneuvering Between Moscow and Washington –
Burhan appears to be using this suspension as a bargaining tool in his dealings with major powers, particularly the United States and Russia, amid his ongoing internal conflict with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The move fits into a broader pattern of international competition over the Red Sea, which has become a vital corridor for regional and global power struggles.
Indicators suggest that Burhan is pursuing a flexible balancing strategy, using the Russian base issue as a strategic bargaining chip.
By suspending the agreement with Moscow, he seeks Western support in exchange for gestures interpreted in Washington as a pivot toward the U.S. camp, including:
-Preliminary approval for establishing a U.S. military base on the Red Sea coast.
-Opening intelligence cooperation channels with Israel through a monitoring center in Port Sudan.
-Reviewing Russian, Iranian, and Turkish contracts in exchange for direct political and military backing.
This approach reflects what could be called defensive pragmatism. Burhan understands that maintaining power requires a delicate balance between external support and avoiding total alignment with any one bloc.
Thus, Sudan’s strategic geography becomes a bargaining card amid overlapping great-power interests along the Red Sea.
However, this maneuver carries dual risks:
Overreliance on Washington and Tel Aviv could compromise Sudan’s autonomy and alienate Moscow and Beijing.
Russia might retaliate through economic or security pressure, further destabilizing Sudan and increasing the risk of internationalizing its internal conflict.
Domestic Implications:
Burhan’s foreign policy directly shapes Sudan’s internal power dynamics, as external alliances have become extensions of the domestic military and political struggle.
Militarily, Burhan seeks to leverage Western engagement to strengthen his army’s intelligence and logistical capabilities, especially after his victory in El Fasher and transition to offensive operations in Kordofan and northern Omdurman.
Yet, this could invite Western intelligence infiltration and transform the Sudanese army into a partner in external agendas—focusing on counterterrorism and migration control—rather than a sovereign national force.
Politically, Burhan relies on external recognition to offset his weak internal legitimacy, replicating a governance model based on international rather than national legitimacy.
Economically, he seeks to convert suspended Russian, Turkish, and Iranian agreements into Western and Gulf-backed gains, but such short-term deals may not create sustainable development.
The overall outcome is that while Burhan’s external maneuvering may yield short-term tactical benefits, it risks deepening internal division and weakening state institutions if not integrated into a national political settlement that rebuilds legitimacy from within.
Policy Options for Sudan
Given current dynamics, Sudan faces two broad options for restoring its regional role and aligning foreign policy with national interests:
Rebuilding Internal Balance as a Basis for External Stability
Achieved through ending the war and pursuing a national political settlement that restores political and institutional legitimacy.
This requires concessions from both military and political elites and will likely face resistance from entrenched power centers.
Positive Neutrality and Strategic Utilization of International Competition
Turning Sudan’s Red Sea location into a platform for regional cooperation rather than a battlefield for great-power rivalry.
This would revive Sudan’s traditional role as a bridge between Africa and the Arab world, requiring a disciplined, professional foreign policy capable of insulating external relations from internal conflict.
Conclusion:
The freezing of the Russian base project in Port Sudan appears more as a tactical political maneuver than a genuine strategic shift in alliances. Burhan is using the issue to consolidate internal control and attract foreign support, at a time when U.S.–Russian–Chinese competition is intensifying in the Red Sea.
This pragmatic balancing carries the risk of strategic dependency on one of the competing blocs, potentially turning Sudan into a proxy battleground and undermining its national independence.
Regionally, Egypt and Saudi Arabia are watching closely—concerned that the shift could disrupt the Red Sea security architecture, but also seeing potential to assert themselves as stabilizing powers preventing full internationalization of the maritime corridor.
Ultimately, Sudan’s future will depend on its ability to transform geography into an asset of sovereignty rather than subordination, and to convert international rivalry into regional cooperation that safeguards both Red Sea security and Sudan’s stability as an independent actor in East Africa and the Arab world.
