Situation Assessment by Zaelnoon Suliman
African Affairs Unit, Progress Center for Policies
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Introduction
Sudan’s announcement of its return to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) represents a political step that goes beyond its procedural dimension, touching directly on the country’s position within the architecture of regional and international mediation and the possible pathways for resolving the ongoing war. The decision follows Khartoum’s suspension of its IGAD membership in early 2024, in protest against what it described as a breach of national sovereignty, and comes amid a regional environment marked by growing competition over how the Sudanese file is managed across multiple frameworks.
This return cannot be separated from broader shifts in the balance of mediation—whether those linked to the international Quartet or to bilateral and regional initiatives. As such, it constitutes a test moment: redefining IGAD’s role as a regional actor, reorganizing relations among the various negotiation tracks, and shaping potential implications for regional polarization and prospects for advancing a sustainable peace and reconciliation process inside Sudan.
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Analysis
A New Formula for Negotiation Mechanisms
Sudan’s return to IGAD signals an attempt to reassert regional recognition of the country as a state with sovereign institutions, rather than merely a conflict file subject to external management. Resuming participation provides the government with a regional platform for political and diplomatic engagement and reinserts the Sudanese crisis into a broader security context tied to the stability of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. From this perspective, the move reinforces a narrative of engaging Sudan through official state channels, granting the current leadership a form of functional regional cover against efforts to place it on equal footing with non-state armed actors.
At the negotiation level, the return does not in itself shift the balance of the political process, but it opens space for its reconfiguration. Khartoum is likely to seek a transfer of gravity from international tracks to a regional framework more attuned to neighboring states’ interests, thereby limiting the conditionalities of external mediation that may not align with the priorities of the military establishment or certain political forces. This could lead to the emergence of a hybrid negotiation track, in which IGAD leads the regional political process while the Quartet continues to provide international and economic support—an arrangement with precedents in other regional contexts where regional and international frameworks have intersected. Despite its realism, this model remains vulnerable to challenges stemming from multiple reference points and divergent agendas.
In terms of reconciliation, embedding the file within a regional framework could help reduce the zero-sum nature of the conflict by linking settlement prospects to broader regional stability interests, thus enhancing the chances of adopting gradual approaches that move beyond the logic of military victory. However, this outcome depends on IGAD’s ability to secure a minimum level of consensus among its members and to gain the trust of Sudanese parties—conditions that remain unresolved.
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International and Regional Implications
• Rebalancing with the International Quartet:
The return carries a political dimension aimed at recalibrating relations with the international Quartet. It reflects a desire to redistribute mediation roles in a way that gives the regional framework greater influence over settlement priorities, without excluding the international track. Instead, it seeks to reposition it within a complementary equation in which international economic and political leverage remains essential to supporting any potential agreement. The relationship between the two tracks thus appears closer to overlap than outright competition.
• Regional Polarization:
Institutionally, the move may help mitigate competition over managing the crisis by bringing together neighboring states directly affected by the war within a single coordination framework. Yet this effect is not guaranteed, given divergent positions among IGAD members themselves, which could shift polarization into the regional framework rather than contain it. Even so, the step remains important in reducing initiative fragmentation and creating common ground for addressing the conflict’s repercussions.
• Broader Geopolitical Context:
The implications of Sudan’s return extend beyond mediation arrangements to the wider geopolitical environment. Sudan occupies a central connective position between the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea, and the Arab hinterland. Reintegrating it into an active regional framework reinserts the war into the regional security matrix of these areas, potentially affecting balances of influence.
• Red Sea Dimension:
The move gains added significance because Sudan’s stability is integral to Red Sea security amid intensifying regional and international competition over ports and coastlines. Deeper engagement within IGAD enhances littoral states’ ability to treat the crisis as a collective security issue, potentially limiting—though not eliminating—the impulse of international powers to fill perceived vacuums.
• Horn of Africa Dynamics:
Reintegrating Sudan into the regional institutional framework strengthens IGAD’s weight in managing security and political interactions and reconnects the Sudanese conflict with issues of border stability, migration, and internal conflicts in neighboring states. This reinforces interlinkages among regional files and situates Sudan’s settlement within a broader approach to regional stability.
• Gulf Context:
The return may also help rebalance channels of influence, as the regional framework provides a stabilizing collective platform alongside bilateral initiatives, enabling Gulf states to engage through a more structured mechanism while maintaining their economic and security interests.
• Egypt’s Perspective:
For Egypt—viewing Sudan’s stability as a direct extension of its national security—strengthening IGAD’s role could offer a regional track complementary to bilateral efforts, situating the crisis within a wider context that includes Red Sea and Horn of Africa security. This remains contingent, however, on the extent to which IGAD’s approach aligns with Egyptian priorities.
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Conclusions
• Sudan’s return to IGAD reflects an effort to reinsert the crisis into a regional framework that enhances recognition of the state and its institutions, providing the government with a political platform beyond immediate international pressures. It also opens the door to rebalancing negotiation tracks, potentially producing a hybrid model that divides roles between IGAD and the Quartet.
• The move may help ease regional polarization by offering an institutional coordination framework, but it does not guarantee containment; IGAD’s effectiveness depends on member cohesion and Sudanese parties’ acceptance of its role.
• Ultimately, the return does not constitute a decisive shift in the trajectory of war or peace. Rather, it reorganizes the surrounding negotiating and geopolitical environment, making its real impact contingent on how it is politically leveraged and on its ability to evolve from an institutional step into an effective instrument for advancing a settlement.
