Situation Assessment by Zaelnoon Suliman, Progress Center for Policies
Introduction:
The Sudanese arena is witnessing intensive diplomatic activity led by the United States and the International Quartet (the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates) in an effort to halt the war that has been ongoing for more than two years between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Details:
U.S. Presidential Advisor for African Affairs, Musad Bolous, stated that reaching a ceasefire agreement requires time due to what he described as “complex technical, security, and logistical details,” including monitoring, follow-up, and implementation mechanisms. He affirmed that the aim of these efforts is to reach a comprehensive understanding that would pave the way for the post-truce phase within a nine-month plan outlined by the Quartet.
Bolous noted that both parties have agreed in principle, with no initial objections recorded, adding: “We are now focusing on the finer details.” He emphasized that the current goal is to reach a comprehensive framework for a ceasefire, which would open the door for a post-truce phase.
He explained that the U.S. has prepared a working paper and presented it to both sides a week ago based on Quartet consensus. The paper is now under review, with negotiations taking place separately with each party. He clarified that there are no direct or indirect negotiations between the two sides, as communication is conducted independently through the U.S.
Regarding Washington’s refusal to classify the RSF as a terrorist organization, Bolous said that such classification is not required at this stage, indicating that the current focus is on achieving a humanitarian truce.
Analysis:
Current indicators suggest that the most likely outcome is a partial or temporary truce between the SAF and RSF, given both sides’ initial acceptance of the U.S.-Quartet mediation.
However, implementation on the ground faces serious obstacles due to mutual distrust, overlapping frontlines, and the presence of multiple armed actors. The U.S. and its Quartet partners are working to transform the humanitarian ceasefire into a gateway for a broader political negotiation process aimed at establishing a permanent ceasefire and paving the way toward a comprehensive settlement.
The ultimate objective of these efforts is to arrange a new transitional phase within nine months, as outlined in the Quartet’s plan. Yet achieving this remains contingent upon a freeze in military operations and genuine political will from both parties.
For now, direct negotiations between the SAF and RSF are unlikely. Washington prefers to maintain separate communication channels to avoid jeopardizing the fragile early stages of the negotiation process.
Possible Scenarios:
Temporary Humanitarian Truce (Most Likely):
A three-month humanitarian truce could be reached, given both sides’ initial welcome of the initiative and increasing U.S. pressure to advance the humanitarian track. This would align with the Quartet’s intention to create a conducive environment for broader talks addressing political and security issues.
Collapse of the Truce:
Negotiations over the details of the truce may break down or be violated soon after announcement, leading to intensified fighting. This could occur due to disputes over implementation and monitoring mechanisms or efforts by each side to improve its battlefield position before any political talks.
Regional Intervention in Case of U.S. Failure:
If U.S. efforts falter, regional powers may act independently to manage the Sudanese crisis through alternative arrangements, such as sponsoring new negotiations or imposing localized settlements. Egypt may seek to secure its borders and the Nile Valley, while Gulf states aim to preserve their influence in Sudan. Such moves, however, could fuel regional competition and undermine international coordination.
De Facto Division of Power:
Continued failure of diplomatic efforts could lead to entrenched zones of control between the SAF and RSF, resulting in a de facto partition of the country—with parallel governments in Port Sudan and Nyala. This scenario could be driven by prolonged conflict, resource exhaustion, and growing regional polarization, posing a serious threat to Sudan’s unity and stability.
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Least Likely, but Optimal):
Under sustained international and regional pressure, the two sides might eventually accept a comprehensive ceasefire, followed by inclusive political dialogue involving civilian forces. This would launch a nine-month transitional period under joint UN-regional supervision.
This scenario depends on increasing global consensus to end the war and the military and economic fatigue of both parties. However, internal challenges persist — particularly divisions among civilian actors and opposition from armed groups that might feel excluded from the settlement.
Conclusion:
A truce announcement is likely within the coming weeks, but its stability and continuity will depend on:
Unified regional support for its implementation, genuine political commitment by both warring parties, and effective international monitoring mechanisms to oversee enforcement, especially given the multiplicity of armed groups and decision centers.
A comprehensive political solution is expected to take considerable time — possibly until mid-2026 — unless there is a major shift in the military balance of power.
Failure of current diplomatic efforts would leave Sudan facing further military escalation, humanitarian deterioration, and security collapse in the months ahead.
