Policy Assessment by Dr. Mohamad Kawas, Progress Center for Policies – London
Introduction:
Indicators of accelerating military and intelligence rapprochement between Ankara and the Haftar camp reveal a pragmatic shift in Turkish policy on Libya, one that intersects with the acceleration of the American settlement initiative and is aimed primarily at consolidating Ankara’s maritime and economic gains in Libya — without this meaning, according to Turkish sources, an abandonment of its functional relationship with the Tripoli government.
Following the announcement in Turkey of training for Libyan forces led by Saddam Haftar, and despite Ankara having already taken steps toward rapprochement with the ruling authorities in Benghazi in eastern Libya before that, researchers are observing major shifts in Turkish policy toward Libya that may be linked to the positions of other concerned states, as well as to the American initiative for a solution in the country.
Data points:
On July 5, 2026, the Turkish Ministry of Defense published an official statement indicating that basic commando training was being provided to Libyan military personnel from the east at the Turkish 40th Commando Brigade.
On July 4, 2026, the head of the Government of National Unity and Minister of Defense, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, received a phone call from Pakistan’s Army Chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, during which the two sides exchanged views on issues of mutual interest and affirmed the importance of strengthening cooperative relations between Libya and Pakistan.
On July 2, 2026, Massad Boulos, the US President’s advisor on African and Middle Eastern affairs, again raised an initiative based on: unifying Libyan institutions, adopting the first unified national budget in years, conducting joint military exercises in Sirte under the supervision of AFRICOM (the US Africa Command) along with the establishment of a joint security operations room, and drawing up plans to unify the government and institutions and hold elections.
In July 2026, Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın met with Saddam Haftar in Benghazi, and units of Haftar’s Libyan National Army participated in a joint military exercise with Turkish forces in Izmir, Turkey.
In June 2025, the Tobruk-based parliament loyal to Haftar formed a technical committee to review and ratify the Exclusive Economic Zone agreement signed with Turkey in 2019.
Analysis:
The pragmatic logic behind the Turkish shift:
Turkish sources say Ankara’s shifts toward Libya began years ago, and that the opening toward the east of the country is due to the impasse the Libyan crisis has reached, with the acceleration of these shifts attributable to changing positions and policies among concerned capitals — particularly Greece and Russia — as well as new relations with Egypt and the growing US drive to play an active role in Libya. Experts note that the Turkish position has always been pragmatic, seeking to secure Ankara’s interests, and that developing the relationship with Haftar came after concluding that he is a rising actor at both the regional and international levels, especially following the emergence of American initiatives that grant him a place within the anticipated settlement. Turkish sources affirm that these shifts eastward align with the belated American intervention in Libya, and are the result of a general rapprochement between Ankara and Washington and close coordination on the Libyan file — the same regional and international shifts that spurred Egypt’s opening toward the eastern government led by Dbeibah are the same ones driving Turkey’s opening toward Benghazi and Haftar. Libyan sources believe Ankara is seeking to build relations with both parties to the conflict, and is working through its relationship with Haftar to maximize its share in reconstruction projects and to consolidate the maritime agreement it previously concluded with the Tripoli government.
Tripoli’s calculations and fears of counter-armament:
Sources in Tripoli criticize Turkey’s shifts, expressing surprise that Ankara — which suffered under military rule — would open up to “a military faction planning a family-based system of rule,” in a veiled reference to Haftar and his sons. These sources recall that two-thirds of Libya’s population live in the west, and that despite the presence of energy wealth in the east, the west holds Libya’s largest oil field, Sharara. In contrast, Turkish sources rule out that Ankara’s rapprochement with the east would come at the expense of its relationship with the west, and believe the process of rapprochement with Haftar is happening in coordination with the Dbeibah government. They note that although the Tripoli government may be seeking an arms deal with Pakistan, these sources believe that military solutions within Libya have become unlikely and enjoy no regional or international cover.
Declining Egyptian influence versus rising Turkish influence:
Sources in Tripoli say Egypt is losing influence after Haftar’s relations with Turkey and the United States solidified, and after his support for the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan was exposed — not to mention his attempt to remove Aguila Saleh, who is seen as aligned with Cairo — which in their view reflects a decline in Egyptian influence in eastern Libya. However, research circles are more cautious about asserting this decline, considering that Boulos’s initiative, based on power-sharing between east and west, requires regional support, making the positions of Egypt and Algeria in particular decisive for the success or failure of Washington’s plan.
Tripoli sources also consider that Turkey’s keenness to develop its relationship with Haftar in order to consolidate the maritime agreement with Libya worries Europe, which had previously rejected this agreement, and that Greece’s repositioning toward rapprochement with the Dbeibah government is a sign of this growing concern. Libyan sources conclude that the new Turkish approach is bold but complicated, and could erupt at any moment, while Turkish sources emphasize that Washington’s plan requires regional and international understandings, and that Turkey is positioning itself to be a present party at the table of these understandings.
Conclusion
Turkey’s rapprochement with the Haftar camp is a pragmatic shift aimed at defending Ankara’s interests and aligning with international shifts, foremost among them the American initiative for Libya. It also aims to consolidate the maritime boundary agreement Turkey previously concluded with Libya’s western government, which Greece, Europe, and Egypt had rejected at the time.
Turkey’s training of forces affiliated with Haftar worries Tripoli, but this does not mean Turkey will allow the military option to be used again against the Dbeibah government. The possibility of Tripoli concluding an arms deal with Pakistan may reflect a crisis of trust between the Dbeibah government and Ankara, though Turkey downplays the significance of the event and considers internal military options to have become unlikely.
According to Turkish sources, Turkish rapprochement with Benghazi will not come at the expense of the relationship with Tripoli, as these sources consider that the process is occurring in coordination with the Dbeibah government. Egypt may have lost some of its influence in the east due to Haftar building relations with Ankara, Washington, and others, but Egypt and other states such as Algeria remain essential in supporting or obstructing Washington’s initiative.
Turkey’s shifts in Libya stem from shifts among the international parties concerned with Libyan affairs, and from Ankara’s rapprochement with Cairo and coordination between the two capitals on this file. These shifts began before Washington’s belated return to Libya and Boulos’s initiative, and are benefiting from the rapprochement between Washington and Ankara and the excellent relationship between Trump and Erdoğan. The Turkish approach is bold but complicated and fraught with risk, and may face pushback from Europe — as evidenced by Greece’s new positioning toward rapprochement with the Tripoli government.
