Saudi Support for Al-Burhan: A Potential Stabilizing Factor or a Catalyst for Escalation and Division in Sudan?
Policy Brief by Zaelnoon Suliman – Progress Center for Policies
1. Introduction
Relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Sudan are entering a new phase of strategic coordination and accelerated diplomatic engagement in 2025. This comes amid the challenges of Sudan’s civil war and the dual power structure between the governments of Port Sudan and Nyala.
Riyadh’s moves reflect its desire to stabilize its southern neighborhood and safeguard its vital interests in the Red Sea. However, they also raise questions about the neutrality of the Saudi role — and whether, in practice, it leans toward supporting one side of the conflict, particularly General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.
2. Key Developments
October 21, 2025: The Saudi Council of Ministers, chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, authorized Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan to negotiate and sign an agreement to establish the Saudi–Sudanese Coordination Council.
March 27, 2025: Al-Burhan met a Saudi delegation in Port Sudan to discuss implementing urgent service projects as part of Riyadh’s reconstruction efforts in war-affected regions.
March 28, 2025: Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received Al-Burhan at Al-Safa Palace in Mecca. The two sides agreed to form a joint coordination council to strengthen cooperation in economic, security, and development fields.
Sudanese government announcement: Preparation of 100 strategic partnership projects with Saudi Arabia worth over $50 billion, covering agriculture, energy, mining, infrastructure, transport, education, and technology.
3. Analysis
A. The Official Saudi Position
Riyadh officially reiterates its commitment to Sudan’s unity and stability, and its support for a Sudanese–Sudanese dialogue under the Jeddah Platform, without bias toward any party.
However, the timing of the Coordination Council’s creation and the level of official engagement with Al-Burhan’s government indicate a de facto recognition of his authority as the legitimate representative of the state. Saudi-funded projects are implemented through ministries under his control in Port Sudan — a move that strengthens his political position and provides him with financial and economic leverage.
B. The Underlying Drivers of Saudi Alignment with Al-Burhan
While the relationship is presented as economic, evidence suggests that Saudi support for Al-Burhan forms part of a broader geopolitical strategy aimed at managing regional balances in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
Key motivations include:
Preserving a Centralized Authority:
Riyadh views Al-Burhan as the last viable embodiment of a centralized state capable of preventing Sudan’s fragmentation into militia-run entities that could threaten Red Sea and oil-route security.
Countering Emirati and Egyptian Influence:
Saudi Arabia perceives Abu Dhabi’s ties with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Cairo’s influence within the Sudanese military as challenges to its regional balance, prompting Riyadh to back Al-Burhan as a counterweight.
Containing Russian and Iranian Influence:
Al-Burhan’s decision to freeze the Russian naval base project in Port Sudan aligns with Saudi efforts to keep Red Sea security within the Saudi–Western security umbrella.
Conditional Political Reward:
Riyadh appreciates Al-Burhan’s attempts to dismantle Islamist networks within the army and bureaucracy, providing support contingent on his continued restraint of Islamist factions.
Preventing Permanent Fragmentation and Filling the Vacuum:
Prolonged war threatens trade and oil routes; thus, Saudi Arabia uses conditional economic engagement to push Al-Burhan toward a political settlement from a position of strength.
Projecting Saudi Arabia as a Stabilizing Power:
Through this calibrated involvement, Riyadh aims to position itself as a responsible mediator — not a partisan actor — in Sudan’s crisis.
C. Structural Challenges in the Al-Burhan Alliance
While supporting Al-Burhan serves certain Saudi interests, his field alliances with Islamist-leaning militias create dilemmas for Riyadh.
Such associations raise concerns among Western partners and contradict Saudi Arabia’s anti-Islamist posture, making continued support risky unless Al-Burhan restructures his alliances and distances himself from ideological factions.
4. Overall Assessment
Riyadh views Al-Burhan as a necessity, not a preference — the only figure currently capable of maintaining minimal state cohesion and balance on the ground. However, he remains a risky bet if he fails to restrain hardline elements or engage in an inclusive political settlement.
Saudi policy is therefore likely to remain pragmatic and dual-track:
Support the central authority in Port Sudan;
Maintain discreet channels with other actors to ensure influence over any eventual peace process.
5. Conclusion
Saudi Arabia’s recent initiatives mark a qualitative shift in its policy toward Sudan, using economic and diplomatic tools to promote stability and protect its Red Sea interests.
However, the sustainability of this approach depends on Riyadh’s ability to balance its support for Al-Burhan without becoming a party to the conflict — and on Al-Burhan’s commitment to political and security reforms that limit Islamist influence and pave the way for a comprehensive national settlement.
