One-Week Deadline for al-Burhan as the International Quartet Nears the Civilian Transition Option
Policy Assessment – African Affairs Unit – Progress Center for Policies
Introduction:
Recent political and diplomatic developments in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, indicate a qualitative shift in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s approach to the Sudanese crisis—from the role of a mediator seeking to manage the consequences of war to that of a pivotal regional actor shaping a comprehensive political settlement. This shift comes amid growing coordination among the parties of the International Quartet, comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States, and against the backdrop of increasing regional and international conviction that the bet on a military resolution has failed, and that it is necessary to move toward civilian transitional arrangements that exclude the warring parties from managing the next phase.
Saudi Arabia as a Regional Platform for Shaping the Solution:
The visit of the Chairman of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, to Riyadh carries particular political significance, both in terms of its timing and the nature of the invitation and arrangements. The visit took place following an official invitation from the Saudi government, conveyed by the Deputy Foreign Minister during an unannounced visit to Port Sudan days earlier, reflecting an advanced level of seriousness and urgency in addressing the Sudanese file. The visit also coincided with the presence in Riyadh of Massad Boulos, Senior Adviser to the U.S. President for Arab and African Affairs, giving the meeting a clear international dimension that went beyond a purely bilateral framework.
According to informed sources accompanying General al-Burhan, the meeting between al-Burhan and Prince Salman was attended by executive, security, and military leaders from both the Saudi and Sudanese sides, in addition to the U.S. presence. This indicates that discussions focused primarily on the war in Sudan and its regional security repercussions, as well as on ways to transition from an open-ended conflict to a disciplined political track. The fact that the meeting was confined to the file of war developments and efforts to achieve security and peace—without addressing other issues—confirms that Riyadh now views Sudan as a security–political file of strategic priority.
The Quartet’s Proposal and Saudi Arabia’s Role in Advancing It:
Based on available information, a comprehensive proposal emanating from the International Quartet’s vision was presented to the Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council. The proposal is based on a comprehensive ceasefire, followed by the transfer of power to a temporary civilian transitional government, and the initiation of rebuilding the military institution within the framework of a unified national army. This political track is linked to a package of regional and international commitments, led by Saudi Arabia, including support for reconstruction projects and economic stabilization in the post-war phase.
In this context, informed sources reported that the Saudi Crown Prince conveyed these proposals directly, setting out a clear timeframe for dealing with them. According to the same sources, al-Burhan requested a grace period not exceeding one week to respond to the proposals, citing the need to conduct internal consultations related to rearranging his political and military position within the armed forces and with allied forces. This short deadline reflects the scale of mounting regional and international pressure and indicates that Riyadh has adopted a time-bound, pressure-based approach that narrows the space for political maneuvering.
Saudi–American Convergence:
The coincidence of al-Burhan’s visit with the presence of Massad Boulos in Riyadh carries additional political significance, particularly in light of previous statements by the U.S. official explicitly calling for the exclusion of the warring parties from the transitional phase and the formation of an independent civilian government. This approach clearly aligns with the substance of the proposal discussed in Riyadh, reinforcing the interpretation that the Kingdom has become the primary regional platform for implementing the U.S. vision for Sudan. This convergence also reflects the evolution of the Jeddah platform from a negotiating framework focused on ceasefires into a broader political platform for managing the transition process.
The Egyptian Position: Signs of Repositioning:
In parallel with this movement, indicators are emerging of the beginning of a measured shift in the Egyptian position toward the Sudanese crisis. The phone call between Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Aaty and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, emphasized the importance of continuing coordination within the Quartet mechanism to achieve a comprehensive ceasefire and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This stance aligns with statements from Egyptian strategic thinking circles, including remarks by Dr. Amani El-Tawil, who is close to Egyptian decision-makers, reflecting increasing openness to a civilian track and gradual acceptance of the idea that the transitional phase may require a civilian façade not involved in the military conflict. Although Cairo has not officially announced a policy shift, these indicators suggest a gradual repositioning in its approach to the crisis.
Assessment:
Estimates suggest that the Sudanese army commander’s response to the proposed initiatives will most likely be conditional, aimed at buying time to reorganize his internal position and improve his negotiating—and possibly battlefield—standing. Conversely, the Rapid Support Forces are expected to escalate their military operations in areas such as El Obeid and Kadugli, in an attempt to pressure the Port Sudan camp and impose their terms from a position of strength on any political arrangements that might lead to their exclusion from the transitional phase.
Conclusion:
Overall indicators suggest that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with U.S. support and increasing coordination with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, has begun leading a process to reshape the International Quartet’s approach to the Sudanese crisis. The Quartet appears to be converging on a shared vision based on excluding the parties to the war from managing the transitional phase and forming a temporary civilian government to administer the state and lay the groundwork for reconstruction.
Although this shift has not yet been officially announced, granting al-Burhan a short deadline to respond to Riyadh’s proposals reflects the seriousness of the current phase and the narrow margin for maneuver. It also indicates that Sudan stands at a critical political juncture that may determine the outcome of the war and the trajectory of the state in the near future.
