Prospects of War Between Eritrea and Ethiopia: Roots of Escalation, Conflict Pathways, and Regional Implications

Policy Paper

Africa Affairs Unit – Progress Center for Policies

Introduction

The Horn of Africa is experiencing a phase of escalating tension, in which bilateral disputes increasingly intersect with broader regional dynamics that threaten political and security stability across the region. Within this context, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have re-emerged as a central fault line following years of open war between the two countries (1998–2000) and the historic agreement to normalise relations in 2018. Recent developments, however, suggest a shift from latent tension to overt confrontation, marked by a series of reciprocal statements that raise serious concerns about the prospects of direct military escalation.

From the Ethiopian side, federal police authorities announced the seizure of an ammunition shipment allegedly destined for armed opposition groups in the Amhara region, accusing Eritrea of supporting the insurgency. Ethiopian officials described this support as a direct threat to the stability of the federal state, a move aimed at reframing the internal crisis as a case of external interference—thereby justifying tighter security measures and opening the door to potential international backing.

In response, Eritrea adopted a hardline posture. Information Minister Yemane Ghebremeskel rejected the Ethiopian accusations, describing them as “fabricated pretexts” intended to justify war. President Isaias Afwerki went further, declaring that “Ethiopia has declared war on Eritrea,” elevating the rhetoric from political dispute to an implicit warning of possible direct military confrontation. Eritrean statements point to Asmara’s readiness to activate its military and regional instruments to pursue strategic objectives, including support for Ethiopian factions defecting from the Tigray front and coordination with the Sudanese army within a broader regional alignment that includes Egypt, Somalia, and Djibouti.

This escalation carries several key implications. First, Ethiopian–Eritrean relations are no longer confined to bilateral border issues but have become a central axis in wider regional balances, particularly in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Second, any direct military clash is unlikely to remain geographically limited, and could instead open multiple fronts inside Ethiopia, significantly amplifying risks to security and stability in the Horn of Africa.

Analysis

Recent indicators suggest that the Ethiopian–Eritrean confrontation encompasses complex domestic and regional dimensions. Ethiopia’s announcement of the seizure of an Eritrea-linked ammunition shipment intended for Fano forces in Amhara reflects an effort to internationalise an internal conflict, legitimising stricter security measures and creating space for potential external support. Conversely, Asmara’s sharp response—moving beyond denial to accusations that Ethiopia is preparing for war—signals a deterrence strategy and an attempt to mobilise domestic opinion in anticipation of a possible confrontation.

Eritrea, moreover, has emerged as an active regional actor, not only through support for Ethiopian dissident forces or Tigrayan elements and coordination with the Sudanese military, but also through participation in a broader regional alignment that includes Egypt, Somalia, and Djibouti. This alignment aims to balance Ethiopia’s power and contain its military and maritime ambitions. As a result, the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab have become highly sensitive theatres, where any escalation could threaten maritime security and global trade, prompting urgent diplomatic engagement and monitoring.

In addition, a potential conflict could trigger multiple internal fronts within Ethiopia—particularly in Amhara and Tigray—while increasing security and political pressure along Eritrea’s borders. This overlap between internal conflicts and regional alliances complicates the prospects of any direct confrontation, transforming it into part of a wider network of cross-border strategic manoeuvres involving maritime security, regional balances, and political stability in the Horn of Africa.

Potential Scenarios and Leverage Points

The likely military and political trajectories can be framed within a unified context: the continuation of rhetorical escalation and indirect support for local proxies, accompanied by mounting political and security pressure without direct confrontation—this remains the most probable short-term scenario; a potential shift toward limited border clashes or targeted strikes, using internal security incidents as a pretext for escalation, followed by regional or international mediation aimed at de-escalation without addressing the root causes of the conflict; or, should preventive and diplomatic measures fail, a direct military confrontation between the two armies, opening multiple fronts and generating severe repercussions for Horn of Africa stability, maritime security, and international trade.

Ethiopia also possesses important internal leverage points, including Eritrea’s domestic vulnerabilities stemming from President Isaias Afwerki’s advanced age and the absence of clear succession alternatives, as well as the mobilisation of minorities such as Eritrean Afar communities and claims by tribes of Eritrean origin in eastern Sudan. These dynamics could draw such groups into a broader founding alliance, increasing the likelihood of exhausting or undermining Eritrea’s position ahead of any full-scale military confrontation.

Conclusions and Recommendations
• The Ethiopian–Eritrean conflict is not merely a bilateral dispute but a focal point for wider regional dynamics involving strategic alliances, threats to maritime security, and pressures on political stability across the Horn of Africa.
• Tensions have reached a critical threshold, shifting from political exchanges to the possibility of direct military confrontation, linked to Eritrea’s support for forces defecting from the Tigray front and Amhara-based Fano elements, and intersecting with the conflict in Sudan within a broader regional alignment. Any escalation would directly affect the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab, undermining regional security and necessitating immediate engagement by the African Union, IGAD, and regional states.

Based on this assessment, the paper recommends the following:
• Intensifying regional and international diplomatic efforts to halt escalation and prevent direct military confrontation; supporting de-escalation initiatives grounded in previous agreements, while opening direct dialogue channels to manage border and internal disputes; and strengthening the capacity of regional and international mediators to establish effective border-monitoring mechanisms and prevent external armed support that could increase the likelihood of war.
• Closely monitoring and analysing the actions of regional and international actors supporting both sides, and urgently addressing the immediate and internal dimensions of the conflict for each party to reduce the risk of a slide toward comprehensive confrontation, while maintaining vigilant oversight of strategic military and political developments in both Addis Ababa and Asmara.