Port Sudan’s Welcome of the Saudi–U.S. Summit: Between Betting on the Return of the Jeddah Track and Absorbing International Pressure

Policy Assessment Paper

Zaelnoon Suliman, Progress Center for Policies

Executive Summary

Port Sudan’s official welcome of the Saudi–American initiative to end the war in Sudan reflects a notable shift in the stance of the military authority and its allied Islamist movement, following years of rejecting any negotiation process similar to the Jeddah track and criticizing the role of the Quad mechanism.

Port Sudan is leveraging this opening for political and military considerations, most prominently the pursuit of reviving a bilateral negotiation track that grants the army greater room for maneuver, and attempting to absorb mounting international pressure linked to suspected rapprochement with Iran. However, this approach faces the official U.S. position, which emphasizes adherence to the Quad mechanism, making the likelihood of creating an alternative political process lower. The paper identifies three potential future scenarios for the war, ranging from a conditional negotiated settlement, to internal–regional escalation, to a prolonged war of attrition.

Introduction:

Port Sudan’s recent welcome of the Saudi–American summit addressing the Sudanese conflict marks an unprecedented policy shift. This comes after three years of consistent criticism of the Jeddah process and accusations that the Quad mechanism promotes unbalanced political approaches that exclude Islamists and equate the army with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This paper analyzes the dimensions of this shift, its drivers, and its potential implications for the trajectory of war and peace in Sudan amid rapidly evolving regional and international dynamics.

I. Background: Port Sudan’s Position and the Jeddah Track
Port Sudan has for years rejected serious engagement with international initiatives—especially those treating the RSF as an equal party to the army. It was wary of the UAE’s role within the Quad and what it viewed as international attempts to exclude the Islamist movement from Sudan’s political future.
This formed the basis for its distancing from the Jeddah process and favoring direct military action over political compromise.

Against this backdrop, the new welcoming position appears to be an attempt to reshape relations with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in alignment with Port Sudan’s political and military calculations.

II. Port Sudan’s Bet on Reviving the Jeddah Track in a Saudi–U.S. Bilateral Format
Port Sudan interprets the Saudi–American initiative as an opportunity to revive a negotiation process that gives the army a stronger hand in representation and decision-making.
Several motivations are at play:
-The reduced influence of the Quad due to internal disagreements among its Arab members.
-The army’s pursuit of a narrower negotiation umbrella (Saudi–U.S.) rather than a multi-party framework involving regional actors with divergent agendas.
-Port Sudan’s possession of geo-strategic leverage related to ports, Red Sea security, and counterterrorism and migration control.

Through this lens, the new track may:
Strengthen the army’s political position,
Or at least buy time for further military gains.

III. Attempting to Absorb International Pressure Amid Rising Concerns over Iranian Influence
International pressure on Port Sudan has grown in recent months due to reports of limited military cooperation with Iran, raising concerns in Washington and among some Gulf actors.
Given the escalation in U.S.–Iran tensions and a broader American campaign against Iranian influence in the region: Continued army rejection of ceasefires or negotiations could expose it to political—and potentially military—threats.
Welcoming the Saudi–American initiative thus serves as a tactic to absorb international shockwaves and reposition defensively. Opening up to Washington and Riyadh is therefore part of a broader strategy to avoid classification as an extension of Iranian influence.

IV. Saudi Interest in Moving Beyond Quad Disagreements
The Saudi Crown Prince’s request for U.S. intervention in ending the war signals:
Saudi discomfort with the Quad’s internal disagreements,
And a preference for a more focused and effective Saudi–U.S. format.
Saudi Arabia, a pillar of the Jeddah process, recognizes that deeper U.S. involvement provides greater diplomatic momentum and reorients the political process in a direction that aligns with its Red Sea and regional security interests.

V. The Official U.S. Position and the Limited Prospects for Launching a New Track
Despite Port Sudan’s optimism:
Statements by President Trump,
The U.S. Africa policy advisor,
And the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum
clearly reaffirm commitment to the Quad as the primary mechanism for halting the war.
This sets clear boundaries on attempts to shift toward a new bilateral framework.

VI. Possible Future Scenarios of the Sudan War
1. Conditional Negotiated Settlement (Partially Likely)
This scenario unfolds if:
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. achieve policy alignment,
And pressure both sides into accepting an expandable ceasefire.
Potential outcomes:
Launching a gradual political process,
Without addressing structural root causes,
And the likelihood of sustained military influence over civilian governance.

2. Military and Regional Escalation (Moderate to High Likelihood)
Escalation becomes more likely if:
The Saudi–American initiative fails,
Port Sudan intensifies its engagement with Iran,
Or foreign support to the RSF expands.
Consequences:
Broader territorial spread of the war,
Possible proxy regional interventions,
Threats to Red Sea navigation,
And worsening humanitarian crises.

3. Prolonged War of Attrition (Highly Likely)
In the absence of a cohesive international–regional consensus, the conflict may persist as a long-term low-intensity war characterized by:
Shifting battlefield control,
Sustained geographic fragmentation,
Further institutional collapse,
And deepening economic and humanitarian decline.
In the near term, this is the most realistic scenario absent major political breakthroughs.

Conclusion:

President Trump’s pledge to use presidential influence to stop the war is significant but insufficient without comprehensive regional alignment—including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Washington, and relevant African and international actors. In the absence of such alignment, the war is likely to persist or escalate into a more dangerous phase—risking the transformation of Sudan into an open regional battleground, with severe implications for Red Sea stability and broader regional security.