Zaelnoon Suliman, African Affairs Unit, Progress Center for Policies
Policy Assessment
Facts and Developments:
Credible information indicates that Pakistan has, in recent months, emerged as an active player in the arming of two Arab states experiencing complex armed conflicts—Sudan and Libya—in a move whose implications go well beyond commercial considerations to broader regional political and security dimensions.
According to military sources cited by Reuters on January 9, 2026, Pakistan has reached the final stages of concluding an arms deal with Sudan valued at approximately $1.5 billion. If completed, the deal would constitute direct, high-impact support for the Sudanese Armed Forces in their ongoing war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). A former senior official in the Pakistani Air Force, along with three other informed sources, confirmed that the deal is “effectively finalized,” suggesting it has moved beyond negotiation into the implementation phase.
In a related context, Pakistan concluded another military agreement in December 2025, valued at more than $4 billion, to sell military equipment to the Libyan National Army (LNA) in eastern Libya. This agreement ranks among the largest arms deals in Pakistan’s modern history and followed an official meeting in Benghazi between Pakistan’s Army Chief Asim Munir and Saddam Khalifa Haftar, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the LNA. The deal is particularly sensitive given the continued UN arms embargo on Libya, placing it in a highly delicate political and legal context.
Available information indicates that the Sudan deal includes ten Karakoram-8 light attack aircraft, more than 200 armed and reconnaissance drones, advanced air defense systems, and Super Mushshak training aircraft. The inclusion of JF-17 fighter jets, jointly developed with China, has not been ruled out, although no official confirmation has been made regarding quantities or delivery schedules.
Pakistan’s growing role in arming Sudan and Libya does not signal a direct replacement or overt displacement of Turkey’s existing influence in these theaters. Rather, it reflects a redistribution of roles within the regional military-influence market. Pakistan enters as a complementary actor—one with lower political and diplomatic costs—in arenas where Turkey is either unwilling or unable to engage openly due to international constraints or complex regional calculations.
The likely outcome of this shift is not the exclusion of an existing actor but the dismantling of single-supplier dominance. The region is witnessing a gradual transition from a “single military partner” model to an open influence market, where arms supply and support are distributed among multiple actors, each guided by its own interests. Turkey does not lose its influence outright, but it loses its capacity to monopolize arms supply and, by extension, to unilaterally shape political and military trajectories.
The Unstated Saudi Dimension:
To date, there is no public evidence or official documentation proving that Saudi Arabia is a direct or contractual party to these arms deals. However, accumulated political and strategic indicators suggest a non-declared Saudi role based on political facilitation and the easing of the regional environment, without direct involvement or public exposure.
This role serves Riyadh’s regional objectives without imposing immediate legal or diplomatic costs. It manifests in a form of silent political alignment, as these deals intersect with a core Saudi objective: strengthening regular national armies as sovereign actors against non-state armed forces, both in Sudan and Libya. This approach aligns with Saudi priorities in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, where stability and the prevention of security vacuums remain enduring strategic concerns.
This posture fits within a broader Saudi pattern often described as “leading from behind,” a doctrine that crystallized after the Yemen experience. Riyadh increasingly prefers influence without visibility and indirect delegation over overt engagement. In this context, Pakistan provides a suitable cover, enabling security and political objectives to be pursued without direct Saudi exposure.
This assessment is reinforced by the absence of any public Saudi objection or effort to obstruct these deals, despite the sensitivity of both arenas and their subjection to international constraints—rendering Saudi silence closer to implicit approval than neutrality.
A distinction must also be made between the two theaters. In Sudan, Saudi objectives appear clearer: preventing the collapse of the national army as the backbone of the state, achieved through political acceptance and regional facilitation rather than direct intervention. In Libya, Saudi involvement appears more restrained, aimed primarily at balancing existing influence rather than sponsoring or leading it, with no clear indicators of direct financial or logistical engagement.
Conclusion:
• The Saudi role in Pakistani arms deals with Sudan and Libya can be summarized as indirect political support—facilitation through silence, benefit without signature, and influence without public accountability. Saudi Arabia is not a contracting party, yet it remains part of the permissive environment that allows these deals to proceed.
• Assessments indicate that this support—particularly in drones and fighter aircraft—could enable the Sudanese Armed Forces to regain relative air superiority they held in the early stages of the war, countering the RSF’s expanding use of drones and territorial gains, potentially shifting the current balance of power on the ground.
• More broadly, these arms deals reflect Pakistan’s transition from a limited, traditional arms exporter to a consequential actor in conflict-linked arms markets, capitalizing on reduced Western engagement and the rising cost of overt intervention by regional powers—thereby redrawing the map of arms suppliers in Arab conflict zones.
