Neutralizing Gulf Disputes and Managing the Political Transition in Damascus:
Policy Assessment:
Reading the Implications of the Saudi–Emirati Divergence
Mustafa Al-Miqdad – Progress Center for Policies | Damascus
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Introduction
This paper comes at a politically sensitive moment for Syria, in which the requirements of managing a complex transitional phase intersect with efforts to reassert the state’s regional standing, particularly within the Arab framework. This trajectory coincides with ongoing and consequential divergences between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on several regional issues, including approaches to influence, conflict management tools, and engagement with non-state actors. In this context, the position of Syria’s new government toward this divergence takes on significance that goes beyond conventional diplomacy, becoming a factor that directly affects the stability of the transitional phase and the re-entrenchment of state logic and sovereign decision-making based on national interests.
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General Context and the Syrian Government’s Orientation
Assessments based on Syrian governmental sources, supported by statements attributed to officials in formal institutions over recent months, indicate that the general orientation of the new Syrian government is to avoid sharp alignment in Arab–Arab disputes. This approach stems from a firm conviction within decision-making circles that the transitional phase cannot bear the costs of becoming entangled in external power struggles, whether directly or through informal instruments, given the negative repercussions such involvement could have on state reconstruction and the restoration of stability.
This orientation is reflected in Syrian diplomatic discourse in Arab forums, which emphasizes the priority of consolidating internal stability, regulating the security sphere, and fostering a supportive regional environment for economic and political recovery—away from the logic of axes and polarization.
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Damascus’ Approach to the Saudi–Emirati Divergence
According to sources close to the government, Damascus views the Saudi–Emirati divergence as a manageable disagreement within Arab frameworks or within the Gulf Cooperation Council, and sees no interest in transforming Syria into a testing ground or pressure tool for either side. This stance aligns with what official circles describe as Syrian foreign policy fundamentals, based on a clear separation between political relations and economic openness on the one hand, and any security or military commitments on the other.
Within this framework, the new Syrian government seeks to maintain balanced relations with both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi without entering into axis-based calculations or political and security trade-offs, allowing it to benefit from Arab re-engagement without exposing the transitional phase to additional pressures or external conditionalities.
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The Transitional Phase and the Risks of Politicizing Non-State Actors
Official assessments indicate that one of the most significant challenges facing the transitional situation in Damascus lies in the potential re-politicization or re-militarization of non-state actors, whether through the recycling of armed factions or the deployment of Syrian elements in external conflicts. Such involvement, according to these assessments, would undermine efforts to rebuild the military and security institutions on national foundations and weaken Arab partners’ confidence in the Syrian state’s ability to monopolize sovereign decision-making and the legitimate use of force.
Accordingly, a direction has taken shape within decision-making circles that can be described as “disciplined neutrality,” based on refraining from involvement in the Saudi–Emirati dispute while leveraging Arab openness to support the internal transition—without allowing it to be transformed into a political or security pressure tool.
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Risks of Escalation and Their Impact on Internal Files
At the same time, Damascus does not overlook concerns that the Saudi–Emirati divergence could escalate from limited bilateral disagreements into broader regional competition, potentially affecting approaches to certain internal Syrian files, particularly those related to Kurds, Alawites, and Druze. Prevailing assessments within Syrian governmental circles suggest that such a scenario could increase the risk of indirect Gulf competition manifesting within the Syrian arena.
Should this occur, it is likely to take a non-confrontational form, emerging through divergent support for political approaches related to decentralization, societal representation, or models of local governance, using diplomatic, economic, or humanitarian tools, or via local intermediaries. Damascus views with heightened sensitivity any attempt to link Syrian communal files to external influence projects, considering this a direct infringement on national decision-making unity and the logic of a centralized state during the transitional phase.
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Opposition Attempts to Exploit Regional Disputes
In a related context, official circles in Damascus express growing concern over the possibility that internal and external opposition forces may perceive opportunities created by an intensification of the Saudi–Emirati divergence, enabling them to reactivate their political presence or improve their bargaining positions with regional actors. Particular attention is paid to the behavior of currents associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, given what the government views as a structural antagonism with Abu Dhabi and a clear political alignment in the Yemeni arena—factors that could drive these currents to attempt to exploit any Gulf divergence to re-present themselves as political actors through escalatory rhetoric or indirect pressure channels.
At the same time, official assessments do not rule out that other opposition forces—liberal, leftist, nationalist, or self-described “national” currents—motivated by ideological backgrounds or by exclusion from current power arrangements, may also seek to exploit this divergence by maneuvering between Gulf axes in hopes of securing political or economic backing that would reinsert them into influence equations. Damascus views such potential behavior as an additional destabilizing factor, given the risks it poses of internalizing regional disputes within the domestic political sphere and reproducing patterns of external polarization that the new Syrian government seeks to neutralize.
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Conclusions
• Damascus views neutralizing itself from Arab–Arab disputes—particularly the Saudi–Emirati divergence—as a structural prerequisite for the success of the transitional phase, not a temporary tactical choice, due to its direct impact on consolidating state logic and sovereign decision-making.
• The official Syrian position rests on a “disciplined neutrality” approach, separating political and economic openness from any security commitments or strategic trade-offs, thereby reducing risks of regional entanglement and reinforcing Arab confidence in the Syrian state.
• Preventing the politicization or militarization of non-state actors—whether through faction recycling or the deployment of Syrians in external conflicts—constitutes a cornerstone in safeguarding the transition and ensuring the state’s monopoly over legitimate force.
• Damascus does not rule out the possibility that an escalation of the Saudi–Emirati divergence could translate into indirect competition within Syria through communal files or economic and humanitarian instruments; however, its capacity to regulate the security and political space remains the decisive factor in mitigating these risks.
• The new Syrian government views attempts by some opposition forces—particularly Islamist currents linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as other opposition actors seeking to maneuver between Gulf axes—as an additional source of instability, necessitating tighter oversight of external funding and communication channels and preventing the internalization of regional disputes within the domestic political arena.
