Policy Assessment by Ameer Makhoul – Progress Center for Policies
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Introduction
Netanyahu’s statements during his first press conference since the beginning of the war, held on the evening of 12 March, can be described as a “great power speech”, both regionally and beyond the region, alongside the United States. The speech represents a development from the earlier “Sparta” doctrine he articulated roughly a year ago.
At that time, Netanyahu spoke about developing Israel’s capabilities to the point where it could rely on itself to manage its wars, and about transforming the relationship with the United States into a strategic partnership focused on advancing military capabilities.
In the recent press conference, however, Netanyahu repeatedly described Israel as a great power, emphasizing that it would deploy the capabilities of a great power to strike any target that could pose a future threat to its security or to its absolute military superiority.
His statement that Iran is no longer what it once was, the Middle East is no longer what it once was, and Israel is no longer what it once was, goes beyond rhetorical enthusiasm. In our assessment, his claim that Israel is no longer what it once was constitutes an announcement of a historic shift toward permanent intervention in the region and beyond, based on Israel’s growing strength and its rise to the ranks of great powers in several fields, as he argued.
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Analysis
Netanyahu framed the Iranian regime as having relied on three pillars within what he described as a “plan to destroy Israel”:
1. Establishing a network of regional proxies, which he claims have already been eliminated or are in the process of being dismantled.
2. Developing a ballistic missile arsenal.
3. Pursuing a nuclear bomb with the declared objective of destroying Israel.
In response, Netanyahu argued that Israel has built independent military, technological, and political capabilities—repeating the term “independent” several times. These capabilities, he said, would prevent Iran from effectively using any of the tools it has developed.
He further asserted that Israel now occupies a different international position than at any previous time, standing alongside the United States as a strategic partner. According to Netanyahu, Israel’s power is growing at a pace that far exceeds the growth of the threats it faces, enabling it to remove risks and guarantee its future security.
On the nuclear issue, Netanyahu emphasized that Israel and the United States “will not allow Iran to conceal any development of nuclear weapons or uranium enrichment.” He referred to technological capabilities that would allow Israel to track and strike such developments even if the war were officially declared over.
This statement implies that Israel intends to continue the conflict through other means, relying on its technological superiority, space-based capabilities, air power, and military intelligence. It also suggests that, according to Netanyahu’s perspective, Tehran’s airspace and Iranian skies will remain open to Israeli military aviation under any circumstances.
At the same time, behind these sweeping statements, Netanyahu appeared to adjust Israel’s war objectives regarding Iran. He shifted the issue of regime change to the Iranian people, while suggesting that Israel could create conditions conducive to such change.
According to his remarks, future strikes would target the Basij, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Iranian military. However, this approach appears closely aligned with the American position, which has similarly placed responsibility for regime change on the Iranian people.
Reports from the Trump administration suggest that Washington may announce the end of the war within a week, which in turn shapes Netanyahu’s calculations. Time constraints and the difficulty of decisively winning the war currently limit the ability of both the United States and Israel to achieve their maximal objectives.
American concerns also center on the possibility that a ground intervention and the establishment of a military bridgehead in western Iran, particularly in Kurdish-majority areas, could ignite tensions with Turkey. Ankara views such a development as a direct threat to its territorial unity and national security due to fears of Kurdish separatist movements.
The United States is also concerned about the so-called “day after the war.” The most likely scenario may be one in which each side claims victory according to its own standards and narratives.
A larger strategic concern for both Washington and Tel Aviv is the possibility of a regional nuclear arms race, with several countries—not only Iran—seeking to develop military nuclear capabilities, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.
Such a development would deeply concern Israel, as it could weaken what is widely referred to as Israel’s nuclear deterrence advantage. It would also undermine Netanyahu’s claim that Israel has emerged as a regional and global great power—unless he relies on the second element of his doctrine: Israel’s ability to prevent any regional state from developing nuclear weapons.
However, this approach could push the region beyond the potential control of the American–Israeli security framework.
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Domestic Dimension
Domestically, Netanyahu intended his press conference to function as a victory speech, even if the Trump administration ultimately decides to end the war.
It appears that Netanyahu believes that ending the war could work to his political and electoral advantage. He hinted that “many surprises” have been prepared for Iran, which could reinforce the perception of victory resulting from his strategy.
Opinion polls conducted over the weekend of 12–13 March indicate a clear improvement in Netanyahu’s electoral prospects, even if this occurs through changes in the composition of his governing coalition.
Maintaining power through such a coalition remains a politically and ideologically comfortable option for Netanyahu, as it helps block any political solutions regarding Palestine or broader regional issues.
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Conclusions
• Netanyahu appears serious in presenting Israel as a regional and global great power in specific fields, particularly technology, artificial intelligence, space capabilities, intelligence, air power, and the energy and liquefied natural gas markets. He also appears determined to transform relations with Washington into a strategic partnership aimed at reshaping the region and the international order.
• In his press conference, Netanyahu laid the foundations for what he portrays as a narrative of victory in the war, suggesting that its end may be approaching.
• Translating Netanyahu’s doctrine into practice would imply maintaining Israel’s absolute military superiority, imposing American–Israeli dominance through force, and seeking to pressure regional states—particularly Gulf states—to comply with these strategic arrangements. Such a scenario is unlikely to be accepted by regional powers.
• Despite the serious tone of Netanyahu’s press conference, part of the message appears directed toward domestic and international political consumption, as well as influencing American public opinion in favor of prolonging the war.
Netanyahu is aware that he cannot directly confront President Trump on this issue, just as he understands that the current direction within the U.S. administration is toward finding an exit point for the war, which has become increasingly costly for Washington and for Trump’s political base.
