Netanyahu: From the Rising Lion to Gaza – Is There a Prospect for Ending the War?
Situation Assessment:
The war with Iran has ended—at least in its current round. The ceasefire came as an American decision before it was Israeli or Iranian. Both sides declared victory:
Israel, claiming it achieved its goals “and much more,” with Netanyahu announcing the elimination of the “two greatest existential threats”;
Iran, asserting it prevented Israel from achieving its objectives, and that its ballistic missiles overcame both Israeli and American air defenses, even striking the U.S. Al-Udeid base in Qatar in retaliation for American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.
Netanyahu’s rhetoric dominated the political scene, both within the government and the opposition, as well as in the media and public opinion. He called the war on Iran “Israel’s greatest victory over those who sought our annihilation,” heavily quoting religious scripture to frame it in divine terms.
However, after lifting the state of emergency, Israel began realizing the scale of damage caused by Iranian missile strikes on strategic and civilian sites—something that had been censored during the war.
On June 25, Israel was shocked by a surprise attack from Gaza, resulting in the deaths of seven soldiers. Gaza returned to the spotlight after being sidelined for 12 days during the war with Iran.
In a televised interview, Netanyahu said: “We did to Iran what Hamas did to us on October 7, 2023.”
Across multiple statements, Netanyahu sought to intertwine his election messaging with the Iranian “victory,” presenting himself as decisive and courageous, trying to focus public and electoral attention on that narrative while diverting it from the war in Gaza, the hostages, and the catastrophic failure of October 7.
While Israel claims a crushing victory over Iran, it also states that “the mission isn’t over”—hinting at two possible approaches:
The Lebanon model, where Israel continues strikes against any perceived violations by Iran, especially targeting what remains of its nuclear and missile infrastructure.
Increased covert operations, including assassinations of Iranian scientists and securing air superiority for future actions. The IDF spokesperson revealed the war on Iran generated thousands of potential new targets for Israel.
Neutral assessments suggest the biggest winner was Donald Trump, whose administration reasserted U.S. regional and global dominance without engaging in a full-scale war—something that could have backfired on his economic and international policies.
Trump took full control of the war’s direction, from authorizing the strike on Iran’s nuclear project to announcing the ceasefire.
Trump rejected Israel’s name for the war (“The Rising Lion”), calling it “The Twelve-Day War.” This implies that Israel played a functional role in executing U.S. policy, not the other way around—consistent with the isolationist stance of Trump’s base, who oppose America fighting wars for others, even for Israel.
Following the ceasefire, Netanyahu launched his election campaign, giving numerous interviews (which he avoided for the past 20 months), visiting markets and religious sites, and quoting the Torah heavily to attract far-right and religious voters. Early elections could happen within three months, although nothing is confirmed. Still, election fever now dominates Israeli politics.
Like all recent regional wars, Gaza suffered greatly, as did the West Bank. During the global distraction, including among Arabs and Palestinians, Israel’s blockade and so-called “humanitarian aid” strategy killed nearly 2,000 starving Gazans. The occupation also intensified its assault on Palestinian presence in the strip.
Current debates suggest two main options for Netanyahu:
Announce early elections (possibly Nov 2025), riding the “victory halo” to win another term.
Maintain his current coalition and govern until the term ends in fall 2026.
Polls after the Iran war show increased support for Netanyahu and the Likud party, but the far-right bloc still holds at 49 seats, with the opposition (plus Naftali Bennett’s party) holding a Knesset majority. The rise of Likud seems to be at the expense of Ben Gvir and Smotrich’s parties, not by attracting new voters beyond the far-right base.
Political dynamics remain fluid. If Israel wakes up from the illusion of a “decisive victory,” party alignments may shift. A unified Arab list could win 15–17 seats, disrupting the power balance between the two main Zionist blocs.
Such uncertainty constrains Netanyahu’s options. He may prefer to extend his government’s life instead of risking elections. In that case, he may agree to a temporary Gaza ceasefire and prisoner exchange deal lasting around two months, based on Egyptian, Qatari, and U.S. mediation.
Notably, Netanyahu previously hinted that the Gaza war would end by October 2025. The proposed deal—involving phased release of hostages and prisoners—may align with that timeline.
IDF Chief of Staff Zamir recently stated that the Gaza war “won’t be endless.” On June 25, Knesset Finance Committee Chair Moshe Gafni said he doesn’t understand why the war is still ongoing. Opposition leader Yair Lapid also declared that the focus should now be on ending the war and rebuilding Israeli society.
On the other hand, ministers like Smotrich, Ben Gvir, and several Likud MPs are calling for capitalizing on the Iran victory to escalate the war on Gaza—pushing for mass displacement, military conquest, and Jewish settlement in the strip.
Netanyahu knows these figures won’t bring down his government, but he wants them as allies heading into elections to control the outcome by any means.
Arguably, the most decisive influence may come from Trump, who on June 25 said that ending the Gaza war and reaching a deal is imminent, expressing optimism. If this reflects serious U.S. will, Netanyahu will have no choice but to comply—Smotrich and Ben Gvir won’t be able to block it.
Still, some Israeli officials like Defense Minister Katz are pushing a fallback position: retaining a buffer zone along Gaza, controlling the Philadelphi (Salah al-Din) corridor, disarming Hamas, dismantling its governance, and preventing the Palestinian Authority from taking control of Gaza.
According to U.S. envoy Bashara Bahbah, the conditions for a deal are viable and the Trump administration will likely enforce it. Hamas may be compelled to accept the terms, which are close to its own proposals—leaving Netanyahu little choice but to go along, even if Israel has not officially confirmed this stance.
Conclusion:
A deal to end the Gaza war is plausible—especially if the Trump administration imposes it on Netanyahu for U.S. strategic priorities.
Despite the sense of victory over Iran, internal Israeli dynamics do not point to a clear move toward ending the Gaza war. There is still tension between accepting a deal and intensifying military action under the guise of “finishing off Hamas.”
If Netanyahu sees electoral benefit in the deal, he may accept it—possibly in exchange for expanding settlements and annexation in the West Bank.
Netanyahu hoped that victory over Iran would free him from the “Gaza trap”—but Gaza continues to haunt him, and it’s unlikely he can reframe the election around “the greatest victory in Israel’s history” while ignoring October 7, 2023—Israel’s greatest failure, by all Israeli assessments.
