Ameer Makhoul, Progress Center for Policies
Situation assessment:
Introduction:
Israeli media focused closely on the visit of Mossad Chief David Barnea to the Qatari capital, Doha. According to Israel Hayom, the current effort aims to reach a deal based on the release of all detainees in exchange for a ceasefire.
Israeli estimates, citing a senior source, say that the visit is “extremely important, given the shift in Qatar’s position towards disarming Hamas the day after.” The Egyptian and Qatari positions have reportedly become “aligned” following President El-Sisi’s visit to Doha.
The senior Israeli source also acknowledges that “the chances for a deal have improved,” although Hamas is still seen as trying to buy time, necessitating further persuasion efforts and continued intensification of Israeli military pressure.
Analysis:
Israeli security circles estimate that Hamas’ strategy is based on buying time, believing that Israel — due to its internal divisions — is prone to collapse, which could slow the pace of the deadly war “to a level Hamas can withstand,” allowing aid deliveries to Gaza to resume.
These assessments are also based on Hamas’ reading of the movements by families of captives and detainees and petitions within the Israeli army “calling for an end to the war without dismantling Hamas’ capabilities.”
Notably, Netanyahu delegated the sensitive Doha mission to the Mossad chief after weeks of sidelining the high-level security delegation led by Barnea, former IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, and Shin Bet head Ronen Bar.
This comes amid harsh criticism over Minister Dermer, a Netanyahu loyalist, leading the negotiations, with the U.S. administration viewing him as an obstacle to progress. Families of Israeli captives and detainees also demanded Dermer’s removal, expressing trust in the sidelined security delegation, which Netanyahu had dismissed when he sought to avoid obligations of the second phase of the hostage deal and returned to waging deadly war on Gaza.
Although the Netanyahu government publicly refuses to move to the second phase of the deal — despite international consensus, wide public opinion within Israel, and sentiments inside the military — Netanyahu and his government blame Hamas for the impasse, portraying Israel’s one-sided deadly escalation as a “means of persuasion” to force Hamas to comply with Israeli conditions and prevent any negotiations from ending the war, stopping forced displacement, withdrawal from Gaza, reconstruction, and Gaza’s reintegration into a unified Palestinian entity.
In a preemptive move to undermine the Community Support Committee for Gaza, the Israeli Cabinet (the Security Cabinet) on April 25 approved the principle of allowing humanitarian aid into Gaza. However, distribution would not be handled by the army, international organizations, or the Committee, but by private companies approved by Israeli security — likely American and possibly Israeli companies.
The Cabinet entrusted the Prime Minister with setting the date for the start of aid entry into Gaza.
The Mossad chief’s visit to Doha is not necessarily an indicator of Israel’s conviction in the necessity of completing the deal and ending the war. Rather, it reflects Netanyahu’s anxiety over the potential outcomes of Trump’s upcoming visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and possibly Turkey.
It also reinforces the idea that the Israeli decision to end the war is primarily in Washington’s hands. Otherwise, Netanyahu’s government could find itself isolated from the pace of regional and global developments, which might impose a new reality on Israel contrary to its desires.
The assessment is that as Trump’s visit draws nearer, Israeli leadership feels increasingly pressed for time, which is expected to be reflected in an escalation of genocidal aggression against Gaza alongside intensified negotiation efforts.
There are growing assessments that the end of the war is approaching, pending an American decision that takes into account U.S. interests and the Arab position.
The Israeli government is increasingly anxious about what Trump’s Gulf visit might bring across various files: the Iranian, Saudi, Syrian, and Palestinian issues.
Israeli statements have started to downplay the possibility of normalization with Saudi Arabia, as the Saudi-American trajectory is no longer subject to Netanyahu’s wishes but moves beyond him.
Any potential normalization would be conditional upon a prior cessation of the war and an American decision, as well as progress on establishing a Palestinian state — which would undermine the creeping annexation project and one of Netanyahu’s government’s main foundations: preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Netanyahu’s greatest challenge is losing his exclusive influence over the American administration.
Conclusion:
If Netanyahu loses the ability to influence the American stance on ending the war in Gaza, he will have no choice but to yield to Washington’s position. He might secure an agreement with the U.S. regarding the disarmament of Hamas and the abolition of its authority; if that fails, he would have a future pretext to resume war under different justifications. He is also seeking to gain popularity through a comprehensive deal in anticipation of possibly announcing early elections.
Assigning the Mossad chief to Doha may signal Netanyahu’s recognition of the failure of the path he pursued by appointing Minister Dermer to lead the negotiations, where he hoped to sway the Trump administration’s stance. In Israel, it is also assessed that appointing the Mossad chief could indicate potential progress toward a comprehensive deal aligned with the American agenda and Trump’s Gulf visit.
Israel’s options are shrinking, with indications that the American green light for continuing the Gaza war may soon expire. Netanyahu’s government will have no choice but to align its expectations with the American position. Until then, an escalation of Israeli operations in Gaza is likely.
In the remaining period before Trump’s Gulf visit, an additional, even more brutal escalation in Gaza is expected.
The Cabinet’s decision to use private companies for aid distribution — which has yet to begin — is an attempt to achieve internal consensus and dodge responsibility for the policy of starvation, thirst, and denial of medical treatment in Gaza, while keeping full control in its own hands.
