Policy Paper by Dr. Mohamad Kawas – Progress Center for Policies
Executive Summary
Hezbollah has reactivated its weapons in defense of Iran, placing the Lebanese front within the scope of U.S.–Israeli war objectives against Iran.
This development could trigger a comprehensive war against Hezbollah—not as an autonomous Lebanese actor, but as an integral component of Iran’s strategic capabilities.
It opens the door to internal confrontation in Lebanon amid mounting domestic resentment toward Hezbollah, the state’s opposition to dragging Lebanon into war, and potential government measures against the group.
Opening the Lebanese front could transform the conflict into a multi-theater war if Iran-aligned factions in Iraq and Yemen become involved.
Introduction
Following Hezbollah’s launch of rockets toward Israel, the military situation in Lebanon deteriorated sharply as Israel carried out strikes on Hezbollah targets across multiple areas, while threatening to expand operations. This raises two central questions: What motivates Hezbollah to engage in the war alongside Iran, and what are the implications for Lebanon and for the broader war against Iran?
Hezbollah Enters the Battle
On March 2, 2026, Hezbollah announced it had launched rockets and drones toward a military site near Haifa, marking its first attack of that scale since the late-2024 ceasefire. The group stated the operation was a response to the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and to “ongoing Israeli aggression.” According to Israeli statements, the rockets targeted an air defense site south of Haifa; the Israeli military reported intercepting one projectile, while another landed in open terrain.
Israel responded with a series of airstrikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, as well as areas in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, issuing evacuation warnings for dozens of villages in the south and western Bekaa. Israeli officials described the attack as a shift to the “northern front” within a broader war being waged in parallel against Iran itself, designating Hezbollah as a “central target” in the next operational phase.
In its statement, Hezbollah directly linked its actions to the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader and to escalating Israeli strikes on Iranian territory, framing the attack within the “right of the Axis of Resistance to respond.” Observers noted that Hezbollah likely assessed that failing to respond to the killing of Iran’s highest authority would undermine the deterrence image it has cultivated for two decades.
Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem had previously declared that the group “may not remain neutral” if Iran were attacked. However, following intervention by Lebanese officials—particularly Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri—Hezbollah adjusted its position, later stating that it would not participate if the war against Iran were limited and did not target the Supreme Leader’s life.
Hezbollah’s Calculations
Observers note that Hezbollah deliberately selected a military target near Haifa to signal operational cohesion while containing escalation by striking an air defense site rather than a major city. The group characterized the attack as a “limited and calibrated response,” seeking to avoid full-scale war. This reflects a longstanding pattern of sending political signals through controlled military actions—though such a pattern has become less acceptable to Israel since the outbreak of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” conflict on October 7, 2023.
Hezbollah’s intervention comes despite mounting domestic pressures, particularly within its Shiite constituency in the south and Beirut’s southern suburbs, amid broader Lebanese frustration over the continued existence of its weapons as a trigger for Israeli retaliation. Although a ceasefire was reached in November 2024, Israel continued targeted strikes that reportedly killed around 500 Hezbollah leaders and fighters without direct retaliation from the group. This raises questions about the strategic rationale of exposing its base to renewed risks by opening the Lebanese front in support of Iran.
Observers argue that the rocket attack has:
Reactivated the concept of “unity of arenas.”
Explicitly tied Hezbollah’s fate to Iran’s.
Sparked internal confrontation with the Lebanese state, which has initiated plans to confine weapons to state authority and assert control over decisions of war and peace.
Opened the door to uncontrolled escalation and potential proximity to civil strife, amid renewed debate over Hezbollah’s arms.
Implications for Lebanon
Following the rocket launch, the Lebanese government convened an emergency session on March 2, 2026, amid reports of international pressure on Beirut to adopt a firm stance. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam announced the following decisions:
Prohibit any military activity by Hezbollah and confine its role to political activity.
Reject any military or security actions launched from Lebanese territory.
Direct security agencies to take necessary measures against violators of state decisions.
Prepare to resume negotiations with civilian participation and international sponsorship.
Instruct security forces to prevent any attacks originating from Lebanese soil.
These decisions constitute the first procedural confrontation with Hezbollah, potentially escalating internal tensions and obliging the state to implement security and legal measures against the group’s military apparatus.
President Joseph Aoun echoed this stance, warning that launching rockets from Lebanese territory undermines state efforts to shield the country from regional confrontation. While condemning Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory, he emphasized that Lebanon must not once again become a “platform for wars of support unrelated to our national interest.”
This reflects an attempt by the Lebanese state to:
Establish political and media distance from Hezbollah’s war decision, despite limited capacity to restrain its military actions or fully implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701.
Reassure international donors ahead of security support conferences that official Beirut does not seek escalation.
Nevertheless, the escalation exposes Lebanon’s structural contradiction between a state committed to a policy of dissociation and armed forces aligned with an external axis that effectively control decisions of war and peace.
Pressures on Lebanon include:
Humanitarian risks: Early Israeli strikes in densely populated southern suburbs triggered internal displacement, evoking memories of the 2006 war under far more fragile economic conditions.
Economic vulnerability: Expansion of Israeli strikes to infrastructure—bridges, ports, roads—would further cripple Lebanon’s already collapsed economy, reeling since 2019.
Revived debate over Hezbollah’s arms: Social polarization may intensify, particularly within Shiite communities feeling targeted.
Risk of sectarian tensions and internal instability.
Political paralysis: Constitutional deadlines, including May 2026 parliamentary elections and IMF-linked reforms, could be suspended under wartime pretexts.
Israeli Scenarios
Israeli strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs and other areas suggest an effort to designate Lebanon as a central front in the war against Iran, rather than a secondary tactical arena. Statements by Israeli defense officials about troop mobilization on the northern border indicate preparation for broader operations.
Three possible trajectories emerge:
Limited aerial campaign: Concentrated airstrikes on Hezbollah strongholds and targeted leadership assassinations without ground invasion.
Expanded infrastructure campaign: Broad targeting of civilian infrastructure, similar to the 2006 war, to pressure the Lebanese state.
Limited ground incursion: Cross-border operations to destroy rocket systems and fortifications, possibly establishing a security buffer zone.
The path chosen will depend on U.S. positioning amid direct engagement against Iran, and Hezbollah’s capacity to inflict tangible damage on northern or deeper Israeli targets.
Conclusions
Hezbollah’s engagement signals that the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader will not pass without cost to Israel and revives the “unity of arenas” doctrine.
By reactivating its arsenal and opening the northern front, Hezbollah effectively transforms Lebanon into a direct theater within the war against Iran.
Iran risks exposing its most significant external deterrent asset to substantial erosion if Israel launches a prolonged destructive campaign in Lebanon.
While Hezbollah sought a calibrated response to avoid total war, Israel may determine escalation dynamics independently.
The development could precede broader mobilization of Iran-aligned factions in Iraq and Yemen, signaling Tehran’s recourse to regional assets amid heavy losses.
The United States may expand operations regionally—including in Lebanon—under declared policies aimed at preventing Iran from activating its regional “proxies.”
Washington and Tel Aviv are likely to treat Hezbollah as a direct extension of Iranian capabilities and therefore a legitimate military target.
The escalation risks deepening Lebanon’s political and economic crisis and fueling internal conflict centered on Hezbollah’s weapons.
Government measures restricting Hezbollah’s military activities could serve as a legal and political reference point for further international actions.
A deteriorating security environment in Lebanon could potentially prompt Syrian military movements tied to strategic security considerations, aimed at preventing instability from spilling over into Syrian territory.
