The Crisis of the Opposition and the Limits of Change in Israel
Policy Assessment by Ameer Makhoul – Progress Center for Policies
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Introduction
At his party’s parliamentary faction meeting on 16 February, Yair Lapid, Leader of the Opposition and head of Yesh Atid, surprised members of his bloc and broader opposition figures by warning that victory for the opposition—often described as the “liberal camp”—in the next elections is far from guaranteed.
Lapid cautioned party lawmakers and opposition leaders of the real risk of defeat unless they “come to their senses” and stop undermining one another. Relying on unpublished internal polling and in-depth studies that he described as “worrying,” Lapid stated: “Even if we do everything in our power, it is not certain that we will win—but at least we will have given ourselves a chance.”
These remarks reflect growing awareness within Israel’s opposition of the structural crisis it faces—not only in terms of electoral balance vis-à-vis Netanyahu’s bloc, but also regarding the absence of a unified political project, eroding trust among its components, and declining public confidence in its ability to present a credible governing alternative. Lapid’s warning carries particular weight, as it comes from the formal leader of the opposition and is grounded in internal data reflecting deeper trends in Israeli political sentiment.
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Analysis
Lapid’s assessment appears realistic to many observers, especially since it is based on internal polling that goes beyond headline numbers to analyze generational, geographic, demographic, and identity-based variables. His remarks also constitute an implicit acknowledgment of the opposition’s structural impasse. According to Lapid, the upcoming elections will be “the most difficult and most critical ever.”
He argues that victory depends on persuading voters “100% that we will not surrender, that we will not join another Netanyahu government, and that we will not form a coalition with the ultra-Orthodox parties who will continue extortion and evasion.” Yet he concedes that even full opposition unity would not guarantee victory.
Unlike Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett, and Benny Gantz, Lapid has rhetorically committed to refusing to sit in a Netanyahu-led government or with the Haredi parties, which he openly opposes—both over military service exemptions and the broader religion–state nexus. Nevertheless, Lapid’s position does not fundamentally differ from that of Naftali Bennett, who, according to polls, is the strongest potential challenger to Netanyahu.
At the same time, most opposition leaders have largely aligned with Netanyahu and the far-right in delegitimizing Palestinian Arab political representation as a legitimate governing partner—reflecting the growing dominance of nationalist-right discourse within Israel’s political system. These positions are likely to face a practical test after the elections, depending on the actual balance of power.
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The Strategic Weight of Arab Representation
In this context, the potential reconstitution of the Joint Arab List acquires strategic significance. It could prove decisive in reshaping the political alignment. Polling suggests that the opposition may secure around 58 seats, compared to roughly 52 for the current coalition. A reformed Joint List could obtain between 12 and 15 seats, potentially reducing Likud and its allies to below 50 seats and blocking Netanyahu from forming a government.
However, Netanyahu appears to be wagering that if his bloc secures more than 52 seats, he could remain as caretaker prime minister and prevent the opposition from forming an alternative government—particularly given the broad political reluctance to rely on Arab parties as coalition partners.
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The Right-Wing Bloc and Its Internal Dynamics
On the right, the strength of the Religious Zionism current rests primarily on the settler constituency, even if its demographic weight does not fully correspond to its current political influence. This influence stems from previous electoral outcomes and the alliance between Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir.
Polling suggests that Ben-Gvir’s party could secure between 9 and 10 seats, many from within Israel’s pre-1967 borders. Meanwhile, Netanyahu seeks to prevent the collapse of this camp by encouraging electoral consolidation or potentially reshaping its leadership.
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A Structural Crisis Within the Opposition
The opposition faces a deep structural crisis characterized by fragmentation, mistrust, and ideological divergence. Leaders such as Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Lieberman often position themselves to the right of Netanyahu on several issues.
Moreover, the opposition does not fundamentally diverge from the government on core security and strategic matters—particularly regarding Iran or Israel’s evolving military doctrine, which increasingly emphasizes offensive capabilities, as articulated by Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir.
This reality reflects a deeper transformation within Israel’s political system: the near-total retreat of the idea of a political solution with the Palestinians and the emergence of broad consensus around “conflict management” rather than conflict resolution. As a result, substantive differences between government and opposition have narrowed significantly, particularly under the prevailing security paradigm.
The Democrats party, led by Yair Golan, represents a partial exception but remains limited in influence.
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Strategic Voting and Leadership Competition
The absence of a coherent alternative political project has reinforced the phenomenon of “strategic voting,” whereby some opposition voters shift toward right-wing figures such as Bennett, viewing him as the most viable candidate to unseat Netanyahu despite ideological proximity between them.
This dynamic reflects growing skepticism regarding the traditional opposition’s ability to effect genuine political change.
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Conclusions and Assessments
• Lapid’s statements reflect increasing awareness within the opposition of the depth of its structural crisis, amid the rise of right-wing currents in Israeli society and the opposition’s failure to articulate a distinct political alternative—particularly on the Palestinian issue.
• There is no guarantee of opposition victory in the upcoming elections, despite realistic opportunities—especially if it achieves meaningful political and organizational unity.
• Arab political representation remains a decisive factor in shaping electoral outcomes; however, continued delegitimization by most Zionist parties limits its capacity to influence government formation.
• Netanyahu’s prospects of remaining in power remain high—either through forming a new government or continuing as caretaker prime minister—benefiting from opposition fragmentation and its reluctance to cooperate with Arab parties.
• Naftali Bennett emerges as one of the primary beneficiaries of the opposition’s crisis and may represent a potential alternative to Netanyahu through reconfiguration within the right-wing camp, rather than through a victory of the traditional opposition.
• The near-total retreat of the political-solution paradigm reflects a structural shift in Israel’s political system, where competition has moved from ideological divergence to leadership rivalry within a broadly right-wing political framework.
• The timing of elections, potential disqualification or fragmentation of Arab parties, and the configuration of political alignments will remain decisive variables in determining whether Netanyahu retains power or leadership shifts to an alternative right-wing figure.
