Israeli Far-Right Dominance Among New Voters: Reading the Data and Weighing the Scenarios
Policy Paper by Ameer Makhoul, Progress Center for Policies, London
Executive Summary
Data published in September 2026 indicate that the number of eligible voters for the Israeli Knesset has reached 6.8 million, an increase of 9.4% on the 2022 elections, or roughly 600,000 new voters. New voters aged 18 to 22 make up about 8.7% of the total electorate, approximately 595,000, of whom 118,000 are Palestinian Arabs. Opinion polls reveal a striking lead in this group for Itamar Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit (“Jewish Power”) party, which wins 16% of all new voters and possibly more than 20% of the Jewish ones. By contrast, Palestinian Arab youth (aged 18 to 35) show a rise in their intention to vote to 59%, driven chiefly by a desire to topple the Netanyahu–Ben Gvir government rather than by ideological affiliation. The paper concludes that this group may decide the election in favour of either the ruling coalition or the opposition, but the deeper impact lies in the entrenchment of an extreme-right mindset within the army and the security and judicial establishments, which will make the cost of future political change far higher.
The Data
The increase in the number of voters in this round is the largest in Israel’s history, and its electoral translation is equivalent to roughly six of the Knesset’s 120 seats. The figures on voting inclinations among new voters are striking. According to the polls, Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit wins 16% of this group, but its share among Jewish new voters (477,000) may exceed 20%. In other words, one in five of the youngest generation supports this Kahanist party. Most of them are soldiers, university students, and students at the religious yeshivas and pre-military preparatory academies affiliated with the Religious Zionism movement, and some are expected to hold leading positions in the state within a generation. This assessment is reinforced by the fact that Jerusalem and its settlements have the most voters in this age group, around sixty thousand, compared with twenty thousand in Tel Aviv.
Jerusalem is considered the most right-wing city and the one most supportive of far-right parties. It is also the most racially violent towards Palestinian Arabs, as attested by the rate of assaults on public bus drivers, most of whom are Palestinian, and by the fan base of the Beitar Jerusalem football club, known as “La Familia”, the most violent and racially inciting of all. At the same time, the city’s natural growth rate is among the highest in Israel, owing to its religious population.
As for the Smotrich–Feiglin alliance, Religious Zionism leader Bezalel Smotrich has signed an agreement for a joint slate with Moshe Feiglin, head of the Kahanist right-wing Zehut (“Identity”) party, under pressure from Netanyahu and as part of his efforts to prevent any vote from being wasted within his bloc. Smotrich’s young supporters are limited in number and cannot compare with Ben Gvir’s. Most belong to the Religious Zionist stream through its religious schools, which combine Torah study with a military ethos and preparation for army service.
Ideologically, they are the vanguard of pastoral outpost settlement, built on the link between Torah and land. They include the terrorist organisation known as the “Hilltop Youth”, as well as those serving in the army. The alliance with Feiglin enhances the slate’s appeal to young people aged 18 to 22, particularly because of Feiglin’s positions, which are distinctive of the anarchic and less religious far right. This audience includes secular, traditional and religious young people alike. Some of them find no home in the existing religious parties but are drawn to the combination of Jewish fanaticism with an economic discourse based on the free market and non-intervention by the state. They are also drawn by Feiglin’s years-long campaign to legalise cannabis, which expresses his economic creed and attracts secular Jewish youth to his party.
As for Palestinian Arab youth, Israeli polls did not stop at the new-voter group. The Afkar Institute adopted a different group: Arab youth aged 18 to 35. According to the institute’s May 2026 polls, the number of those wishing to take part in the 26th Knesset elections has risen, with the rate reaching 59%. It may grow as the election approaches, amid this generation’s anxiety about its future in the context of savage racism, the push towards emigration, and the closing of horizons for development, security and safety. Among the survey’s most prominent findings is that young Arab citizens respond far more strongly to practical, immediate concerns than to general ideological slogans. This generation is turning away from traditional party politics, a global phenomenon characteristic of so-called Generation Z. It relies instead on communication tools and a communication language built on the latest technologies and artificial intelligence, as opposed to the mobilisation rhetoric familiar from non-populist parties.
According to the poll, the most important motivator for this generation to vote is the desire to replace the Netanyahu–Ben Gvir government, cited by 61%. The most common answer about what they expect from the parties they will vote for was “presenting a practical plan to address young people’s daily problems”, cited by around 30%. About three in four young Arabs say that rising violence and crime in Arab society, alongside employment and cost-of-living issues, will determine whether they go to the polls. They also demand tangible solutions, and there is growing support for exerting influence from within decision-making positions, as well as a desire for youth and women’s representation on candidate lists.
The poll was conducted roughly six months before the official election date, so further polling of this generation’s attitudes, and of new voters’ attitudes, is needed. It also calls for polls conducted by Palestinian Arab polling institutes, which are expected to be more accurate and faithful to reality in interpreting trends. Most Israeli polling centres, including liberal ones, want in advance an integrationist, pragmatic orientation from Arabs; their conclusions may touch on the truth, but their interpretation skews it, which calls for another polling body.
Analysis
Polling is widening and accelerating as the Knesset elections approach, provided they are not postponed on security pretexts. This marked increase points to several serious matters. One is the attempt to use the poll itself as a tool of influence, either to demoralise one side or to mobilise the other. Many polls are tendentious in essence and funded by a specific political party for the benefit of its campaign, or seek to create uncertainty and ambiguity in order to push one of the two blocs towards internal conflict. They are also used for racist, exclusionary purposes, warning against the opposition’s reliance on the bloc of Palestinian Arab votes inside Israel. The major parties, meanwhile, rely exclusively on in-depth polls that look not only at the general picture but at the details of voters’ identity, generational, geographic and regional dimensions.
In this regard, the picture is bleaker than the polls suggest, particularly if we focus on voting trends among first-time voters. In this age group, Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit stands out as the leader. In electoral terms, and according to poll estimates, Ben Gvir’s party wins on average between one and two Knesset seats, depending on the overall voting rate. The Smotrich–Feiglin alliance, by contrast, attracts a broader youth segment, combining secular, traditional and religious young people. They are drawn by Feiglin’s positions, which are distinctive of the anarchic far right, his liberal economic discourse, and his call to legalise cannabis.
As for Palestinian Arab youth, this generation differs from the traditional parties in that it wants direct solutions from elected representatives. Especially in the 18 to 22 group, it also tends towards non-partisan grassroots youth movements, with a more defiant spirit towards the Israeli police and its repression. The prevailing impression is that this generation leans more towards political pragmatism. In practice, the prevailing view among them is that their motivation to topple the Netanyahu–Smotrich–Ben Gvir government is, on the one hand, a moral stance and, on the other, an expression of a pragmatic orientation, since this government poses an existential threat to their future, dreams and aspirations.
Possible Scenarios
Scenario One: The opposition wins and the ruling coalition is toppled. This scenario materialises if the opposition succeeds in uniting its ranks and ensuring high participation by Arab youth, and if the elections are not postponed on security pretexts. It would bring changes in domestic and foreign policy and a relative improvement in the conditions of the Palestinian Arab public. But it would not halt the entrenchment of the extreme-right mindset in state institutions, nor address the deep roots of the fascist and genocidal tendency that has taken hold during the current coalition’s years in power.
Scenario Two: The ruling coalition continues. This scenario materialises if the opposition fails to muster sufficient support, or if the elections are postponed on manufactured security pretexts. It would deepen exclusionary and racist policies, increase the risks of ethnic cleansing in the West Bank, and widen the circle of political targeting to eliminate Palestinian Arab leaders, and even opposition ones, if the coalition feels it may fall.
Scenario Three: Political paralysis and postponement of the elections. This scenario materialises if security or regional tensions escalate, or if it proves impossible to form a governing coalition after the elections. It would deepen the crisis of legitimacy, widen the circle of protest, and possibly trigger an internal explosion, with trust in the political process as a whole continuing to erode.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Political change in the Israeli elections is possible and has a chance of toppling the ruling far-right coalition, yet the roots of fascist and genocidal tendencies are becoming entrenched. The mindset of young people who support Ben Gvir’s party exclusively is a bloodthirsty, militia-like one, which sees its mission as ridding itself of the Palestinian presence wherever it exists. These young right-wing circles are even more extreme than the environment in which Yigal Amir grew up. Amir assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin nearly three decades ago. These circles portend political targeting to eliminate Palestinian Arab leaders, and even opposition ones, should the current ruling coalition feel it may fall.
Electorally, this Israeli segment may decide the election in favour of the current coalition, and in any case it will later occupy positions in the army, the security and judicial establishments, and most state systems. The ruling security, civil and political system, together with the continuing occupation, the genocidal war on Gaza, the ethnic cleansing in the West Bank and the fascist racism inside Israel, constitutes the environment in which this segment is growing up. If the Netanyahu government and its coalition with the fascist far right are not toppled in the coming elections, assuming they are not postponed on contrived security pretexts, the task will be immeasurably harder in the future. The price for the Palestinian Arab public would be existential.
On the other side, the prevailing awareness among Palestinian Arab youth of the importance of toppling the current ruling coalition forms a segment parallel to the far right among their Jewish peers, and Arab youth may play a decisive role in bringing the coalition down. The challenge is that this segment’s awareness rests on pragmatic foundations that prioritise direct, tangible solutions.
Accordingly, there is an urgent need to draw the international community’s attention to the dangers facing Palestinians, and to call for genuine monitoring of the elections, since the disqualification of Arab candidates remains a real and serious possibility. Independent research and polling by Palestinian Arab institutes should also be supported, to provide a more accurate reading of Arab youth’s attitudes. Communication with them should be strengthened in a language suited to their tools and technologies, focusing on practical solutions rather than ideological slogans.
Preparation for the scenario in which the ruling coalition continues remains a necessity, through contingency plans to protect Palestinian civilians and document violations, while awaiting the outcome of the ballot boxes.
