Dr. Mohamad Kawas – Progress Center for Policies
Situation Assessment
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Introduction
Amid calls by the U.S. president for a change in Iran’s leadership—and in the absence of an organized opposition ready to serve as a viable alternative—speculation is mounting over the regime’s ability to reform itself through internal mechanisms. At the same time, scenarios remain unclear regarding a potential regime collapse that could be triggered by prospective U.S. strikes.
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Key Developments
• On 29 January 2026, former Iranian Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi, under house arrest since 2009, issued a statement calling on current officials of the Islamic Republic to step down from power.
• Mousavi described the widespread repression of recent protests as a “major crime” and a “black page” in Iran’s history, calling for political change through a comprehensive constitutional referendum without any external interference.
• He proposed holding a constitutional referendum through the formation of a broad national front encompassing all political currents, based on three principles:
1. No foreign intervention.
2. Rejection of internal authoritarianism.
3. Peaceful democratic transition.
• Western research institutions observed, between late December 2025 and January 2026, a series of statements by Iranian reformist figures—such as former minister Ali Rabiei, sociologist Taqi Azad Armaki, researcher Amir Dabiri Mehr, and academic Abbas Abdi—calling for an exit from the crisis. These figures warned of a “point of no return” and “imminent collapse,” urging an urgent “national dialogue” and deep reforms to avert total breakdown, while emphasizing the rejection of violence and foreign intervention.
• On 11 January 2026, the “Reformist Front,” which includes several reformist parties, called for the resignation of Iran’s Supreme Leader to end the current situation and pave the way for a political transition. It proposed forming a transitional council to govern the country and prepare the ground for restructuring the political system.
• Sources reported that the Front discussed the option of collective resignations by senior officials and calls for large-scale popular demonstrations following the peak of confrontations.
• A notable position was recorded from former Minister of Cultural Heritage and Tourism Ezzatollah Zarghami, considered close to the conservative camp, who stated: “It is not correct to attribute all losses solely to terrorists.”
• On 29 January 2026, the official newspaper Ettela’at called on President Pezeshkian to apologize to the public for “the failure of the security services.” It questioned the reasons behind the free movement of armed elements despite extensive security deployment, and the justification for internet shutdowns, arguing that these issues require convincing answers to the public.
• Between December and January 2026, former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi issued statements urging Iranians to continue protesting and calling for a peaceful democratic transition, including a referendum to determine the future system (a democratic republic or a return to constitutional monarchy). He emphasized that his role is not to run for office, but to facilitate a democratic transition.
• Research bodies also documented, during 2025–2026, calls by Maryam Rajavi, leader of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), to overthrow the regime through internal resistance, proposing a “democratic, secular, non-nuclear republic,” free elections, and an end to the rule of the Supreme Jurist (Velayat-e Faqih).
• Opposition positions generally converged around a set of conditions for changing or reforming the system without foreign intervention, including:
1. An internal, peaceful, democratic transition.
2. The formation of a comprehensive national front including all political currents.
3. A free constitutional referendum to draft a new constitution or determine the system of governance.
4. The disarmament of security forces and their withdrawal from politics.
5. The release of political prisoners and an end to repression.
6. A national dialogue involving workers, students, merchants, and retirees.
• Researchers found no serious indicators suggesting the regime is prepared to amend its leadership structure, nor any signs of fractures within the ruling hard core.
• Iranian analysts noted that despite initially flexible and understanding rhetoric from President Masoud Pezeshkian, he has since realigned his discourse to fully conform with the Supreme Leader’s positions.
• Despite talk of a pragmatic current within the Revolutionary Guard linked to Iran’s economic activities, the institution has shown unity behind the Supreme Leader and declared readiness for war.
• Researchers found no meaningful parallels between the Venezuelan and Iranian cases, citing differences in scale, conditions, geography, and the nature of each regime’s regional and international entanglements. They add that sidelining the Supreme Leader—similar to what occurred in Venezuela—would not alter the ideological nature of the Iranian system, which is structurally tied to revolutionary and religious doctrine.
• Regardless of what may be prepared behind the scenes, no visible Iranian leadership alternative has emerged that could credibly engage with Washington, as Venezuela’s vice president did.
• Some observers do not rule out the possibility that Iran could introduce leadership changes—including at the level of the Supreme Leader—while maintaining the system of Velayat-e Faqih, potentially linking such changes to an agreement with the United States.
• The U.S. president’s refusal to receive Iran’s former crown prince is seen as evidence of a lack of confidence in him as an alternative, and of continued preference for dealing with the same Iranian system after modifying its behavior.
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Conclusions
• U.S. war threats against Iran reduce the likelihood that reformist or opposition voices inside Iran will be heeded in pursuing a peaceful change in leadership or political system.
• Any internal calls for the resignation of the Supreme Leader or senior officials are likely to be associated with U.S. military deployment, stripping such calls of their national legitimacy.
• Calls for change emerging from within Iran deliberately avoid advocating outright regime overthrow and remain marginal under the regime’s control and surveillance.
• The international community does not support or prepare the Iranian opposition in the manner seen in cases such as Iraq, weakening opposition movements—especially those abroad, including the MEK and the former crown prince.
• Trump is believed to favor a “Venezuela model,” dealing with the same regime after weakening it and closing off alternative options.
• Tehran appears unconcerned about opposition movements and confident that there is no U.S. plan to overthrow the regime militarily, giving it room to maneuver and hold to its conditions.
• Iran benefits from the absence of any regional environment supportive of the Iranian opposition and from regional capitals’ rejection of a potential war against it.
• Maximum pressure, without an explicit threat of regime overthrow as in Iraq, Libya, or Afghanistan, may—though without certainty—encourage internal adaptations within the regime itself to adjust to shifting balances of power.
