Policy Brief | Progress Center for Policies – London
Introduction
Drone attacks targeting several Gulf states, launched from Iraqi territory, have sparked widespread anger across the Gulf and placed the new Iraqi government under Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi under an early and acutely sensitive test: how to assert state authority across its territory and rein in Iran-backed armed factions. These events raise fundamental questions about how to approach attacks originating in Iraq but ordered from Tehran, and how Gulf states can engage with the Washington-backed Zaidi government within this complex equation.
I. The Facts
The Attacks and Their Timeline
On 17 May 2026, Saudi air defences intercepted three drones entering from Iraqi airspace, according to an official statement from the Saudi Ministry of Defence, which simultaneously affirmed “the right to respond at the appropriate time and place.” On the same day, a drone struck an electrical generator near the Barakah nuclear power plant in Abu Dhabi.
On 19 May 2026, the UAE Ministry of Defence confirmed that all three drones targeting Barakah had been launched from Iraqi territory, noting that its air force had downed two while the third struck a generator outside the plant’s inner perimeter. The UAE also announced it had intercepted six hostile drones within 48 hours, warning of its right to respond.
Regional and International Reactions
At the Gulf level, the Gulf Cooperation Council condemned the attacks on 18 May 2026, with Secretary-General Jasem al-Budaiwi describing them as a “flagrant violation.” The UAE simultaneously condemned the attacks on Saudi Arabia, expressing its full solidarity.
In a notable statement, Anwar Gargash, Diplomatic Adviser to the UAE President, implicitly blamed Iran without naming it directly, stating: “Whether carried out by the principal actor or through one of its proxies, drone attacks constitute a serious escalation.”
On the Iraqi side, the Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning the attack on the UAE, while the spokesman for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Sabah al-Numan, denied that any launch had been detected from Iraqi territory, insisting that Iraq “will not be a launchpad for aggression.” Government spokesman Bassem al-Awadi called for an investigation into the incident, and former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi urged Iraqi authorities to pursue all those who “harm Iraq’s Arab relations or destabilise regional security.”
The Accused Factions and Their Background
Reports attributed the attacks to what has become known as the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq” — an umbrella grouping of Iran-backed Shia factions, prominently including Kata’ib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.
Reporting indicates these factions are working to consolidate their influence within the Popular Mobilisation Forces and are systematically resisting any attempt to impose a state monopoly on arms. Their regional agendas are described as serving Iranian interests, particularly as a pressure instrument against American and Israeli strikes — even following the ceasefire declared on 8 April 2026.
Faction sources, for their part, deny any involvement in the attacks, dismissing them either as false reports or suggesting Israel carried them out from bases covertly operating inside Iraqi territory.
II. Analysis
The New Iraqi Government Faces a Test of Sovereignty
The Zaidi government’s pledge to establish a state monopoly on arms has been welcomed in Washington and Gulf capitals alike, and represents in itself a meaningful rhetorical shift. Yet translating this commitment into practice remains constrained by structural limitations. The government has so far adopted precautionary security measures and deployed forces along western border areas, while deliberately avoiding any direct confrontation with armed factions. Zaidi finds himself navigating an exceptionally complex equation: simultaneously seeking to deepen economic ties with the Gulf, maintain open channels with Tehran, and satisfy American demands to secure Washington’s continued political and financial support.
Iran and the Exploitation of the Iraq Card
These attacks reveal an entrenched Iranian strategy of deploying proxy factions in Iraq as a tool of regional pressure while maintaining a safe distance from direct responsibility. They occur in a particularly telling context — following the April 2026 ceasefire announcement — suggesting that Tehran seeks to retain effective leverage against the West and Israel even during periods of formal de-escalation. The contrast between Gargash’s pointed statement and Washington’s silence regarding a ceasefire violation reflects a profound diplomatic complexity that makes it difficult for Gulf states to secure a firm American response beyond verbal condemnation.
Gulf Options and Their Limits
Gulf states possess a range of available options, spanning diplomatic measures and a reduction in economic cooperation with Baghdad, to bolstering air defence systems, with the possibility of limited retaliatory strikes. Yet Gulf sources themselves tend to rule out escalation to the point of full-scale confrontation, and suggest that Gulf capitals are pursuing a strategy of calibrated pressure on Baghdad — aimed at pushing it toward enhanced sovereignty and control, rather than antagonising a government they regard as a potential partner.
Washington’s Role and the Limits of Its Reach
Washington, in turn, holds a toolkit of leverage: direct strikes against faction positions and leadership, the imposition of stringent economic and financial sanctions, or conditioning aid packages to Iraq on security reform. A Gulf–US coordination framework is also mooted, potentially encompassing joint border monitoring or logistical and security support for the Iraqi government. However, Washington’s failure to treat these attacks as a violation of its ceasefire with Tehran — despite explicit Emirati statements attributing responsibility to Iran — reveals a genuine strategic constraint that narrows American room for manoeuvre and complicates coordination with Gulf allies.
III. Conclusions
Under the existing Iran–US ceasefire, Gulf states accuse Tehran of continuing to target them through its proxies in Iraq, asserting that the ceasefire has not halted Iran’s strategy but merely altered its instruments.
Despite knowing the identity of the executing factions and those who command them, Gulf states have directed their criticism at the Iraqi government and held it responsible for halting attacks emanating from its territory — a deliberate diplomatic distinction between the source of orders and the location of execution.
Iraq’s security posture remains ambiguous: official platforms continue to issue vague statements casting doubt on Iraqi responsibility for the attacks, fuelling observer concerns over a potential deterioration in Gulf–Iraqi relations.
Although Washington has not treated these attacks as a breach of its ceasefire with Tehran — despite Emirati statements explicitly attributing responsibility to Iran — both Gulf states and the United States are relying on the Zaidi government to honour its pledge to concentrate weapons under state authority and exercise effective sovereignty across Iraqi territory.
In sum: the Zaidi government’s interest in halting these attacks is an objective interest beyond dispute — contingent on it are the continued flow of Gulf investment into Iraq and the continued political and economic support of the United States during a foundational and deeply fragile phase of its tenure.
