Situation Assessment – Progress Center for Policies
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Introduction
Following the outbreak of the Yemen crisis and the disagreements it revealed between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, observers noted Saudi moves aimed at reshaping emerging alignments involving several capitals linked to the security of the Red Sea, North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel. Within this context fall indications of advanced cooperation between Riyadh and Algiers, serving shared security interests and potentially amounting to a new bilateral or multilateral alignment.
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The Facts
• In the wake of the Yemen crisis and the divergences it exposed between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, reports spoke of Saudi interest in expanding its policies and reinforcing its influence in North Africa and the Horn of Africa.
• These reports cited indicators of Saudi interest in the region, most notably:
1. Talk of new trilateral military alliances (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Somalia), with a focus on Somali, Djiboutian, and Eritrean ports to secure maritime routes through Bab al-Mandab.
2. A strong diplomatic presence in Somali developments (such as the inauguration of a new northern federal state in January 2026 attended by the Saudi ambassador).
3. Coordination with Turkey and Qatar in the region, including joint naval meetings and potential alliances (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan).
4. Intensive efforts to support the Sudanese Armed Forces economically and militarily, alongside joint mediation with the United States to end the civil war.
5. High-level meetings with Sudanese leaders (the Crown Prince’s meeting with Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in December 2025).
6. Strengthening the security partnership with Egypt (a maritime protocol in 2025 and discussions of a trilateral alliance with Somalia).
• On 20 January 2026, The Washington Post quoted a Saudi diplomat as saying that the expansion of Emirati influence in the region conflicted with Saudi Arabia’s vision of it as part of its strategic security belt, stressing that Riyadh was determined to clarify its red lines.
• On 20 January 2026, Saudi Interior Minister Abdulaziz bin Saud paid an unannounced visit to Algeria. The Algerian presidency stated that President Abdelmadjid Tebboune held an “expanded session” with the Saudi minister and his accompanying delegation.
• Tebboune typically holds “expanded sessions” at the presidential palace only with visiting heads of state or government, underscoring the importance of the Saudi minister’s visit. The Algerian side did not disclose the substance of the talks.
• Algerian academic sources state that Algeria and Saudi Arabia have always been linked by security understandings irrespective of convergence or divergence on political issues.
• These sources add that Algeria refused to join the Saudi-led Arab coalition in Yemen, a position grounded in a doctrinal stance against joining alignments it believes do not support collective Arab action.
• The sources suggest the possibility of new security understandings that could require Algeria to engage in a qualitatively different manner or assume specific security roles in the Sahel, without amounting to political alignment within newly formed coalitions.
• Saudi sources confirm that Saudi and Algerian positions were aligned in their approach to the Libyan crisis, and that Algeria had previously discussed its disagreements with the UAE with Riyadh—suggesting that current communications address developments in the Yemen crisis as well as Saudi and Algerian interests in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa.
• Regional experts argue that talk of a Saudi-Egyptian-Somali military agreement aims to counter Emirati influence in the Sahel—an influence Algeria has long viewed as a threat to its strategic security.
• Saudi sources deny that their regional understandings are intended to confront Emirati influence, asserting instead that the goal is to support Somalia against Israeli encroachment in the region.
• At the same time, Saudi sources acknowledge that Riyadh has begun to act openly to counter Emirati influence in the region, hinting that Saudi Arabia may be financing a Pakistani arms deal for the Sudanese army.
• Libyan diplomatic sources report that Saudi Arabia—previously absent from the array of regional and international actors involved in Libya—has in recent years begun attending all international, regional, and UN meetings related to the Libyan crisis.
• An Algerian observer notes that Saudi Arabia, as a key regional power, has the right to seek a major role in the region, and that Algeria is interested in aligning its interests with Riyadh’s there.
• The observer speaks of Algerian comfort with a “new vision” expressed by Saudi Arabia that emphasizes stability in the Sahel and North Africa, including Libya—creating an overlap of interests that could form the basis for joint action.
• On 10 October 2025, the Algerian president affirmed the strength of relations with Gulf states “except one,” accusing that state of meddling in Algeria’s internal affairs—interference Algeria has rejected even from major powers.
• A Saudi source confirms a shared interest with Algeria in expanding Saudi relations with regional states, including Riyadh’s reception of Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in December 2025, the signing of new agreements between the two Red Sea littoral states, and efforts that led Djibouti to cancel an agreement with DP World.
• Diplomatic references indicate that Algeria is not concerned with becoming involved in intra-Gulf disputes, a position consistent with that of all North African states (including Morocco), which refused to engage in the Gulf rift during the Qatar crisis (2017–2021).
• These references add that Algeria—along with Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria—was among the key states that thwarted attempts to admit Israel as a member of the African Union, and that the Saudi minister’s visit reassured Algeria that it is not alone in facing security concerns.
• Algerian sources deny that Algeria’s relations with Saudi Arabia alter the regional balance of power between Algeria and Morocco, emphasizing that the issues discussed have no Maghreb-specific dimension and that Riyadh maintains good relations with all regional states.
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Conclusion
• Saudi–Algerian engagement is believed to fall within Riyadh’s renewed interest in the Sahel, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa.
• The emerging relationship with Algeria is shaped by the Saudi–Emirati rift following the Yemen crisis, particularly given a prior Algerian–Emirati disagreement.
• Despite Saudi assertions that its regional efforts aim to counter Israeli influence, sources acknowledge that they also seek to confront Emirati influence.
• While Algeria adheres to a doctrine rejecting intervention by non-regional powers (previously France and Russia), sources acknowledge Algerian comfort with Saudi involvement.
• Saudi policy encompasses stability in North Africa, including Libya, where Riyadh and Algiers share aligned positions.
• Algerian sources stress that any understandings with Saudi Arabia will remain security-focused without political alignment.
• Engagement with Algeria is part of a broader Saudi effort that has included Eritrea, Djibouti, and other states.
• The Saudi approach aligns with efforts to establish a Saudi-Egyptian-Somali alignment to reshape Red Sea dynamics.
• Algeria understands the risks Saudi Arabia identifies emanating from its strategic security belt, placing the relationship with Algeria within a framework aimed at controlling Red Sea security through Libya and Sudan and their African extensions.
