Dr. Mohamad Kawas, Progress Center for Policies
Situation Assessment
Introduction:
Following leaked reports of what was described as a secret visit by a Hezbollah official to Riyadh, analyses diverged regarding the background and implications of this development for Lebanon, the party itself, and Iran. This comes particularly amid parallel reports of Turkish mediation between Tehran and Hezbollah on one side, and Damascus on the other. Is there Saudi–Turkish coordination behind this move, and how should it be interpreted?
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Key Facts:
• On 17 December 2025, Lebanese media outlets revealed that Hezbollah’s head of Arab and international relations, Ammar al-Moussawi, conducted a secret visit to Saudi Arabia, reportedly brokered by Turkey, following his participation earlier that month in a conference in Istanbul.
• These reports were carried by media close to the Lebanese Forces party led by Samir Geagea, which is known for its proximity to Saudi Arabia, lending credibility to the information.
• In September 2025, Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem called on Saudi Arabia to “open a new page with the resistance” through frank dialogue addressing disputes on the basis that Israel is the common enemy.
• On 6 December 2025, al-Moussawi headed a Hezbollah delegation at the “Covenant for Jerusalem” conference. Information indicated that this was not his first such visit, as it was preceded by other trips by al-Moussawi and additional Hezbollah officials who met Turkish officials engaged in relaying messages between the party and Syria’s new leadership.
• Analysts stated that Turkey’s objective is to ensure that neither Iran nor Hezbollah plays any role in Syria’s coastal region, Homs, or any area that could destabilize the rule of Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa. In return, Turkey guarantees that the new Syrian leadership will pose no threat to Hezbollah.
• Observers at the time pointed out that the main obstacle to these efforts was that they were proceeding without coordination or agreement with key Arab states.
• The visit of a Hezbollah representative to Saudi Arabia confirms that Turkish mediation efforts are being conducted in full coordination and agreement with Riyadh, under the umbrella of their clear partnership in supporting the system of President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Syria.
• Observers believe that Riyadh and Ankara are seeking to “reorder” both the Syrian and Lebanese arenas simultaneously, manage the repercussions of the fall of the Assad regime in Damascus, and contain the decline in Hezbollah’s power following the “support war,” while redrawing the rules of stability in both countries.
• Analysts argue that the visit is taking place within a framework of coordination among Ankara, Tehran, and Riyadh, and on the basis of the “Beijing Agreement” of March 2023, which was reaffirmed during a Saudi–Iranian–Chinese follow-up meeting held in Tehran on 9 December 2025.
• Some assessments suggest that Iran and its ally in Lebanon are seeking to “take cover” within a regional environment represented by Turkey in Syria and Saudi Arabia in Lebanon, following Damascus’s break with Tehran after Assad’s fall and the deterioration of official Beirut–Tehran relations after the Lebanese foreign minister refused to visit Iran and proposed a meeting in a neutral third country.
• Informed Lebanese sources confirm that the balance of power no longer allows Hezbollah to impose conditions on Saudi Arabia or the region, and that Iran has an interest—under a Saudi ceiling—in preserving its influence through Hezbollah in Lebanon via a political formula, amid irreversible pressure to disarm the group.
• The sources say the visit took place with the knowledge of President Joseph Aoun and coordination with Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri.
• They further note that Saudi Arabia remains committed to its firm position: no reconstruction and no normalization of relations without Hezbollah’s disarmament. This was evident in the absence of reconstruction from the agenda of meetings held by Saudi representatives in Beirut.
• The development followed a summit on 12 December 2025 that brought together the presidents of Russia, Iran, and Turkey on the sidelines of the “International Forum for Peace and Trust” in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. While portrayed as a façade of trilateral alignment, the summit reflected Iran’s acceptance of a Turkish role in “normalizing” its regional and international relations.
• It also followed a visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to Tehran on 30 November 2025, amid reports of a forthcoming visit by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to Iran.
• It is believed that Saudi and Turkish positions—after the Saudi Crown Prince’s refusal to normalize relations in Washington and Turkey’s opposition to Netanyahu’s rejection of a Turkish presence in Gaza—against Israeli overreach in the region, as well as their shared concerns over Netanyahu’s policies, are driving both countries to harden a counter-front in Syria and Lebanon that includes them and does not exclude Iran.
• Diplomatic sources believe that despite the lack of clarity in Iran’s official position, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s message to the Saudi Crown Prince shortly before the latter’s meeting with the U.S. president in Washington reveals an Iranian “mandate” for Saudi mediation with Washington, and that the Hezbollah envoy’s visit to Riyadh forms part of this atmosphere.
• On 17 December 2025, Lebanese reports also spoke of preparations for a visit by Gebran Bassil, head of the Free Patriotic Movement and a former Hezbollah ally, to Riyadh—signaling a new Saudi policy in Lebanon.
• Observers believe that the Hezbollah envoy’s visit may also be interpreted as a Saudi signal rejecting the prospect of a new Israeli war against Hezbollah, which Netanyahu was said to seek U.S. approval for during an upcoming meeting with President Trump in Washington.
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Conclusion:
• The visit of a Hezbollah envoy to Saudi Arabia takes place amid Turkish mediation encompassing Iran’s and Hezbollah’s relationship with Syria’s new political order.
• The development follows the Hezbollah secretary-general’s call three months earlier for opening a new page with Saudi Arabia, widely viewed at the time as a direct Iranian signal.
• Riyadh and Ankara are believed to be seeking to reorder the Syrian and Lebanese arenas simultaneously, manage the fallout from Assad’s fall and Hezbollah’s weakened position after the “support war,” and redraw the rules of stability in both countries.
• Turkish and Saudi opposition to Netanyahu’s policies may necessitate the formation of a regional front that does not exclude Iran or its interests.
• Saudi Arabia is focused on providing a stable environment for Lebanon’s new political era and assessing Hezbollah’s capacity to adapt to new local, regional, and international conditions.
• Lebanese circles consider that the balance of power no longer favors Iran and its ally, and that Saudi Arabia will not pay political costs within Lebanon’s political system in exchange for Hezbollah’s weapons.
• The development follows a Saudi–Iranian–Chinese follow-up meeting in Tehran reaffirming the Beijing Agreement, as well as an Iranian presidential message to the Saudi Crown Prince interpreted as a request for mediation with Washington.
• The visit may also signal Saudi opposition to a new Israeli war against Hezbollah, which Netanyahu was reportedly seeking U.S. approval for during his forthcoming meeting in Washington.
