Hezbollah Conditions Disarmament on the Disarmament of Palestinian Factions

Policy Assessment: Progress Center for Policies

Introduction

A team affiliated with the Lebanese President has begun a dialogue with representatives of Hezbollah to discuss the potential handover of the group’s weapons to the Lebanese state. Some indications point to Hezbollah’s serious engagement in this dialogue and a willingness to discuss the optimal conditions and timing for disarmament. Among the concerns and reservations raised by the party is its anxiety over the arms held by Palestinian factions in Lebanon.

Key Findings

Sources indicate that negotiations are underway between President Joseph Aoun’s team and Hezbollah representatives on how to handle the group’s arms, with the goal of ultimately handing them over to the state, as stipulated in the President’s inaugural address on January 9, 2025, and the ministerial statement upon which Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government gained the confidence of Parliament on February 26, 2025—affirming the commitment to exclusive state control over weapons.

Information suggests that Hezbollah has begun discussing mechanisms, timing, and conditions for disarmament, acknowledging the inevitability of handing over its weapons to the Lebanese state. The party is reported to have made a strategic decision to operate once again within the framework of the state.

This new posture contrasts with earlier statements by Hezbollah leaders, including Deputy Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem, and contradicts a position expressed by Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani on April 17, 2025, in which he expressed reservations or opposition to the principle of disarmament.

Leaked details from the meetings between Aoun’s team and Hezbollah indicate that the party presented several observations that it called on the state to consider. Among them were concerns about the five locations in southern Lebanon where Israeli forces remain stationed, and the need to protect Shiite areas along the Syrian border from attacks recently carried out by forces and groups linked to the new Syrian regime.

Hezbollah raised the issue of Palestinian arms in Lebanon as a justification for its insistence on retaining “Shiite arms” to defend the Shiite community. Despite its rhetorical support for Palestine and the Palestinians, the group argued in meetings that Palestinian arms are “Sunni arms” and concentrated in refugee camps—especially Ain al-Hilweh near the city of Sidon—along the main route connecting Beirut’s Shiite suburbs to Shiite areas in southern Lebanon.
From the discussions, it was understood that Hezbollah is pushing for the disarmament of Palestinian factions as a prerequisite for its own disarmament—a position that has reportedly surprised many in the Palestinian community in Lebanon.

Lebanese sources say that the government and military intelligence have already opened the Palestinian arms file, beginning with the case of Hamas. On May 2, the Supreme Defense Council recommended warning Hamas against using Lebanese territory for activities that threaten national security. The government adopted this recommendation and took steps to implement it.
It was later reported that Lebanese security agencies (notably General Security and Military Intelligence) summoned Hamas representatives in Lebanon and informed them of the government’s decision to ban any military activity by the group and demanded the handover of those involved in launching rockets toward Israel. Hamas complied and has begun handing over the individuals in question.

On April 16, 2025, Military Intelligence arrested Palestinians in refugee camps in both southern and northern Lebanon in connection with the Jordan operation and with Hamas involvement in it.
Lebanese sources say that the ongoing process of addressing the Hamas arms issue—potentially extending to a full ban on its presence in Lebanon—will be followed by broader efforts to deal with all Palestinian arms in the country, especially those held by Fatah, the largest Palestinian organization in Lebanon. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is scheduled to visit Lebanon on May 21–22, 2025, with this issue expected to be a primary focus, and major decisions anticipated.

Behind-the-scenes dialogue is said to be taking place between the Lebanese government and Palestinian leaders in Lebanon via the “Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee” and Lebanese security agencies. Discussions reportedly extend beyond the arms issue to include the future civil status of Palestinians living in Lebanon.
Diplomatic sources monitoring the situation say that Iran, as part of its ongoing nuclear negotiations with the United States, is not obstructing Beirut’s efforts to address Hezbollah’s weapons. This was evident when the Iranian ambassador walked back a statement made on X on April 22 that was interpreted as opposing disarmament, and in his compliance with a summons from the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protesting his statement.
These sources add that Tehran is counting on a potential agreement with Washington that would provide an acceptable framework for managing the state’s approach to Hezbollah’s arms. Iran also sees this as an opportunity to rehabilitate Hezbollah’s political image in Lebanon and secure American recognition of the group as a legitimate Lebanese political party like any other.

Conclusion

A significant shift is being registered in Hezbollah’s stance—from outright rejection of disarmament to openness toward discussing the conditions, timing, and rules for handing over its weapons to the Lebanese state.
The group cites fears of siege-like conditions for Shiites, due to the new Sunni-dominated political and religious regime in Syria and the ongoing Israeli occupation of five areas in southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah points to the risk posed by arms inside Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, which could threaten the strategic connection between the Shiite-majority southern suburbs of Beirut and southern Lebanon.
The group is calling for the disarmament of Palestinian factions as a confidence-building step to alleviate Shiite and Hezbollah concerns before it proceeds with disarmament.
Hezbollah’s framing of Palestinian arms as “Sunni arms” reflects anxieties about shifting regional power dynamics and the rise of Sunni influence in Damascus.
Iran appears not to be obstructing the Lebanese state’s dialogue with Hezbollah on disarmament. This was demonstrated by the Iranian ambassador’s retreat from earlier objections.
Tehran is relying on its negotiations with Washington to help reposition Hezbollah as a recognized Lebanese political party, fully integrated into the national political system and accepted by the international community—including the United States.