From “Normalization Illusion” to “Imposed Security Arrangements”: Why Have Israeli Expectations of the Lebanese President Receded?

Assessment by Ameer Makhoul, Progress Center for Policies

Introduction
On the eve of announcing the ceasefire in Lebanon, U.S. President Donald Trump hinted at a direct political engagement track between Lebanon and Israel, referencing an anticipated phone call between Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and a possible meeting in Washington. However, this track quickly faded — the call never took place, and no credible indicators of an imminent meeting materialized. This reflects a stark gap between the political expectations promoted by Washington and Tel Aviv, and the Lebanese and regional realities that constrain any transition toward a political process or an “Abraham-style peace” with Lebanon.

Analysis
Confronted with popular anger — particularly within Israel’s right-wing circles — following the ceasefire announcement, Netanyahu reframed his rhetoric for a domestic audience. He sought to present the outcome as an incomplete achievement, centering on the hypothesis of an Abraham Peace with Lebanon on Israeli terms — a hypothesis that has historically remained outside the bounds of practical discourse. Available data suggests that approximately 70% of Israeli public opinion supported the continuation and escalation of the war at the moment the American decision was announced.

In practice, none of the indicators promoted regarding political engagement have materialized, nor does any genuine horizon for a peace process appear to exist. Rather, the Israeli approach tends toward redefining any potential relationship with Lebanon as stringent security arrangements closer to an “imposed security alliance,” backed by the United States.

On the ground, the Israeli military regards the ceasefire as an operational opportunity rather than a retreat. It allows the army to consolidate its hold over seized territories, prevent the return of displaced Lebanese civilians to border villages up to a depth of eight kilometers, and continue the destruction of villages — particularly in Shia-majority areas — under security pretexts. These policies fall within a military doctrine aimed at reshaping the demographic geography, consistent with historical precedents dating back to 1948, alongside efforts to “cleanse the area” of any military or logistical infrastructure belonging to Hezbollah — effectively imposing unilateral security arrangements.

At the strategic level, assessments from Israeli security figures — such as retired General Amos Yadlin — reflect an orientation toward decoupling the Lebanese front from the Iranian one, through establishing a buffer zone “free of Shia presence,” while viewing the military mission in Lebanon as nearing completion and asserting that priority should shift to Iran in the event of renewed confrontation. Meanwhile, Israeli diplomats such as Gilad Erdan have floated hypotheses concerning Iran’s possible abandonment of Hezbollah in the interest of regime preservation, alongside skepticism about the feasibility or realism of any political meeting between Netanyahu and Aoun.

In the media and analytical sphere, assessments within Israel pointing to the absence of a coherent strategy are growing in scope. A clear gap emerges between military achievements resulting from an overwhelming force advantage and the inability to translate these into sustainable political or strategic gains. Compounding this confusion is the fact that Israel has not conclusively settled any front to date, which deepens anxiety within public opinion. In this context, Israeli policy focuses on “security arrangements” while avoiding political commitments, with a clear inclination toward maintaining a military presence in southern Lebanon for the foreseeable future — even if this contradicts the disarmament slogan raised by the Israeli government.

Lebanon, for its part, maintains a sovereignty-based approach premised on full Israeli withdrawal to the international border, rejection of any imposed normalization formula, and keeping the Hezbollah file within a Lebanese domestic framework supported by Arab and international understandings. Israeli assessments themselves indicate that Lebanese factions regard any slide into internal armed conflict as a red line — in contrast to Israeli approaches that may push in that direction.
Within this context, certain Israeli right-wing circles — as reflected in the newspaper Yisrael Hayom — advance a harder vision for any future settlement, resting on three conditions: disarmament of Hezbollah, reinforcement and restructuring of the Lebanese army, and dismantlement of Palestinian refugee camps. These propositions reveal an attempt to redefine the roots of the conflict and link them to structural files that transcend direct border issues — most notably the Palestinian refugee question.

This dimension carries particular significance in light of Israeli policies pursued since the Gaza war of October 2023, characterized by a systematic approach to dismantling Palestinian refugee camps in Gaza and the northern West Bank. This fits within a broader framework targeting the closure of the refugee issue, the undermining of UNRWA’s role, the erasure of the right of return, and the cancellation of Palestinian statehood — all within a political vision backed by a Knesset majority that rejects a Palestinian state and enshrines the exclusivity of Jewish self-determination under the Nation-State Law.

Conclusions

Israeli assessments have reverted to downplaying expectations of a shift in the Lebanese position at the level of the President and Prime Minister. What Trump promoted and Netanyahu echoed regarding the possibility of an Abraham Peace with Lebanon remains, from the Lebanese perspective, a remote prospect.

A breakthrough in Lebanese-Israeli relations remains highly unlikely. Betting on divergent positions within Lebanese leadership will not produce such an outcome.
Israel continues to prioritize security arrangements over any political track, while entrenching long-term facts on the ground in southern Lebanon.

The range of assessments within Israel calling for prioritizing the Iranian file — rather than the Lebanese file, which is seen as derivative of the Iranian one — is widening.

The current Israeli condition reflects a strategic impasse, stemming from the absence of a political horizon and an excessive reliance on military instruments, which limits the possibility of converting battlefield gains into sustainable achievements