Transformations in the Use of Force in the International System and Their Implications for the Middle East
Mohamed Masharqa – Progress Center for Policies – London
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Executive Summary
The international system has undergone profound transformations over the past two decades in the place and function of military power within the architecture of international relations. After the end of the Cold War, a broad assumption prevailed in political and strategic literature that the world was moving toward an international order more heavily grounded in legal rules and multilateral institutions, and that the use of military force would remain governed by strict legal and political constraints derived from the UN Charter and the principle prohibiting the use of force in international relations. Yet developments in the international system since the beginning of the twenty-first century point to a different, more complex trajectory.
A succession of wars and military interventions has brought the practice of military power back to the center of international interactions as a primary instrument for managing conflicts and advancing political and strategic objectives and interests. These military precedents include the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; military interventions in Libya and Syria; the Russia–Ukraine war; Venezuela; repeated Israeli wars of annihilation in Gaza; and, ultimately, war against Iran. These developments suggest that the international system is witnessing a gradual shift from the model of strategic deterrence that characterized international relations during the Cold War toward a model that relies more on military coercion and the imposition of strategic realities by force.
In this context, a growing number of researchers have begun to point to a phenomenon that may be described as “strategic contagion”—that is, the transmission of patterns of force use from one state to another when states perceive that such patterns can achieve political aims without encountering decisive international deterrence. The Economist has warned that repetition of such military precedents may erode the international standards that once constrained the use of force, thereby encouraging other states to adopt similar approaches in international disputes.¹
This paper proceeds from the hypothesis that the international system is entering a transitional phase that may witness a deep redefinition of the rules governing the use of force in international relations. It seeks to analyze these shifts across three interconnected levels: first, the theoretical framework for the transition from deterrence to military coercion; second, an analysis of the military precedents the international system has witnessed since the end of the Cold War; and third, an examination of how these precedents may contribute to the spread of new patterns of strategic behavior among states.
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Introduction
The principle prohibiting the use of force constituted one of the foundational pillars of the international system that emerged after the Second World War. The UN Charter clearly stipulates that the use of force in international relations must remain confined to two main cases: self-defense in the event of an armed attack, or the use of force authorized by the UN Security Council to maintain international peace and security.
This principle helped entrench a normative conception of the international system in which relations among states were to be managed primarily through diplomatic and legal means, and in which military force should remain an exceptional option. Yet this conception began to face, gradually, a series of challenges after the end of the Cold War.
Since the 1990s, the international system has seen a growing number of military interventions carried out outside the framework of explicit Security Council authorization, as occurred in NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999. The larger turning point in this trajectory came with the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003, which sparked wide debate over the boundaries of legitimacy in the use of force in international relations.²
In subsequent years, such military precedents recurred in a range of international conflicts, from Libya and Syria to the Russia–Ukraine war. An analysis issued by the Progress Center for Policies in London noted that these developments reflect a deeper shift in the structure of the international system, as states increasingly rely on military force to reshape strategic balances across different regions.³
In this context, military force has no longer been used solely as a means of self-defense or a tool to deter adversaries; it has also become a means of imposing new political and strategic realities on the ground. This shift reflects a gradual change in the nature of the international system, where the normative constraints that once limited the use of force recede in favor of the rising logic of power in managing international relations.
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Theoretical Framework: From Deterrence to Military Coercion
The concept of deterrence constituted the cornerstone of military strategy during the Cold War. Deterrence rests on the idea that a state can prevent its adversary from taking a hostile step by threatening to impose a high cost that makes initiating that step irrational.
Thomas Schelling formulated this concept in his classic work Arms and Influence, emphasizing that deterrence depends on the ability to shape an adversary’s calculations by convincing it that the costs of military action will exceed any potential gains.⁴ This concept played a central role in managing the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Strategic literature, however, distinguishes between deterrence and another concept known as “military coercion.” While deterrence aims to prevent an adversary from doing something, coercion seeks to compel an adversary to change its behavior or accept a new political reality.
Alexander George argued that military coercion relies on a blend of military and political pressure designed to push an adversary toward a particular decision without resorting to full-scale war.⁵ This concept is useful for understanding many military operations the international system has witnessed over recent decades.
In many cases, the objective of using military force was not to destroy the adversary completely, but rather to compel it to alter its behavior or accept new political arrangements. This is what makes the concept of military coercion more suitable for understanding contemporary transformations in the use of force.
An analysis by the Progress Center for Policies further noted that the declining effectiveness of traditional deterrence is also linked to changes in the nature of contemporary wars. Technological developments in drones, precision missiles, and artificial intelligence have enabled limited military operations capable of achieving political objectives without sliding into comprehensive wars.⁶
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Military Precedents After the Cold War
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the international system has witnessed a series of military precedents that have contributed to redefining the boundaries of the use of force in international relations.
Afghanistan
The U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001 constituted a major turning point in international politics. The war came in response to the September 11 attacks, but it soon evolved into a long-term project to rebuild the Afghan state through military force.
This war demonstrated that military power can be used not only to respond to direct security threats, but also to reshape political systems in other parts of the world.
Iraq
The war on Iraq in 2003 represented an even more controversial precedent. It was justified through a set of strategic considerations and fabrications later exposed as false, including preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and reshaping political balances in the Middle East.
Many researchers have argued that this war weakened the constraints imposed by the international system on the use of force and reopened debate over the role of military power in reshaping regional political environments.⁷
Libya
In 2011, NATO used military force in Libya under the cover of a UN Security Council resolution to protect civilians. The operation, however, ended with the overthrow of Qaddafi’s regime, which raised extensive debate over the limits of Security Council mandates.
Syria
The Syrian war presented a more complex model of multi-party military intervention, in which several international and regional powers participated through direct military operations or by supporting local actors.
Researchers in policy centers have described the Syrian war as a model of contemporary conflicts in which local, regional, and international struggles overlap.⁸
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Strategic Contagion
In light of these repeated military precedents, some researchers have begun to point to a phenomenon that may be described as “strategic contagion.” By this concept they mean that the use of military force by one state may encourage other states to adopt the same approach if they perceive that such operations achieve political objectives without excessive costs.
Stephen Walt wrote that the erosion of constraints on the use of force may lead to the spread of a pattern of strategic behavior grounded in the belief that military power can be an effective means of achieving political objectives.⁹ In this context, The Economist warned that the repetition of military precedents may weaken the international norms that once constrained the use of force, thereby encouraging other states to follow the same course.¹⁰
However, this theory does not imply that all states will necessarily adopt the use of military force. The decision to resort to force remains linked to a set of political and strategic factors, including regional balances of power, the nature of the domestic political system, and international pressures.
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Limits of the Strategic Contagion Theory
Despite the importance of the concept of “strategic contagion” in interpreting certain ongoing transformations in international politics, the theory also faces a number of limitations.
First, international institutions—foremost among them the United Nations—still play an important role in regulating the use of force in international relations, particularly given that no alternative framework has yet emerged.
Second, the use of military force remains laden with substantial political and economic costs, which makes many states reluctant to resort to it.
Third, the strategic environment of each state differs from others, making it difficult to transfer models of force usage directly from one context to another.
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Conclusion of Part One
The transformations unfolding in the international system indicate that the world is entering a transitional phase that may redefine the rules governing the use of force in international relations. The relative decline of the constraints the international system imposed after the Second World War, alongside the intensification of competition among major powers, suggests the possibility that military power will return to play a more central role in shaping global balances of influence.
This shift does not necessarily mean a return to the pure logic of force that prevailed in the nineteenth century; rather, it points to the emergence of a more complex transitional phase in which legal, political, and strategic considerations overlap in defining the limits of the use of force.
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Part Two
“Strategic Contagion” and Its Implications for the Middle East and the International System
The Transfer of the Force-Use Model to Major Powers
The transformations discussed in Part One suggest that the use of military force has gradually returned to the center of international politics. Yet the importance of this phenomenon lies not only in the increasing number of military interventions, but also in the possibility that this behavioral pattern may spread to other international powers that regard these precedents as evidence that political gains can be achieved through the use of force.
A number of researchers in international relations have noted that major military precedents tend to shape what can be described as unwritten rules of conduct within the international system. When a great power uses military force to achieve political objectives without encountering decisive international deterrence, this may encourage other states to adopt the same approach.¹¹
In this context, three principal international powers can be identified as likely to be influenced by this shift in the rules governing the use of force: Russia, China, and Turkey. Each of these states possesses regional or global geopolitical ambitions, and each has demonstrated in recent years a growing willingness to use military force to pursue its strategic objectives.
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Russia
Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine is among the most prominent examples of the return of military force to the center of the international system. Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has demonstrated a readiness to use military power to reshape geopolitical balances in its regional neighborhood.
Some researchers have argued that the Russia–Ukraine war represents an attempt to redefine the European security order that took shape after the end of the Cold War.¹² It also reflects a Russian perception that the current international environment may permit the use of military force to impose new geopolitical realities.
An analysis by the Progress Center for Policies noted that the war in Ukraine represents one of the clearest manifestations of the international system’s shift from a phase of American primacy to a phase of major-power competition.³
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Turkey
Over the past decade, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a noticeable shift toward using military force as an instrument for achieving regional goals. Turkey has conducted a series of military operations in Syria and Iraq, intervened militarily in Libya, and supported Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
This shift indicates that Ankara has come to view military power as an effective means of protecting its strategic interests and enhancing its regional influence. Some scholars have described this orientation as part of a broader Turkish strategy aimed at redefining Turkey’s role as an influential regional power—one that shapes outcomes in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.¹³
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China
Although China historically remained more restrained in using military force beyond its borders, its economic and military rise over recent decades has made it a key actor in international strategic balances.
A number of studies have indicated that Beijing is closely monitoring the military precedents unfolding in international politics, especially regarding how major powers manage regional conflicts.¹⁴ In this context, Taiwan stands out as one of the most dangerous geopolitical files in the contemporary world.
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The China–Taiwan Case
The Taiwan issue is among the clearest examples of how the model of military coercion might migrate to other regions. China views Taiwan as an inseparable part of mainland China, and Chinese leaders have repeatedly stressed that national reunification is a core strategic objective of the Chinese state.
At the same time, Beijing recognizes that any attempt to impose reunification through large-scale military force could trigger a direct confrontation with the United States. Accordingly, some analyses suggest that China may adopt a gradual strategy based on limited military coercion rather than a direct invasion.
Scholar Oriana Skylar Mastro has argued that China may seek to employ a set of military, economic, and political tools to increase pressure on Taiwan, with the aim of pushing it to accept new political arrangements without entering a full-scale war.¹⁵
Such tools may include:
• Large-scale military exercises around the island
• The imposition of a limited naval blockade
• Cyber and economic warfare
• Intensified diplomatic pressure on states that recognize Taiwan
The Economist has warned that the success of such strategies could encourage other states to use military force to impose their territorial claims.¹⁶
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Implications of the Shift for the Middle East
The Middle East is among the regions most affected by ongoing transformations in the nature of force usage in the international system. The region’s geopolitical position and the overlap of international and regional interests within it make it a principal arena for testing major shifts in the rules of the international order.
Iran
The military escalation and confrontation between Israel and Iran constitutes one of the clearest manifestations of the evolving nature of regional conflict. Military operations—such as airstrikes and cyberattacks—have become a core component of how this conflict is managed.
An analysis by the Progress Center for Policies argued that this pattern reflects a shift toward what might be called **“war below the traditional threshold of full-scale war.”**¹⁷
Israel
Israel is among the states most reliant on military power as an instrument for achieving its strategic and security objectives. Israeli military operations in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria have formed part of a strategy intended to prevent adversaries from developing military capabilities that could threaten Israeli security.
However, this mode of force usage may also reinforce a wider logic of power in the management of regional conflicts.
The Gulf
Gulf states face growing strategic challenges in light of ongoing shifts in the international system. On the one hand, these states remain heavily dependent on the U.S. security umbrella. On the other hand, they seek to diversify their international relationships by strengthening cooperation with powers such as China, India, and Russia.
In this context, Gulf states may play an important role in shaping regional balances during the coming phase.¹⁸
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Future Scenarios for the International System Until 2035
Current trends in international politics suggest that the international system may move toward one of three principal pathways over the coming decade.
Scenario One: A Multipolar Order
In this scenario, an international system forms based on power balances among several major powers, such as the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union.
Scenario Two: The Spread of Military Coercion
In this scenario, the use of limited military force becomes a common instrument for imposing new strategic realities, which could increase the number of regional conflicts.
Scenario Three: Rebuilding the Rules-Based International Order
In this scenario, the dangers of major military conflicts push states to reinforce international institutions and revive a rules-based international order.
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Strategic Lessons for Decision-Makers in the Middle East
In light of the ongoing transformations in the international system, several strategic lessons emerge for decision-makers in the Middle East.
First, the international strategic environment is likely to witness increasing instability over the coming decade.
Second, regional states need to develop more independent security strategies rather than relying entirely on external alliances.
Third, building strong state institutions remains one of the most important foundations of stability in a changing international environment.
An analysis by the Progress Center for Policies emphasized that strengthening national state institutions on the basis of genuine democratic rules constitutes one of the most important conditions for political stability in the Middle East.¹⁹
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Conclusion of Part Two
The transformations unfolding in the international system indicate that the world is entering a transitional phase that may redefine the rules governing the use of force in international relations. The relative decline of the constraints imposed after the Second World War, alongside the intensification of competition among major powers, suggests the possibility that military power will once again play a more central role in shaping global balances of influence.
However, this shift does not necessarily imply a return to the pure logic of force that prevailed in previous centuries. Rather, it points to the emergence of a more complex phase in which legal, political, and strategic considerations overlap.
In this context, understanding the ongoing transformations in the nature of force usage becomes essential for grasping the future of the international system and its regional balances over the coming decades.
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Footnotes and References (Part One)
1. The Economist, “The Changing Rules of War,” 2026.
2. Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford University Press, 2013).
3. Progress Center for Policies, “Transformations of the International System After the Cold War.”
4. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966).
5. Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion (USIP Press, 1991).
6. Progress Center for Policies, “Transformations of Deterrence in the International System.”
7. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
8. Progress Center for Policies, “The Syrian War and the Reshaping of the Regional Order.”
9. Stephen Walt, “The Return of Power Politics,” Foreign Affairs.
10. The Economist, analysis on the erosion of norms in war.
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Footnotes and References (Part Two)
11. Hal Brands, “Great Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs.
12. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
13. Soner Cagaptay, The New Sultan: Erdogan and the Crisis of Modern Turkey.
14. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap?
15. Oriana Skylar Mastro, The Costs of Conversation.
16. The Economist, analysis on China and Taiwan.
17. Progress Center for Policies, Position Assessment: The Iran–Israel Escalation.
18. Progress Center for Policies, “International Competition in the Middle East.”
19. Progress Center for Policies, “Transformations of the State in the Middle East.”
